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Just like Nature: Habit and the Art of Life 
Daniel Manfred del Nido 
 
In this dissertation, I will examine the conceptions of philosophy of the 19th and 20th 
Century thinkers Félix Ravaisson, Henri Bergson, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and their 
implications for contemporary theories of religious ethics and philosophical practice, especially 
that of Pierre Hadot. In doing so, I will elucidate their understanding of both the goals of 
philosophical practice and the means by which they are achieved, focusing in particular on the 
importance of the body in their respective theories of philosophical practice. Specifically, I argue 
that Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of philosophical practice are grounded in 
an understanding of habit as a dynamic process of producing and transforming bodily dispositions 
that problematizes distinctions between self and world and limits attempts to achieve conscious 
self-mastery. As a result, their work calls into question the extent to which self-conscious 
cultivation of intellectual and bodily habits that conform to an ideal self-conception is either 
possible or desirable, and instead affirms a conception of philosophical practice as what I term 
“indefinite self-cultivation.” 
In chapter one, I examine Félix Ravaisson’s conception of philosophical practice in 
relationship to his theory of habit, which he claims originates as a principle of desire that gives 
rise to bodily spontaneity. This theory of habit underlies a conception of philosophical practice as 
imitation of models of ideal conduct through which habits of inventive conduct that outstrip 
capacities for rational deliberation are produced. In chapter two, I contrast Ravaisson’s conception 
of habit with Henri Bergson’s, who regards habit as a form of bodily memory that produces 
automaticity. Philosophical practice for Bergson resists the effects of habit on thought and action 





movement that generates new ideas and new forms of life. In chapter three, I examine Merleau-
Ponty’s intermediate position between these theories of habit, and his argument that the fluid 
nature of habituation as a process of social interaction makes living according to a determinate 
way of life possible only at the risk of doing violence to oneself. For Merleau-Ponty, philosophy 
entails critical practice of interrogating and expressing affects and immediate responses to events 
that serves as a way to question consciously-held values and uncover new personal and social 
possibilities. Finally, in chapter four, I conceptualize Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s 
theories of philosophical practice as forms of indefinite self-transformation by putting their work 
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“Plato scolded a boy for playing knuckle-bones. He replied, ‘You are scolding me over a small 
matter.’ ‘Habit,’ Plato said, ‘is not a small matter.’” 
- Montaigne, On Habit: And on Never Easily Changing a Traditional Law1 
 
If the interest in conceiving of philosophy as both a theoretical and a lived practice has 
blossomed over the past two decades, it is not simply because doing so unearths marginalized 
traditions within the history of philosophy. Rather, many of those who have turned to studying 
Greco-Roman conceptions of philosophy as therapy or as an art of life have done so from a sense 
that linking philosophy to one’s life is, in the words of Pierre Hadot, the scholar and philosopher 
whose work first gave insight into these traditions, an “elementary human need.”2 In Hadot’s now 
famous interpretation, philosophy in antiquity was not practiced simply as a theoretical discipline 
but as a way of shaping and transforming one’s subjectivity.3  Philosophical theories, doctrines, 
and arguments had the goal not simply or even primarily of informing people of particular truths 
but of forming them according to an ideal state of existence he refers to as “wisdom.” Hadot argues 
moreover that his model of lived philosophy is not simply a historical artifact of the ancient world 
but, to use William James’ term, a “live option” for the present.4 Hadot believes that his conception 
of a philosophical life transcends the divisions between “ancient” and “modern” and can still be 
                                                          
1 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. M.A. Screech (New York: Penguin, [1991] 2003), p. 124. 
 
2 Pierre Hadot, Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002), p. 365. 
 
3 For the most important and general statements of Hadot’s theory of philosophy as a way of life and his 
interpretation of ancient philosophy see especially Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Michael Chase 
(Malden: Blackwell, 1995), Pierre Hadot What is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), and for a helpful introduction to his thought see Arnold Davidson, “Spiritual 
Exercises and Ancient Philosophy: An Introduction to Pierre Hadot,” Critical Inquiry, 16 (3), 1990: 475-482. 
 
4 William James “The Will to Believe,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: 






practiced, even if the content of particular theories has radically changed.5 The philosophical 
search for wisdom, clarity, and tranquility is not merely a historical curiosity but is in fact 
permanently available. 
Though many have criticized particular aspects of his conception of philosophy as a way 
of life, the majority of the theorists who have responded to Hadot’s work agree with his basic 
assertion that philosophy can be practiced not just in the classroom or in the text, but in one’s life.6 
In making these claims, these theorists in no way argue that philosophy must be conceived as a 
practical activity, even less exclusively so. What the past two decades has seen is instead a 
continual attempt to open both the theoretical and the practical space for understanding what 
philosophy practiced as a way of life has been, and what it could potentially become. In attempting 
to open this space, scholars, often with different and even conflicting theoretical commitments, 
have articulated a number of different conceptions of philosophy as a lived practice. In this 
dissertation, I add to this discussion by articulating and defending a conception of philosophical 
practice as what I will call “indefinite self-cultivation.” I will do so through an examination of the 
concepts of philosophy of three 19th and 20th Century thinkers, Félix Ravaisson, Henri Bergson, 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Each of these thinkers treats philosophy as not merely a theoretical 
activity but as a lived practice, something that affects one’s overall conduct along with one’s ways 
                                                          
5 Pierre Hadot “La philosophie est-elle un luxe?”, in Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique, p. 365, Hadot, 
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique?, pp. 392-407. 
 
6 See for instance Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: Overview of a Work in Progress,” in Ethics: 
Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997: 253-280), p. 260, Martha Nussbaum, 
The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 
1, Richard Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (New York: Routledge, 
1997), p. 3, Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), p. 2, John Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of 
Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury, [2003] 2009), pp. 173-175, and Richard Sorabji, “Is Stoic Philosophy Helpful as 
Psychotherapy?”, in Richard Sorabji ed. Aristotle and After, BCIS Supplement 68 (London: Institute of Classical 





of thinking. What makes their concepts of philosophy distinct, however, is that the goals of their 
philosophical practice go beyond assimilation of oneself to a particular way of life and instead 
entail continual self-transformation. Philosophical practice for Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty does not simply consist of giving one’s ways of thinking, feeling, perceiving, and acting a 
particular form but moreover involves their constant and open-ended change. I intend in this 
dissertation to elucidate their conceptions of philosophical practice as indefinite self-
transformation and to draw out their implications for contemporary theories of philosophical 
practice, particularly that of Pierre Hadot. 
In making this argument, I will focus on the concept of habit and its role in philosophical 
practice in the work of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty as a perspective from which to 
critically examine Hadot’s and other conceptions of philosophical practice. Specifically, I will 
argue that these thinkers develop conceptions of habit that call into question both the goal of 
philosophical practice for Hadot and the efficacy of the practices by which it is achieved. 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty conceive of habit as a process whereby repeated acts and 
affections are retained within subjects that produces and transforms dispositions in a fluid and 
continuous fashion. While each thinker conceptualizes this process in different ways, they all 
recognize that habit is an essential element of human selfhood that operates independently from 
consciousness and gives rise to constant changes in our ways of being. As a result, undertaking 
philosophical practice to achieve a particular state of being will always produce something either 
beyond or different from what can be consciously intended. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty all demonstrate how the process of habituation causes projects of philosophical practice to 
produce unpredictable results and thus limits the extent to which it is possible, and even desirable, 





of openness not only in regards to how philosophical commitments might be expressed, but 
moreover to creative change within those commitments themselves that do not arise solely from 
rational reflection but rather from the dynamics of habituation as a process. 
My intention in investigating the work of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty is both 
to articulate and defend their conception of philosophy as indefinite self-cultivation, and to argue 
for the importance of an understanding of habit to future conceptions of philosophy as a lived 
practice. In this regard, I situate my discussion of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work 
as a response to Richard Shusterman’s plea to theorize lived philosophical practice not as a “one-
sided life of the mind” but as including the body as an element of the philosophical way of life.7 
My analysis of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty expands upon his turn to the body by 
discussing how their understandings of habit as a process and as an element of the human self can 
influence our understanding of philosophical self-transformation. I hope to demonstrate that habit 
complicates not only attempts at gaining intellectual self-mastery over the body but also at 
achieving somatic self-perfection, and instead points towards new ways of understanding 
philosophical practice as a continuous and open-ended process. In this introduction, I will first 
articulate in provisional fashion my understanding of philosophical practice as indefinite self-
cultivation. I will then provide a sketch of how Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty ground 
theories of habit in accounts of the effects of repetition on the human body, and finally outline the 
argumentative and chapter structure of this dissertation. 
1. Philosophical Practice as Indefinite Self-Cultivation 
 
                                                          
7 Richard Shusterman, Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 15-16. Shusterman names Hadot, Nussbaum, Nehamas, and Cavell as 





In identifying philosophical practice for Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty as 
“indefinite” self-cultivation, I contrast the goal of their philosophical practice with types of 
philosophical practice which seek to produce a “defined” or “formed” self. This contrast should 
not be taken, however, as crude opposition. I do not wish to suggest that the thinkers I study in this 
dissertation valorize radical self-contradiction or incoherence. Rather, the kinds of self-cultivation 
they articulate result in ways of being that exceed the boundaries of form or definition in different 
ways and to varying degrees. The goal of philosophical practice cannot simply be identified 
therefore with assimilating oneself to a particular self-conception that is expressed in actions, or 
with reshaping one’s habits of thought according to a rational standard, but instead allows space 
for continual change and even transformation of dispositions and forms of character. In this section 
I intend to provide a preliminary conception of what indefinite philosophical practice involves by 
contrasting it with some existing conceptions of philosophical practice that involve different 
notions of definition or form. Marking these relationships will not only illuminate the theoretical 
terrain on which this dissertation is built, but also clarify some of the presuppositions of 
contemporary theories of philosophical practice. 
Beginning with the basic notion of “form” or “definition,” take the elucidation of the 
concept of “form” in Sabina Lovibond’s “practical-reason” view of ethics as: “a structure such that 
the person in whom it is present will know (insofar as anyone ever does) how they should act 
‘occasion by occasion,’ even if they cannot state any fully explicit, exceptionless principle from 
which, on a given occasion, the relevant bit of knowledge is deduced.”8 Lovibond’s definition of 
form is normative rather than substantive, but it offers some helpful indications of what the notion 
                                                          
8 Lovibond equates the terms “form” and “definition” in her work, contrasting them with “formlessness” or 






entails. First, “form” implies a structure or pattern whose ideal is a perfectly rational principle that 
admits of no exceptions. A defined character exhibits consistency and regularity in its actions, such 
that it can be said to act the same even as circumstances change. As she clarifies later, a formed 
character acts according to what is “essential” to a given form such as justice or bravery regardless 
of the circumstance.9 A formed character’s actions thus preserve whatever is essential to the 
particular ideal or virtue by which it is formed. And second, form entails knowledge of how to act 
in different circumstances. Whether or not one can articulate this knowledge in any given case, 
insofar as one’s character or way of life is “formed” one possesses some kind of knowledge that 
guides one’s actions. Along with consistency and predictability in one’s behavior, a formed person 
is ideally the “author” of her acts, in that she can take responsibility for them and provide an 
account of them.10 
 With regards to the first aspect of the notion of form, the notion of indefiniteness I espouse 
in this dissertation again does not simply mean the opposite of inconsistency or incoherence. 
Instead, it relaxes the ideal of perfect norm-governed action and instead is open to a greater range 
of situational and improvisational acts. In other words, normative behavior tends less towards 
rational deducibility but has greater space for actions whose relationship with the ideal is felt or 
intuited, as well as for experimentation in one’s ways of acting.11 The connection of form to 
essence is also loosened, as ways of living in accordance with one’s ideal might emerge through 
experimentation or improvisation. An indefinite conception of philosophical practice will thus 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p. 69. 
 
10 As Lovibond says, to be the author of one’s acts, the acts must not only be consistent but the actor must satisfy a 
“more demanding psychological criterion” regarding her relationship with her acts, ibid., p. 85. 
 
11 In deference to Wittgenstein’s critique of the notion of “rule-following,” Lovibond recognizes “inexplicit” 
responses to moral situations as legitimate expressions of formed character, and prefers the language of norms over 





affirm a greater degree of unpredictability in the philosophical life than the “defined” or “formed” 
way of life does. As a result, it will also attempt to conceive of the ideal of the philosophical life 
on a model other than that of a principle that admits of no exceptions. While a way of living will 
still guide the philosopher’s conduct, the ideal on which that life is based will be open to changes 
in the ways it is expressed, perhaps even continual changes. Consistency and regularity is balanced 
with recognition of the need to abandon patterns of action that have become ossified or irrelevant 
to one’s circumstances or to create new patterns of action. Indefinite philosophical practice 
therefore does not reject the notion of form, but opens it to unforeseeable changes to one’s way of 
living according to the ideal. 
The ways the second aspect of form would be changed in indefinite philosophical practice 
follow from the changes to the first. What constitutes “knowledge” of how to act in a particular 
case is further opened to include such mental resources as intuition, aesthetic taste, or other 
affective forms of experience that can provide guidance to one’s ways of acting. Likewise, it also 
allows for cases in which no prior knowledge of how to act is possible or desirable, and where one 
proceeds by experimentation or improvisation rather than in ways whose norm is deliberation. As 
a result, the responsible authorship standard for action is relaxed, such that indefinite self-
cultivation not only accepts but has the space to affirm cases where actions can only be justified 
by aesthetic criteria, or cases where justification can occur only after actions have been completed.  
Differentiating the conception of philosophical practice I will articulate and defend in this 
dissertation from the concept of form or definition as Lovibond articulates provides helpful 
suggestions for what indefinite self-cultivation entails. I will now further specify what I mean by 
indefinite self-cultivation by elucidating two aspects of it that arise from contrast with Lovibond’s 





receptivity to bodily influence. I will continue to proceed by relating each aspect of indefinite self-
cultivation to a current theorist of philosophical practice, in order to provide greater clarity to the 
kinds of philosophical practice Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty advocate. 
The first way indefinite philosophical practice differs from current conceptions is that it is 
open. I elucidate the notion of openness by contrasting it with the unity attributable to the 
“character” resulting from Alexander Nehamas’ conception of philosophy as “aesthetic self-
fashioning.” Aesthetic self-fashioning understands philosophical practice as construction of a 
model of aesthetic perfection from which one’s conduct and self-understanding follows. This 
model is not created ex nihilo, but drawn together from the various apparently meaningless 
moments of one’s life in order to give them a unique and consistent form.12 As a result, self-
fashioning tends towards unity and individuality. The goal of philosophical practice is to move 
from formlessness in one’s biography to a form that provides coherence to one’s history and an 
orientation for one’s future actions. Philosophical practice produces, in other words, what 
Nehamas calls a “character” understood not in terms of moral character but as a literary character 
that forms the self dispersed throughout its life into an individual unity, a “set of features and a 
mode of life” that differentiate oneself from others and make one memorable.13 As his repeated 
use of metaphors such as “self-fashioning” and “stylization” suggest, literary self-presentation for 
Nehamas becomes the basis of one’s behavior.14 For Nehamas, self-formation can thus be taken 
                                                          
12 The goal of philosophical practice is in Nehamas’ words to “be like no one else, before…or after.” Alexander 
Nehamas, The Art of Living, p. 11. 
 
13 Ibid., p. 5.  
 
14 Nehamas draws the notion of style from Nietzsche’s exhortation to “give style” to one’s character, see Alexander 
Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 185, cf. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 290. Hutter’s study of 
Nietzsche’s conceptions of “self-shaping” add to Nehamas’ by focusing on the political aspirations behind them 
(Horst Hutter, Shaping the Future: Nietzsche’s New Regime of the Soul and Its Ascetic Practices [New York: 





in two senses, first as providing one’s life with a form that gives it determinacy, and as inhabiting 
an aesthetic form that makes it beautiful, together resulting in a harmony of thought and action 
that differentiates one from others. 
 The notion of aesthetic self-fashioning is significant for my purposes in that Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty all analogize the practice of philosophy to that of the artist. Whereas 
self-fashioning for Nehamas entails articulating a character that determines one’s conduct in a 
linear fashion, however, the philosophical life as the thinkers discussed in this dissertation 
understand it entails a much greater degree of openness to actions that do not directly follow one’s 
model of conduct. Philosophical practice for Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty entails 
constant production of new forms of action associated with one’s philosophical commitments. The 
fixity and unity of the solid, statuesque character Nehamas idealizes will thus be replaced with 
openness to change, even constant change, in possibilities for a philosophical life, albeit to varying 
degrees. Whereas for Ravaisson philosophical practice entails spontaneous invention of news ways 
of acting in accordance with one’s ideal self-model, Bergson sees the goal of philosophy as the 
creation of new ways of living, and Merleau-Ponty as the uncovering of possibilities implicit 
within one’s social world. These forms of philosophical practice exhibit varying degrees of 
structure, but they all involve continual change in the actions and dispositions associated with 
them. Philosophical self-cultivation does not tend towards solidity and unity in one’s conduct but 
is open to development and transformation. 
To the unpredictability of indefinite philosophical practice I contrast the way the result of 
philosophical practice can be anticipated in advance in Martha Nussbaum’s “therapeutic” 
conception of philosophy. Unlike Nehamas, the goal of philosophical practice for Nussbaum is not 





replacing them with “healthy” ones, and is motivated by the “urgency of human suffering.”15 In 
order to cure their patients, philosophers operate with normative conceptions of human flourishing 
or eudaimonia that function as criteria for assessing health and sickness, and it allows the result of 
successful philosophical practice to be marked out in advance. Even though the course of 
treatment, which Nussbaum refers to as “therapeutic arguments,” are applied situationally, with 
respect to the particular malfunctions in belief and desire with which a patient presents, the goal 
in each case of treatment is the same: to expose the false beliefs that give rise to unhealthy desires 
and to replace them with true ones.16 Specifically, therapeutic arguments cure misdirected desires 
and disturbed emotions by going to their source, the false or misleading beliefs to which one has 
become habituated through socialization.17 A patient who has been “cured” of her disease through 
philosophical therapy is one who achieve a state of “self-sufficiency” and “flourishing” that results 
from living life consistently and according to one’s inherent nature.18 
 We will see that Bergson in particular and Merleau-Ponty to a lesser extent offers 
something like a philosophical therapy in that they isolate a negative condition it is the goal of 
philosophical practice to alleviate. What differentiates the thinkers I study from Nussbaum, 
however, is that the results of philosophical practice are unpredictable and cannot be defined in 
advance. Philosophical practice produces something unanticipated, a form of action or possibility 
that could not be articulated prior to its performance. To use the language of contemporary 
                                                          
15 Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, p. 15. 
 
16 In her discussion of Epicurus Nussbaum compares the effect of therapeutic argument to that of Proust’s 
examinations of habit, in which the soul is left “raw and unprotected, simply perceiving itself.” (The Therapy of 
Desire, p. 199) Williams, however, doubts how much ancient forms of therapy have to say to the modern subject in 
the wake of its interpretations by Christianity, Romanticism, and psychoanalysis among other doctrines (Bernard 
Williams, “Do Not Disturb,” London Review of Books, 16 (20), 20 October 1994: 25-26.  
 
17 Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, p. 39.  
 





philosophers of creativity, the results of philosophical practice will be more or less “original,” not 
derivable from a previous set of ideas or elements.19 Whereas the doctor can identify states of 
health and therefore knows that the result of therapy will be beforehand, philosophy for Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty is closer to an improvisational practice where the philosophical life 
emerges through the practice of philosophy itself. While each philosopher will outline a goal for 
philosophical practice to achieve, the criteria by which success in achieving that goal can be 
measured will not be as neatly objective as for Nussbaum. The philosophical life for these thinkers 
is better understood as operating within a dialectic of freedom and constraint in which particular 
acts or dispositions will be more or less recognizable as conforming to a particular self-model or 
state of existence, with the possibility of an individual action developing the model in an 
unforeseen yet consistent direction.  
The final aspect of philosophical practice as indefinite self-cultivation is its receptivity to 
bodily influence. This feature I do not contrast but associate with Richard Shusterman’s conception 
of philosophical practice as somaesthetics, which he defines as “critical meliorative study of one’s 
experience and use of one’s body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation (aesthesis) and 
creative self-fashioning.”20 As a form of self-fashioning, somaesthetics bears great similarity to 
Nehamas’ model of philosophical practice, though Shusterman focuses directly on the body as a 
site of fashioning rather than indirectly through the medium of literary self-creation. In conceiving 
of the body as a locus of aesthetic experience in its own right, however, Shusterman takes seriously 
bodily subjectivity as a basis of self-expression. Ideals of perfection are to be expressed not simply 
                                                          
19 Originality, as Bence states, is an attribute of the products of mental or physical processes, whereas creativity is an 
attribute of the subjective experience of those processes (Nanay Bence, “An Experiential Account of Creativity,” in 
Elliot Paul and Scott Kaufman eds. The Philosophy of Creativity: New Essays [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014: 17-38], p. 19). 
 





in one’s words or even in one’s acts but also in one’s bodily “style,” the “intentionality” or “spirit” 
that animates one’s ways of behaving and gives them a unique quality.21 Furthermore, the body is 
taken as its own independent criteria of perfection to be combined with mentally-derived aesthetic 
models of perfection. Cultivating consciousness of one’s bodily states allows aesthetic perfection 
of the body’s “functioning at its happy best” through recognition of pleasures, pains, and other 
bodily “pathologies” and training to eliminate what is harmful, a regime of training Shusterman 
refers to as the art of living.22 Bodily experience in Shusterman’s work becomes an influence thus 
not only on the expression of models of aesthetic perfection in one’s conduct but also in their 
production. 
While the philosophers I study in this dissertation do not go as far as Shusterman in 
articulating a bodily form of self-perfection, their theories of habit result in a similar recognition 
of the influence of the body and bodily processes on philosophical practice. Indeed, their analyses 
of habit provide the theoretical basis for explaining why philosophical practice is open and 
unpredictable. Conceiving of habit as a process of retaining repeated actions and affections allows 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty to grasp its ongoing effects upon the self and upon 
attempts at self-cultivation in a way that I will argue is more nuanced than Shusterman’s own 
understanding of bodily style and habit. Habit, as I will describe in more detail in the following 
section, is an autonomous process that occurs independently from and at times in active opposition 
to conscious awareness and therefore has important effects, both helpful and harmful, on efforts at 
active self-cultivation. In attempting to enumerate and account for these effects, Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty also attend to bodily influence on the process and products of self-
                                                          
21 Richard Shusterman, Thinking Through the Body: Essays in Somaesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), p. 334. 
 





cultivation, though I will argue that their accounts of habit complicate efforts like Shusterman’s to 
gain conscious awareness of one’s own body and to shape it according to a particular model. 
At stake in these conceptions of philosophical practice, I argue, is whether it is possible 
and indeed desirable to actively and self-consciously work on oneself with the goal of providing a 
determinate form to one’s conduct, or whether such projects will produce either something other 
or beyond than what they intend, or in fact have some negative effect upon those who undertake 
them. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of habit give insight into the ways the 
body and bodily processes affect the processes of self-cultivation in ways that give rise to its 
fluidity and unpredictability. In analyzing their conceptions of philosophical practice, I will 
demonstrate that embedded within their work are reasons why the philosophical life tends towards 
indefiniteness in the sense I have sketched in this section. Through critical examination of current 
theories of self-cultivation not only in philosophy but also in the study of religious ethics in Chapter 
Four, I will argue that Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of philosophical 
practice give insight into both the possibilities and the limits of philosophical practice and 
embodied practice more generally construed as an active, goal-oriented process.  
Also at stake is the goal of the philosophical life, the aim of giving one’s character a certain 
form or allowing it to be transformed in what I am calling an “indefinite” fashion. Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty go beyond articulating conceptions of philosophical practice that 
entail continuous and unpredictable change and furthermore argue for why the philosophical life 
should be conceived of in this manner. Investigation of their work will thus afford an opportunity 
to reflect upon current conceptions of philosophical practice, the notions of subjectivity they affirm 
or presuppose, and whether the particular picture of self-cultivation that will emerge in this 





Pierre Hadot will be a constant conversation partner in this dissertation, not only because of his 
centrality to current conceptions of philosophical practice, but more importantly because of the 
role Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty play in his own thought. Hadot returns to the thinkers 
discussed in this dissertation at various points in his work as examples of philosophers who treat 
philosophy as a lived discipline in a manner that extends the ancient tradition into the modern age. 
In fact, these three thinkers are crucial to his argument for the permanence of the notion of 
philosophy as a way of life, as for Hadot the existential concerns motivating their conceptions of 
philosophy are shared with the ancients. In the course of investigating Ravaisson, Bergson, and 
Merleau-Ponty’s forms of philosophical practice, I will critically examine Hadot’s interpretation 
of their work from the perspective of their theories of habit in order to put the originality of their 
understandings of the goals of the philosophical life and the issues that they believe animate it into 
sharper relief.  
Examining these issues from the perspective of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s 
theories of habit is particularly relevant in this case as the concept of habit is crucial to Hadot’s 
understanding of the problems philosophical practice attempts to solve. Bergson and Merleau-
Ponty in particular represent according to Hadot a continuation of the tradition stretching back to 
antiquity that opposes everyday, “habitual” ways of perceiving and engaging with the world to the 
philosopher’s conscious lucidity.23 For Hadot, the overarching goal of philosophy as a way of life 
is to achieve a “total transformation of one’s vision, lifestyle, and behavior” that entails “a state of 
complete liberation from the passions, of utter lucidity, of knowledge of ourselves and of the 
                                                          
23 This argument is made most clearly in Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique, pp. 346-356, cf. Pierre Hadot, 
La voile d’Isis: Essai sur l’histoire de l’idée de la nature (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), pp. 279-284. Hadot also argues 
that the “aesthetic” mode of perception he argues is most fully developed in Bergson finds a precursor in Ravaisson, 





world.”24 Hadot’s understanding of the goal of philosophy is existential: the philosopher is defined 
by her mode of being, her recognition of herself as free and rational and her control over her ways 
of thinking, feeling, acting, and even perceiving. Achieving this state requires “tearing oneself 
away” from ways of being in which one is identified with one’s everyday concerns and in which 
practical need and selfish desire govern one’s conduct, a state of existence that Hadot argues that 
is governed by habit and that it is the task of philosophy to overcome.25 While for Hadot achieving 
conscious self-mastery is the very essence of the philosophical life, however, we will see 
throughout this dissertation that when situated in the context of their theories of habit, Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s forms of philosophical practice affirm the freedom and joy that 
they claim arises from their “indefinite” forms of philosophical practice over rational self-mastery. 
Although these thinkers all hearken back to antiquity, particularly to the figure of Socrates, in their 
articulations of philosophical practice, their theories of embodiment transform ancient conceptions 
of philosophy and reveal strikingly different concerns and aims for the philosophical life. I will 
conclude my argument in Chapter Four by defending the goals and methods of their forms of 
philosophical practice as interpreted through their theories of embodied subjectivity, which allow 
for more sustainable harmonization between philosophical commitments and everyday practical 
and social concerns than Hadot’s attempt to deploy their conceptions of philosophy to provide 
contemporary justification for the ancient opposition between reason and the passions. 
2. Habit and Self-Cultivation 
 
I stated earlier that Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s forms of “indefinite” self-
cultivation are not grounded in an aesthetic idealization of incoherence or equivocity for their own 
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sakes. Nor do they take their inspiration from the cognitive embrace of paradox in the structure of 
the cosmos, society, or the self.26 Their projects are instead animated by an even more basic issue, 
namely that which Richard Shusterman puts in the mouth of Socrates: what is the “self” that is to 
be cultivated?27 Or to use Foucault’s language, what is the “ethical substance” on which practice 
will work to achieve a particular ideal?28 Even prior to any issues in our behavior that we might 
find to be imperfect and require improvement, we must ask what the object of ethical practices 
will be, or in what aspect(s) of ourselves will we find the issues that it will be the task of practice 
to resolve. For Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty, this is not an idle or a merely theoretical 
question. Each of them claims that the potential success of self-cultivation depends upon knowing 
what the true basis of our behavior is, and on understanding how and to what extent it can be 
shaped through consciously-undertaken practice. These concerns are neatly summarized by a 
statement Socrates makes to Alcibiades regarding his education: “if we know ourselves, then we 
might know how to cultivate (epimeleian) ourselves, but if we do not know ourselves, then we 
never will.”29 If the soul is what we truly are as Socrates insists, and if our states of character 
depend therefore upon the state of our soul, then it will be a mistake, for instance, to cultivate the 
body in order to achieve virtue. Cultivating ourselves requires knowledge of what we truly are and 
                                                          
26 As Matthew Bagger has argued is the case in a cross-cultural swath of ascetic and mystical forms of self-
cultivation. In Bagger’s “deflationary” interpretation, the response of religious thinkers to conceptual paradox is 
related to their attitudes towards social boundaries and the boundaries between self and other, and various strategies 
for harnessing or transcending paradox are formed in this crucible, see Matthew Bagger, The Uses of Paradox: 
Religion, Self-Transformation, and the Absurd (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). What I find most 
helpful about Bagger’s account is his broad framing of the question concerning how forms of self-cultivation 
respond to particular attitudes concerning boundaries and their crossing in the self and in society. As we will see, 
Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty both embrace openness in the self to external influence, whereas Bergson is more 
concerned with setting the limits of the individual. 
 
27 Shusterman, Thinking Through the Body, p. 69. 
 
28 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1985), p. 26. 
 





what makes us behave the way we do, as it is only on the basis of such knowledge that we can 
craft ways of improving ourselves that impact us in desired ways. 
Whereas Socrates identifies the soul as the object of self-cultivation, Ravaisson, Bergson, 
and Merleau-Ponty all claim that philosophical practice must understand and work on habit. Each 
of these thinkers argues that habit forms a “layer” of the self, and that the self is constituted by 
habit in a profound enough fashion that it must be treated as a primary object of philosophical 
practice.30 To be more precise, these thinkers articulate theories of habit as a continuous process 
whereby repeated actions and affections are retained within the self as dispositions, which are then 
adapted, transformed, and made new in their very enactment. Understanding habit as a process 
might seem odd to those of us accustomed to thinking of it as a settled tendency or a pattern of 
behavior. We will see in our investigation of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work that 
this understanding of habit is not so much incorrect as it is incomplete. Habit can become a settled 
tendency or pattern, but it is better conceived actively as a tending or patterning, the way actions 
and affections are formed into dispositions that become the basis of our engagement with the 
world. What I hope to emphasize in the work of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty, however, 
is that the active process of habit is ongoing and continually produces change in us. Whereas 
tendency and pattern by themselves suggest stasis, the process of habit is equally the basis of 
spontaneity and movement. We are, to a certain degree, what we repeat, such that the opposition 
between first and second nature, what is natural and what is acquired, becomes blurred in the 
                                                          
30 I take the word “layer” from Gaines’ study of Maine de Biran, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty, though in my view 
his understanding of the habitual “layer” of the body overstates its conservatism. For Gaines, habit becomes the 
“stable, massive, and almost objective layer” of the body that is “opposed” to the more “buoyant layer” of 
spontaneity, whereas I see habit and spontaneity as inextricably linked. (Jeffrey Jay Gaines, The Habitual Body-





phenomenon of habit in ways that have important implications for consciously undertaken 
practice. 
In conceiving of habit as a process, Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty treat it as in 
Malabou’s words a “primary ontological phenomenon.”31 The common premise underlying their 
work is that all actions and affections have some effect on entities that lasts beyond the time of 
their occurrence. A theory of the self must therefore include an account of how the repetition of 
actions and affections produces durable changes within them that in turn affect their characteristic 
behavior, and the concept of habit serves their purposes in this regard. The association of habit 
with durable change is of course not original to their work, but stretches back into the Early Modern 
period. David Hume, for instance, famously notes that: “Whenever the repetition of any particular 
act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled 
by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect 
of Custom.”32 Custom for Hume is not merely a static regularity but also entails causality. 
Repetition is the direct cause of a change within the individual, a difference that lasts beyond 
specific acts of repetition and takes the form of a propensity or tendency to continue acting in ways 
one has done in the past. Propensity is thus the form retained repetition takes in the individual, and 
it continues to exercise an influence even in the absence of conscious intervention. 
What distinguishes the approaches I examine in this dissertation from earlier accounts in 
the modern period is that their conceptions of habit do not merely articulate that habit entails the 
retention of repetition but go on to explain how it occurs, something Hume’s empiricism prevents 
                                                          
31 Catherine Malabou, “Addiction and Grace: Preface to Félix Ravaisson’s Of Habit,” in Félix Ravaisson Of Habit, 
trans. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (London: Continuum, 2008: vii-xx), p. vii. 
 





him from doing as Sinclair has argued.33 Although their accounts differ in important ways, 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty all attempt to describe the process whereby repeated acts 
and affections bring about durable changes within individuals, and they refer to this process as 
habit. In doing so, they recognize habit as an inherent dimension of our being, something that is 
not only ongoing but indeed essential to our ontological constitution. In this regard their 
conceptions of habit go beyond associating habits with particular actions as Hume and other Early 
Modern thinkers do and common definitions of habit tend to do and instead understand them as 
change occurring within the body as a whole.  
Specifically, I will argue that their conceptions of habit respond ways of accounting for 
habit that followed from Descartes’ ontological separation of mind and body. One method, which 
Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty will call “physicalist” or “empiricist,” interprets habit as arising 
through physical changes to the body and to the nervous system. In physicalist or empiricist 
accounts of habit, repetition leaves a “trace” or “imprint” within specific bodily organs that 
determines the way it acts.34 Habits, under this view, operate according to mechanical laws and 
create tendencies to repeat specific actions that have become easier to accomplish through physical 
change. The other method, which they refer to as “rationalist” or “intellectualist,” understands 
habit as the automatic association of ideas and actions brought about through the application of 
conscious attention. Repetition, under this view, relates specific impressions drawn from the senses 
or the imagination in ways that create causal links between ideas and motions in ways that as Pfau 
                                                          
33 Mark Sinclair, “Ravaisson and the Force of Habit,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 49 (1), 2011: 65-85, pp. 
65-66. 
 
34 On these notions see John Wright, “Ideas of Habit and Custom in Early Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the 
British Society for Phenomenology, 42 (1), 2011: 18-32. On the connection between Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty 
cf. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair, “Editors’ Commentary,” in Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit (London: Continuum, 





has argued anticipates behaviorist understandings of habit as pathways from stimuli to responses.35 
Like the empiricist view, the intellectualist view also regards the result of habit as a tendency or 
propensity to repeat particular actions, though that tendency arises not from physical but from 
mental change. 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty attempt to either add to or go beyond these 
conceptions of habit by theorizing habit not just as an effect within a specific bodily organ or the 
mind but as a process that involves the body in holistic fashion. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty explain habit as a determination within the body’s capacities as a whole that gives rise not 
only to tendency or propensity but an ability to act in a certain way. These changes need not be 
understood materially: while Bergson will hypothesize a form of bodily memory that comes about 
through changes in the nervous system that expands upon conceptions of habit in modern 
philosophy, Ravaisson will understand habit as a force of desire that gives rise to spontaneity, and 
Merleau-Ponty will describe an intersubjective process of the structuring and restructuring of 
bodily and perceptual aptitudes he names “sedimentation.” Despite their differences, these 
accounts all attempt to grasp the production of dispositions and tendencies as a process that creates 
a condition that characterizes not just particular actions but the body’s capacities in general. 
As a result, habit will appear as an active process that produces both change and stability. 
By effecting a determination in the body in a systematic fashion, habits do not merely affect 
particular acts but the manner of action in general. To paraphrase Lockwood, by instituting a 
condition within the body, habit predisposes us “adverbially.”36 Terms like “propensity” thus 
                                                          
35 Thomas Pfau, Minding the Modern: Human Agency, Intellectual Traditions, and Responsible Knowledge (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame University Press. 2013), pp. 355-358. I will discuss behaviorism in greater detail in Chapter 
Three. 
 
36 Thornton Lockwood, “Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,” in Tom Sparrow 






encompass only one side of the phenomenon of habit. While we will see that habit can give rise to 
a fixation on and even a necessity to reiterate past acts in a nearly identical fashion, it also takes 
the form of abilities to act in particular ways for which terms like “disposition” and “aptitude” are 
more appropriate. Habits take the form of stable ways of engaging with the world, but ones that 
are simultaneously characterized by adaptability to circumstance and receptivity to change. While 
changes to bodily systems are durable, they remain susceptible to the very same influences that 
brought them about in the first place, such that any regularity in one’s conduct habit gives rise to 
is never final but only provisional. In claiming that habituation is a continuous process that 
produces ongoing changes, I wish to emphasize the durable yet temporary nature of one’s ways of 
being in and engaging with the world that result from habit, and that habit should be understood 
as mutable rather than static. 
In understanding habit as a process that produces dispositions, Ravaisson, Bergson, and 
Merleau-Ponty’s theories of habit are both historically and substantively related to a tradition of 
thinking on habit that begins with Aristotle, runs through Medieval Scholasticism, and is again 
taken up by sociologists such as Elias, Mauss, and Bourdieu along with contemporary virtue 
ethicists. For this “organicist” tradition, which we will see also has resonances with recent 
philosophy of action and neuroscientific research, habit constitutes a mode of self-organization 
that resides not solely in the mind but is rather distributed throughout the body.37 Instead of either 
behavioral patterns or static traces deposited in the body, this tradition conceptualizes habit 
                                                          
37 I take the term “organicist” from Alberto Toscano’s genealogy of 19th and 20th Century thinking on what he calls 
“organismic ontology,” in which the “philosophy of habit” entails an attempt at merging Kantian and Nietzschean 
conceptions of the organism that replace Early Modern mechanistic conceptions of being with Aristotelian and 
Scholastic conceptions. (Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between Kant 
and Deleuze [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006], p. 110f.). Toscano’s focus is on early Pragmatists like Charles 
Sanders Peirce and William James and he only briefly mentions Ravaisson, but I think the term is equally applicable 
to Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty. For a discussion of this tradition of thought concerning habit in relation 
to the neurosciences, see Xabier Barandianan and Ezequiel Di Paolo, “A Genealogical Map of the Concept of 





according to its etymology as hexis or habitus, flexible dispositions of action and feeling, that serve 
as the basis of an embodied form of practical knowledge. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty 
share concerns with the modern inheritors of this Aristotelian tradition, namely to rescue the body 
from its reduction to a passive object in post-Cartesian philosophy.38 Aristotle’s concept of hexis 
has been invaluable for this project, naming as it does a “kind of activity” that forms the basis of 
one’s dispositions and character and thereby providing the conceptual space to understand the 
body as inherently active.39 In retrieving Aristotelian thought, modern “organicist” thinkers have 
employed the concept of hexis/habitus to free subjectivity from its imprisonment within the res 
cogitans and instead understand it as in itself embodied. 
What is especially significant for the purposes of this dissertation is the association drawn 
in this tradition between concepts like habit, hexis, and habitus and the notion of practical reason. 
Aristotle’s understanding of hexis in particular as “second potentiality,” an ability or skill that 
subtends a way of acting, has been applied among a number of organicist thinkers to conceptualize 
the body as more than the effect of physical or biological laws.40 Instead, the habituated body has 
been conceptualized as “man’s first and most natural technical object,” the acquired means 
whereby the subject achieves its purposes and that serves as an immediate and non-propositional 
                                                          
38 On the avoidance of the term “habit” in the discipline of sociology in particular due to the way the concept had 
been developed in behaviorist psychology, see Charles Camic, “The Matter of Habit,” The American Journal of 
Sociology, 91 (5), 1986: 1039-1087. 
 
39 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1022b4-14. 
 
40 Aristotle gives the example of knowledge of mathematics or grammar, in which “first potentiality” names the 
simple capacity for learning while “second potentiality” or “first actuality” names an acquired understanding that 
can be applied but is not necessarily in practice at any given time (i.e., it is being held in potential). “Second 







form of knowledge of how to act in various situations.41 Viewed objectively, the body is thereby 
conceptualized as a set of abilities that form the subject’s “objective potentialities,” its immediate 
possibilities for acting that it applies and adapts to individual cases.42 Viewed subjectively, the 
body can be attributed a principle of practical intelligence that spontaneously “understands” how 
to coordinate its abilities as means to the exigencies of a particular situation in order to achieve a 
particular end even in the absence of conscious deliberation.43 Taken as a whole, the habituated 
body thus becomes a true body-subject, an entity that is capable of carrying out the acts that it 
itself plays a role in positing. The embodied subject of habit in the modern organicist tradition thus 
appears as (1) intelligent, capable of engaging in action that is oriented towards a goal and not 
either repetitive or arbitrary, and (2) free, self-moving and self-directing without requiring 
conscious acts of will to determine it from without.  
Yet also essential to the organicist picture is that the subject’s hexis or habitus is not natural 
but acquired. Although the capacity to acquire habits is innate within human subjects, it is 
inevitable that they undergo processes of formation in which they acquire the dispositions that 
form the basis of their practical lives. The institutions of socialization such as the family, the 
school, work, among others, as well as the related institutions of ethical formation, comprise the 
subject’s “education” to use Mauss’ term, and the habituated body-subject only exists as an 
                                                          
41 That is, not merely as an instrument for the mind’s use but simultaneously as a form of knowledge in its own 
right, see Marcel Mauss, “Techniques of the Body,” in Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter eds. Incorporations 
(New York: Zone, 1992: 455-477), p. 461. 
 
42 The range of these abilities articulates the limits of the subject’s possibilities, what it can and cannot do. In this 
regard, it serves the function in particular of eliminating the need to interpret the subject’s actions in terms of 
explicit rules it does or does not follow. On this point see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. 
Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 76. 
 
43 Thus avoiding the twin evils of “mechanism” and “finalism,” the interpretation of acts as the simple repetition of 





educated subject.44 Although habit is an essential component of the body-subject, it comprises not 
its first but rather its second nature as an acquisition that has become so essential a component of 
the subject that they become indistinguishable. The subject’s habitus, in other words, is the product 
of a pedagogical process of habituation, such that the latter can be understood as causing the 
former.45 The ability to engage with one’s world intelligently and freely is based on a process of 
habituation that necessarily involves – along with any amount of explicit knowledge – repetition 
of particular ways of acting. If undertaken correctly, the repetitive process of habituation gradually 
and seamlessly produces a flexible disposition that is incorporated into the subject’s stock of 
acquired aptitudes. 
It is well known that a major concern of Merleau-Ponty’s work is to challenge the Cartesian 
subject identified with the active, self-conscious mind and separated from the passive, material 
body, but Ravaisson and Bergson are important predecessors of his in this regard. For each of these 
thinkers, habit gives rise to constant change in the body’s capacities, such that first and second 
nature, what is natural and what is acquired, become almost indistinguishable. Ravaisson, Bergson, 
and Merleau-Ponty all articulate conceptions of embodied subjectivity that are grounded in 
                                                          
44 Mauss, “Techniques of the Body,” p. 73. I cite Mauss here because of the distinction he draws between hexis that 
is a function of education and what he calls the “metaphysical habitudes” that belong to a body that would exist in a 
hypothetical State of Nature. The human subject only exists as a socialized subject. Similar points have been made, 
however, in recent studies of Aristotle as well, and the acquisition or moral dispositions both as children and 
throughout life has become the focus of a set of recently published collections of essays on the subject of “virtue 
acquisition,” see for instance Myles Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” in A.O. Rorty ed. Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980: 69-92), Thomas A. Lewis, “Ethical Formation 
and Ordinary Life in the Modern West: The Case of Work,” in Elizabeth Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker eds. Religious 
Ethics in a Time of Globalism: Shaping a Third Wave of Comparative Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012: 27-48), and the essays included in Brad Wilburn ed. Moral Cultivation: Essays on the Development of 
Character and Virtue (New York: Lexington, 2010), David Carr and Jan Steutel eds. Virtue Ethics and Moral 
Education (New York: Routledge, 2014), and Nancy Snow ed. Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, 
Theology, and Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
 
45 As Burnyeat puts it, the “appropriate mode of acquisition” for ethical virtue in Aristotle is habituation, even 
though the latter must be understood as having “cognitive powers” along with its repetitive aspects, “Aristotle on 





theories of habit, and their discussions of the nature of the habituated body-subject will be a 
guiding thread throughout this dissertation. As an aspect of this project of uniting first and second 
nature, we will see that each of these thinkers articulates how the “educative” process of acquiring 
habits situates individuals within their social world. While Ravaisson’s interest in socialization is 
limited to the potential social benefits of moral pedagogy, Bergson focuses on how habituation 
causes subjects to conform to existing customs, while Merleau-Ponty articulates a more dialectical 
process of exchange between the individual and other people and institutions with whom she 
interacts. In each case, the habituated body is understood as the result of interactions between self 
and world that produces a socially informed subject. 
What sets them apart from the larger organicist tradition is their greater focus on the nature 
of habituation as a process. Each of these thinkers grounds his conception of embodied subjectivity 
in an account of the processes whereby repeated actions and affections are retained within subjects 
and of the ongoing and ultimately unpredictable effects of these processes on the aptitudes of 
which embodied subjectivity is formed. Specifically, what results from their theories of habit as a 
process is an understanding of the self as to varying degrees fluid. The gradual and mutable nature 
of the process of habit is both productive of embodied practical reason and at the same time 
significantly disrupts the self’s transparency to itself, as well as its autonomy. The process whereby 
repeated actions and affections are formed into dispositions and exercise ongoing changes in 
subjects takes place outside of conscious awareness and gives rise to bodily spontaneity that 
precedes rational deliberation. Insofar as it takes the form of an adaptable disposition, habit will 
appear as a form of bodily intentionality that both makes possible the achievement of goals and 
desires and producing a world with which one is familiar and comfortable but that operates 





knowledge. Clare Carlisle’s invocation of the Derridean term pharmakon, something that is both 
poison and remedy, is thus not inappropriate as a way of describing habit.46 Habit entails both 
automatic action and imperceptible change that limits autonomy and self-transparency, and at the 
same time embodied freedom and practical ability that allows for stable yet intelligent engagement 
with the world, all of which are receptive to change.   
What also results from these conceptions of habit is an appreciation of both the potential 
and the limitations of undertaking conscious practice on oneself. Ravaisson, Bergson, and 
Merleau-Ponty all recognize that it is possible to actively and consciously create habits in oneself, 
and that one can become aware of acquired habitual dispositions through attention or through 
interaction with other people. In consciously habituating oneself it is indeed possible to create an 
aptitude that becomes incorporated into one’s ways of intelligently engaging with one’s 
environment as a skill. Their conceptions of habit as a process, however, suggest limits to the 
extent to which one can achieve full mastery over one’s acquired dispositions. While one can take 
advantage of the process of habit in acquiring desired dispositions, that process remains 
autonomous and outside of the sphere of consciousness. Attempts at self-formation will thus 
always run up against the inherent openness and mutability of habit as a layer of one’s being one 
cannot control. The continual changes habit brings about affect attempts at controlling and shaping 
one’s tendencies, and this results in the indefiniteness of projects of philosophical self-cultivation 
described in the previous section. While Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty all appreciate the 
importance of habit in self-cultivation, they recognize that it causes such projects to produce results 
other than what they intend, and they articulate their theories of philosophical practice in 
consideration of this fact. 
                                                          
46 Clare Carlisle, Of Habit (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 5, cf. Clare Carlisle, “Creatures of Habit: The Problem 





3. Chapter Outline 
 
The conceptions of habit and philosophical practice I examine in this dissertation do not 
progress in a linear fashion. At the risk of oversimplification, it would be more correct to say that 
the progression is closer to dialectical. Ravaisson’s conception of philosophical practice as the art 
of life, a notion he takes from Greco-Roman and particularly Stoic practice, relies heavily on a 
notion of habit as a form of embodied spontaneity that frees the self to accomplish its ends without 
the need of rational deliberation. Bergson, however, articulates a mechanistic theory of habit that 
shares features with (though by no means replicates) Cartesian dualisms and looks suspiciously at 
the effects of habit on human consciousness and human freedom. While Bergson draws on ancient 
notions of philosophy to describe his conception of philosophical practice, it diverges sharply from 
Ravaisson’s and is premised on overcoming the effects of habit rather than using it to achieve a 
particular form of selfhood. Merleau-Ponty in certain ways returns to a conception of habit like 
Ravaisson’s but operates with a different ontological foundation and takes on some of Bergson’s 
insights even while rejecting his overall dualistic picture. This results in a more nuanced picture 
of habit as a fluid process that is both essential to practical life and also resists conscious self-
awareness and gives rise to a conception of philosophical practice as self-experimentation and 
examination. I will attempt to articulate how much of each form of philosophical practice I believe 
is defensible in the course of relating their work to Hadot’s in Chapter Four. 
In Chapter One, I begin to develop my conception of indefinite self-cultivation through an 
interpretation of Ravaisson’s late theory of philosophical practice as the art of life that reads it as 
an outgrowth of his early reflections on habit. Ravaisson’s claim that imitation of models of ideal 
conduct gives rise to what he calls “invention,” creation of new ways of acting that accord with 





argue, on his theory of habit as productive of bodily spontaneity that precedes conscious 
deliberation. Habit for Ravaisson expresses the metaphysical desire or conatus, a concept he takes 
from Leibniz, to persist in one’s way of being that operates as a principle of freedom within the 
human body. While I do not attempt to resuscitate either his or Leibniz’s metaphysics, I argue that 
his relationship of habit and desire is a brilliant intuition that allows us to view habits as more than 
simply skills or tendencies but as bodily expressions of purposiveness and preference. By 
cultivating habits that follow the models one has chosen for oneself, an ability and a desire to 
inhabit that model is produced that allows for the “unreflective spontaneity” of habit to govern 
one’s actions in a way that both accords with models but does so on the basis of imagination and 
preference rather than reason. I will argue, however, that Ravaisson’s optimism regarding the 
power of habit to serve as the basis of ways of being is at odds with some of his own statements 
regarding its potential to lead to fixation and need, a tension that is left open in his work. 
Bergson’s attempt to provide a naturalistic reading of Ravaisson’s theory of habit results 
in a mechanistic account that culminates in a starkly opposed conception of philosophical practice. 
In Chapter Two, I will argue that Bergson’s form of philosophical practice is therapeutic in that it 
seeks to alleviate the harm habit causes to consciousness and operates not through habit as a 
principle of freedom but against habit in what I view as a problematic attempt to introduce radical 
novelty into philosophical practice. Habit in Bergson’s view is a bodily automatism that arises 
from the reduction or “fossilization” in his words of free acts into motor mechanisms within the 
nervous system. While this process of fossilization produces a form of bodily memory that allows 
for quick and effortless practical activity, it also homogenizes perceptual experience and creates a 
layer of the self characterized by imprecise thinking, rigid and unfree conduct, and social 





just as an epistemological method but as the basis of his conception of philosophical practice. 
Intuition grasps the qualitative richness of lived experience that breaks through the “superficial” 
self and opens up new avenues for acting that results in philosophical practice as radical self-
creation and the production of absolutely new models of living. Because his theory of habit is 
ultimately weaker than Ravaisson’s, however, I will conclude that his theory of philosophical 
practice is best understood as an adjunct to Ravaisson’s that responds to contingent ways in which 
habit can degenerate into automatism. 
Merleau-Ponty offers a comprehensive and, in my view convincing, critique of the 
Bergsonian picture of habit, and in Chapter Three I will argue that his own conception of habit as 
“body schema” takes on many of Ravaisson’s insights regarding habit without his metaphysics, 
though I will claim that Ravaisson’s linkage of habit and desire fills a gap left open in Merleau-
Ponty’s theory of the body. Merleau-Ponty goes beyond both Ravaisson and Bergson, however, in 
his understanding of habit as being structures as a “vertical history” in which forms of gesture and 
speech are drawn from one’s social world and expressed in various contexts in a way that 
continually changes them. I will argue that this fluid understanding of the process of habit as 
sedimentation and style culminates in a powerful criticism of attempts to live according to a 
particular ethical ideal. Not only does the constant change habitual dispositions undergo make 
them impossible to contain within a particular model, attempting to live in accordance with a model 
despite that fact creates the danger that one’s way of life will ossify and do violence to the freedom 
inherent to one’s existence within an open social world. Merleau-Ponty’s own theory of 
philosophical practice thus entails a Socratic dialogue with oneself that involves experimental 
expression of one’s occurrent reactions and affects in a way that reveals change within one’s 





 In Chapter Four I bring my discussion of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty together 
by using their work to critically examine current theories of embodied practice and of 
philosophical practice. I will first define the concept of indefinite self-cultivation more precisely 
by putting Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories in conversation with contemporary 
discussions of embodied practice in the study of religious ethics. In doing so, I will argue that 
when understood in terms of their theories of habit, bodily practices that use habituation as a means 
to achieve a certain ideal selfhood will give rise to continuous and unpredictable changes and 
hence become indefinite. I will then turn to discuss the implications of Ravaisson, Bergson, and 
Merleau-Ponty’s work for discussions of philosophical practice by putting their work in 
conversation with that of Pierre Hadot to demonstrate that their theories of philosophical practice 
resolve the problem of the passions in a superior manner than Hadot does. In making this argument, 
I will demonstrate attempts to achieve rational self-mastery without accounting for the fluid nature 
of habit as it is revealed in Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work inevitably degenerate 
into a repressive form of self-control that prevents the kind of harmony between reason, emotion, 
and action that Hadot seeks. By treating the condition of stasis in one’s habitual aptitudes or in 
one’s conscious knowledge through uncovering forms of existence that develop possibilities for 
perfection within one’s existing social world while constantly examining them to prevent 
ossification, indefinite philosophical practice solves the problem of the passions without 






Chapter 1: The Necessity of Desire: Habit and the Art of Life in Félix Ravaisson 
 
If the name of Félix Ravaisson (1813-1900) is still not familiar within the English-speaking 
world, it is not because of his lack of importance within the philosophical tradition. In spite of the 
brevity of his career as a professional philosopher, his work helped to bring German Idealism to 
France, and his theories of metaphysics and the body presented in his thèse d’agrégation and his 
report on 19th Century French philosophy exercised an enormous influence on French thought in 
both the 19th and 20th Centuries.47 Since English editions of some of Ravaisson’s main works have 
been made available over the past decade, however, a greater appreciation of the substantive value 
of his thought in its own right has developed, with scholars exploring the possibilities of 
Ravaisson’s thought to address contemporary issues in embodiment, metaphysics, ethics, and 
aesthetics.48 In this flurry of new interest, one topic that has gone relatively unnoticed is 
Ravaisson’s metaphilosophical considerations. Along with his interventions into discussions on 
traditional philosophical topics, Ravaisson also reflected on the nature and function of philosophy. 
Of overarching concern to Ravaisson in this regard was to defend the value of philosophy against 
                                                          
47 In making these claims, I am referring primarily to English-language scholarship, in which the name of Ravaisson 
is still fairly unfamiliar. Bergson enjoys somewhat greater recognition as I will discuss in Chapter Two, in part due 
to Gilles Deleuze’s influential interpretation of his work. For some English-language studies of the relationship 
between Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work see Jeffrey Jay Gaines, The Habitual Body-Subject: A 
Study in the Maine de Biran – Bergson – Merleau-Ponty Lineage, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1992, Pascal Engel, 
“Psychology and Metaphysics from Maine de Biran to Bergson,” in Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuters eds. 
Psychology and Philosophy; Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought (Amsterdam: 
Springer, 2008: 235-246), Mark Sinclair, “Is Habit the ‘Fossilized Residue of a Spiritual Activity’? Ravaisson, 
Bergson, Merleau-Ponty,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42 (1), 2011: 33-52, Mark Sinclair 
“Embodiment: Conceptions of the Lived Body from Maine de Biran to Bergson,” in Allison Stone ed. The 
Edinburgh Critical History of Philosophy, Vol. 4: The Nineteenth Century (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2011: 187-203). The “lineage” running from Ravaisson to Merleau-Ponty is much better known in the French 
literature and numerous titles could be given as examples, but see along with Janicaud’s study of French 
Spiritualism Clare Marin, “L’être et l’habitude dans la philosophie française contemporaine,” Alter, 12, 2004: 149-
172, and for discussion of Ravaisson’s influence on the larger phenomenological tradition, particularly the work of 
Heidegger, see Frédéric Towarnicki, À la rencontre de Heidegger: Souvenirs d’un messager de la Forêt-Noire 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1993). 
 
48 See Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit, trans. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (London: Continuum, 2008), and Félix 





what he called the “majority view” of the time that the natural sciences and mathematics had made 
it obsolete.49 Ravaisson’s defense focuses on philosophy’s value to change individual conduct for 
the better. While mathematics and the sciences have made astounding discoveries over the past 
century, they possess, Ravaisson claims, no equivalent to the Socratic project of turning critical 
attention back from its focus on the external world and onto one’s own self and one’s patterns of 
thinking, feeling, and acting. Ravaisson understands philosophy as a “Socratic” activity in that he 
argues that its role is to change individual “conduct of life.”50 Properly understood and practiced, 
philosophical thought can give rise not just to knowledge but moreover to love of truth and of the 
good and desire to live in accordance with them. In doing so, philosophy opens up the possibility 
for true moral perfection, not merely correctness in actions and consistency in thought but 
moreover “purity of heart” and total transformation in individual character and personality.51 By 
cultivating a love of truth, philosophy can create the desire to live in accordance with the truth and 
embody it in one’s life to the greatest possible extent.  
Ravaisson’s belief that philosophical thought can be made applicable to everyday life 
conduct, along with his emphasis on moral perfection as the goal of philosophical practice, 
associates his conception of philosophy with the Greco-Roman traditions of philosophy as a “way 
of life” that have been studied by scholars such as Pierre Hadot, Martha Nussbaum, and John 
Sellars. As with the conceptions of philosophical practice these authors and others have studied, 
Ravaisson regards philosophy not simply as a cognitive activity but as one that has real effects on 
                                                          
49 Félix Ravaisson, “Métaphysique et morale,” Revue de Métaphysique et la Morale, 98 (4), [1893] 1993: 437-454, 
p. 437. The “majority view” of which Ravaisson speaks derives from what he sees as overexcitement with Auguste 
Comte’s positivism in particular and in addition with Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy. Comte had already been 
a major target of criticism in Ravaisson’s 1867 Rapport on contemporary French philosophy (Félix Ravaisson, La 
philosophie en France au XIXe siècle [Paris: Fayard, [1867] 1984]). 
 
50 Ravaisson, “Métaphysique et morale,” p. 452. 
 





everyday conduct. Ravaisson makes this connection explicit when he claims that philosophy 
should be understood as an “art of life,” a Stoic understanding of philosophy as a practice that 
produces a disposition of the soul in conformity with wisdom and human flourishing.52 My 
argument in this chapter is that Ravaisson’s theory of moral pedagogy appropriates the Stoic 
conception of the art of life along with Aristotelian virtue ethics in a way that opens the theoretical 
space to consider the body as a subject of the philosophical life. In vindicating the social value of 
philosophy, Ravaisson articulates a theory of moral education that makes a powerful case for 
viewing the body not as the passive object of self-cultivation but instead as a subject that functions 
as the primary agent of virtue. In doing so, Ravaisson’s conception of the art of life responds to 
and ultimately deepens Shusterman’s call for a form of philosophical practice that treats the body 
as an independent criterion of perfection by understanding ethical ideals as defined not solely in 
advance by the mind but also by the body itself in the course of their enactment. Cultivating virtue 
for Ravaisson goes beyond acquiring dispositions that conform to a pre-given model by 
simultaneously allowing those dispositions to govern one’s conduct in place of rational 
deliberation. As a result, the ideal state of being moral pedagogy strives to achieve emerges in the 
very attempt to achieve it and cannot be articulated in advance. Ravaisson’s conception of the art 
of life entails the production of dispositions that continually adapt to circumstances and give rise 
to forms of action that cannot be anticipated. As a result, Ravaisson’s philosophical practice entails 
what I call “indefinite” self-cultivation in which the way of being to be achieved through practice 
is in a constant state of change and development. 
                                                          
52 Félix Ravaisson, Testament philosophique et fragments, ed. Charles Devivaise (Paris: Vrin, [1933] 1983), pp. 96-
97. Ravaisson had dedicated two essays in the middle of his career to the study of Stoicism, in both of which he 
discusses traditions of the Stoic art of living or conceptions of wisdom (Félix Ravaisson, Discours sur la morale des 
Stoïciens [Paris: Firmin Didot, 1850], pp. 19-21, Félix Ravaisson, Essai sur le Stoïcisme [Paris: Imprimerie 
Impériale, 1856], pp. 52-53). See also Félix Ravaisson, Essai sur la métaphysique d’Aristotle, Tome II (Hildesheim: 





Ravaisson opens the conceptual space to conceive of practice as embodied in this way 
through the theory of habit he articulates in his early work. It hardly requires establishing at this 
point that Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists articulate a profound critique of Cartesian 
mind-body dualism and articulate notions of embodied subjectivity that have been enormously 
influential in philosophy and sociology. Over the past few decades a greater appreciation of the 
influence of Ravaisson and Bergson, often known as representatives of the “Spiritualist” tradition 
in French philosophy, on Merleau-Ponty’s work above and beyond that of phenomenology, has 
also arisen.53 Ravaisson and Bergson are not only forerunners of Merleau-Ponty’s in the sense that 
they share his concerns with questioning modern philosophical conceptions of the body, but they 
also articulate theories of embodiment that are philosophically valuable in their own right. It is my 
contention in this dissertation that the “indefinite” conceptions of philosophical practice 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty articulate all arise from theories of habit that attempt to 
challenge dualistic conceptions of the body, and Ravaisson’s theory of habit is the first in this 
particular lineage to be applied to understand the nature of self-cultivation. Ravaisson understands 
philosophical practice to be embodied in a manner that not only anticipates the work of such 
contemporary scholars as Richard Shusterman but also helps to inspire Henri Bergson and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s own theories of philosophical practice.  
In reinterpreting ancient conceptions of self-cultivation through his theory of embodiment, 
Ravaisson also begins to articulate an aim of the philosophical life that diverges from current 
emphases on conscious self-knowledge and rational self-mastery and that Merleau-Ponty and to a 
                                                          
53 In using the term “Spiritualism,” I do not contest Dominique Janicaud’s claim that the philosophers typically 
grouped under that heading are united more by a “convergence of inspiration than by shared adherence to a system.” 
(Ravaisson et la métaphysique: Une généalogie du spiritualisme Français [Paris: Vrin, [1969] 1997], p. 1). I do not 
intend in this dissertation to make historical claims about Spiritualism as a whole, but on the specific line running 
from Ravaisson through Bergson to Merleau-Ponty. On Ravaisson’s influence in the 19th Century see Jean Beaufret, 





lesser extent Bergson will further develop. Because the body plays a role in defining the nature of 
ethical commitment and in enacting it, the importance of conscious self-governance diminishes 
for Ravaisson in favor of the free exercise of bodily capacities. We will thus begin to see, 
particularly in section three of this chapter, that greater attention to the body in Ravaisson, Bergson, 
and Merleau-Ponty’s work reveals that their conceptions of philosophy differ in crucial ways from 
Pierre Hadot’s interpretation of them as being animated by at bottom the same concerns as ancient 
forms of philosophical practice. By grounding their conceptions of philosophical practice in 
theories of embodied subjectivity, Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty displace and ultimately 
challenge the primacy of conscious intelligence over the body in the philosophical life. For 
Ravaisson, allowing the body to serve as the primary agent of the philosophical life allows for a 
stronger and more pleasurable adherence to ethical commitments, such that he can be read as 
articulating a criticism of attempts like Hadot’s to treat ancient philosophical practice as a 
permanent “live” option. 
Ravaisson synthesizes ancient and modern concepts in order to articulate a theory of habit 
that challenges Cartesian dualism and opens up new avenues for understanding ethical practice. 
Accordingly, before turning to his conception of the art of life, this chapter’s first two sections will 
present the argumentation of Ravaisson’s thesis De l’habitude as providing a viable theory of habit 
in a manner that allows us to appreciate his contributions to theories of philosophical practice. The 
first section reads Ravaisson’s theory of habit as a critique of the dualistic descriptions and 
accounts of habit of post-Cartesian philosophy and physiology. My aim in doing so is two-fold. 
First, to establish Ravaisson’s interest in breaking with Cartesian dualism and thereby motivate 
the three-way conversation I will stage in this dissertation between his work and that of Bergson 





theory of habit and by extension his conception of philosophical practice. The second section 
examines how this concept of tendency founds a unique theory of embodied subjectivity that I 
argue both anticipates and goes beyond current interpretations of habit as a form of skill. This 
theory accounts for how goal-oriented actions become habits and give rise to what Ravaisson calls 
an inclination, an intelligent ability that coordinates bodily and perceptual capacities that makes 
possible the accomplishment of ends (1) without conscious deliberation, (2) with increasing 
immediacy and ease, and (3) as more of a felt preference. This examination of Ravaisson’s theory 
of habit will prepare us to appreciate the novelty of Ravaisson’s theory of moral education and the 
cultivation of virtue, this chapter’s third section. In particular, I will focus on how Ravaisson 
critiques rationalist theories of virtue and moral education, embodied in the figure of the 
Aristotelian phronimos and the Stoic conception of the art of life, from the perspective of his theory 
of embodied subjectivity, and how he deploys this theory to articulate a conception of moral 
education in which habitual inclinations themselves play a role in constructing the ideal of virtue 
towards which moral education strives. Ravaisson’s conception of the art of life as the imitation 
of models of ideal conduct articulates an understanding of self-cultivation as “invention” that gives 
the body an active role in the moral life. I will conclude by showing how Ravaisson’s program of 
moral pedagogy results in a form of moral selfhood that goes beyond current conceptions of the 
“formed” or “defined” self and instead affirms continual and indefinite change.  
1. Tendency and Desire: Ravaisson on the Double Law of Habit 
 
Ravaisson’s theory of habit is a solution to a problem he believes post-Cartesian 
philosophers have left open. In this section I follow Ravaisson’s critique of his contemporaries’ 





on human life and human action common in the early modern period.54 Previous commentators 
are noted that Ravaisson’s method in De l’habitude is “phenomenological,” not in that it engages 
in something like the Husserlian epoché but in the broader sense of providing a unitary account of 
the phenomena or appearances of habit.55 Ravaisson argues that descriptions of and theories 
purporting to explain the double law of habit that separate the passive and mechanistic body from 
the freely active mind fail to account for all its features. The double law of habit can only be 
explained, he concludes, by abandoning Cartesian dualism and instead conceiving habit as a 
dynamic process grounded in an ontological desire to persist in current ways of being. Examining 
Ravaisson’s argumentation will illuminate the notion of “tendency” that is at the heart of his 
theories of bodily intelligence and philosophical practice. This section builds on interpretations of 
Ravaisson’s “phenomenological” investigations to clarify the concept of tendency as an ability or 
aptitude that strengthens over time, such that one becomes more likely to engage in a particular 
type of action and develops a conscious preference for doing so. With his understanding of habit 
as tendency grounded in an ontological desire to persist in place Ravaisson is able to account for 
the features of the double law of habit more successfully than his predecessors and thus articulates 
a theory of habit that is worthy of contemporary consideration. 
What is the double law of habit? In Ravaisson’s statement of it: “prolonged or repeated 
sensation diminishes by degrees until it is extinguished. Prolonged or repeated movement 
gradually becomes easier, quicker, and more assured. Perception, which is linked with movement, 
                                                          
54 For contextualization of the “double law” of habit within broader debates concerning habit, freedom, and the body 
in post-Cartesian philosophy see John Wright, “Ideas of Habit and Custom in Early Modern Philosophy.” 
 
55 See for instance Mark Sinclair, “Ravaisson and the Force of Habit,” p. 77, citing Claire Marin, “L’activité obscure 
de l’habitude,” in Jean-Michel Le Lannou ed. Études sur Félix Ravaisson: de l’habitude (Paris: Kimé, 1999: 47-59), 






also becomes clearer, more certain, and quicker.”56 Habit, in other words, has two primary effects 
on human life. On the one hand, sensations to which we have become habituated pass from 
conscious attention to the point where they are no longer noticed. Repetition of motions such as 
rocking, for instance, or monotonous sounds that at first may cause disturbance over time recede 
and fade from consciousness, even to the point where they can be soothing and help someone sleep 
(H 51). On the other hand, actions, including perceptions, that have become habitual are 
reproduced with greater frequency or ease. To use Ravaisson’s words, “spontaneity increases” as 
movement begins to occur even without an inciting cause, and those movements gradually occur 
not only more quickly but with greater facility (H 31). Habit causes actions we consciously 
undertake become easier and quicker to accomplish and sensations we experience to become dull 
and recede from consciousness. 
Ravaisson does not claim to be the first to have observed these features of habit, but 
questions the dualistic frames in which they have been interpreted in the past. In particular, he 
credits their discovery to the Eighteenth-Century philosopher Joseph Butler, who interprets the 
law in terms of a distinction between active mental habits and passive bodily habits. Butler’s 
distinction between active and passive principles, language that will be taken up by later 
philosophers such as Hume and Maine de Biran whose work Ravaisson also cites57, fits neatly 
within Cartesian ontological dualism in differentiating between a free, active mind and a passive, 
material body. Butler uses this distinction as the interpretive clue to the double law of habit: the 
tendency of sensation to fade from consciousness is attributable to a passive principle that belongs 
                                                          
56 Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit, p. 49. Translations of De l’habitude in this chapter are adapted from those in Carlisle 
and Sinclair’s volume, with French and English text on opposing pages. Throughout this chapter, I will cite Of Habit 
in text by the abbreviation “H”. 
 
57 See David Hume. A Treatise Concerning Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 2.3.5.1, 
François-Pierre-Gonthier Maine de Biran, Influence de l’habitude sur la faculté de penser, in Oeuvres, Tome II 





to the body and that gives rise to an “involuntary readiness” to respond to situations in automatic 
and stereotyped ways.58 As sensation weakens we notice our behaviors less and less to the point 
where they become automatic and difficult to control. On the other hand, although difficult to 
perform at first, “practical principles,” habits acquired through conscious acts of will, require less 
effort as they are repeated.59 For Butler, these “active habits” are crucial to our practical and 
ultimately our moral abilities, as they allow us to achieve our goals of performing a certain type 
of action or of acquiring a certain character without the need to consider all that we do. Butler 
suggests that these habits, though visible in bodily acts, properly belong to the mind, as they entail 
action of the mind that produces a lasting change within the body. 
Ravaisson does not directly challenge Butler or his followers’ dualistic frameworks, but 
argues that they fail at the descriptive level in a way that suggests the need to go beyond them. 
Habit, Ravaisson argues, does not merely outstrip both sensation and conscious acts of deliberation 
but tends to anticipate (prévient) them (H 51). As a result of habit, one’s actions and affections 
respond not to current but to projected circumstances. This phenomenon also entails a subjective, 
felt expectation and even need for a certain event to occur that can cause pain if it is disappointed. 
Repetition does not simply produce a change that subsists in the body or mind but rather one that 
actively persists as an active being-disposed towards repeating what one has done before. As 
sensation and effort diminish it becomes increasingly difficult for them to become reestablished, 
and one can even come to feel discomfort in the absence of whatever change instigated those 
effects. Once one becomes “accustomed” to reading while listening to music, for instance, one 
                                                          
58 Joseph Butler. The Analogy of Religion (New York: Ungar, [1736] 1961), p. 71. Butler uses the language of 
“perception” to describe “passive” habits, while Ravaisson uses that of sensation, but they are intended in identical 
ways. 
 





ceases to notice the music and it can even become more difficult to read without such background 
noise. Likewise, movements and perceptions become both easier and quicker to accomplish, and 
more pleasurable as well. Building a habit of jogging makes running easier and more pleasurable 
to the point where failing to run on a particular day causes discomfort. The separation between 
“active” and “passive” habits might account for the decrease in sensibility and the increased ease 
in action associated with habit, but not the way habits become tendencies in a progressive sense of 
tending towards repeating what one has repeated before. Habits strengthen over time, and this 
appears not just in the form of an increased likelihood to behave in a certain way but moreover in 
a conscious preference for doing so, and the dualistic separation of active mental and passive 
bodily habits does not possess a way to account for this mixture of the physical and the mental in 
the phenomena of habit. 
Ravaisson’s case against dualistic theories of habit is that they fail to account for both the 
progressive nature of the effects associated with the double law of habit, and also their affective 
dimensions. In making this case, Ravaisson criticizes what he calls “physicalist” and “rationalist” 
theories of habit in a manner strikingly similar to Merleau-Ponty’s later discussion of “empiricist” 
and “intellectualist” theories of habit (H 53-55).60 Like Merleau-Ponty, Ravaisson sees theories 
that explain habit solely through mental or physical changes as outgrowths of the ontological 
separation of mind and body and as failing on their own terms. Physicalist theories of habit account 
for the effects of habit in terms of physical changes that occur in the body. Ravaisson cites as an 
example of such a theory the early neurological hypotheses of Charles Bonnet, who speculates that 
the ease with which habitual movements are undertaken and their independence from 
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consciousness suggests that they originate in modifications within nerve fibers.61 Such 
modifications function mechanistically, such that once an organic change has occurred an impulse 
will automatically cause a particular response whose ease is thus explained by a determination 
within the nervous system. Ravaisson responds that while organic changes within entities might 
account for the diminished attention given to habits and increased muscular facility through 
alterations in the neural connections, but “no organic modification can explain the tendency 
(tendance), the inclination (penchant) whose progress coincides with the degradation of sensation 
and effort.” (H 51) The habituated body is not merely statically capable of acting in certain ways 
without effort or attention but is actively oriented towards doing so as an inclination that is 
expressed both as a propensity within the body and as a consciously experienced need. 
Intellectualist theories like that of Dugald Stewart, in which habits result from the repeated 
association of ideas that becomes so rapid as to be forgotten, fail on precisely the same grounds.62 
The mind itself is the agent of the changes brought about through habit, and as association occurs 
the mind’s operations come occur more quickly and with less effort, and leave conscious attention 
free for other matters. Ravaisson agrees that associative theories of habit can explain especially 
how repetition frees attention, but not why one begins to prefer the sensations or operations to 
which one has been habituated. The habituated body acts in an intentional fashion in a way that 
neither physical determination nor association of ideas can grasp: “Physicalist and rationalist 
theories are equally lacking on this point.” (H 53) The effects of habit combine the objective and 
                                                          
61 Charles Bonnet. Essai analytique sur les facultés de l’âme (Copenhagen: Philibert, 1775), pp. 101-106. Bonnet’s 
remarks are admittedly speculative, but he believes that such physical changes account for why habits developed 
when young have such a profound effect even on the adult individual. Ravaisson was familiar with Bonnet’s work 
through its citation at the beginning of Maine de Biran’s mémoire on habit (Maine de Biran, Influence de l’habitude 
sur la faculté de penser, p. 126). 
 





the subjective in a way that requires an account that presupposes a holistic account of mind and 
body rather than one that treats them as antecedently separated.  
By observing the effects of habit on human life, Ravaisson concludes that habit must be 
understood as a tendency in the senses that emerge in his observation of the effects of habit: first 
as a propensity or likelihood to act in a certain way that slowly increases over time, and second as 
a felt preference for acting in that way. Viewing habit in this manner preserves his contemporaries’ 
observations concerning the effects of habit while rejecting their dualistic explanations of those 
effects. Habit for Ravaisson is neither a behavioral pattern nor a specific determination within 
one’s thinking or physical structure but rather what Ravaisson calls a “change in the disposition, 
the potential, the internal virtue” of an entity (H 25). Ravaisson’s language here is Aristotelian, 
and his concept of tendency can be understood as attempting to provide a dynamic interpretation 
of Aristotle’s concept of hexis. Hexis, which is translated into Latin as habitus, is defined as a 
“disposition, according to which something is either well or ill disposed, either towards itself or 
with reference to something else.”63 A hexis for Aristotle is an acquired state of one’s capacities, 
an ability to act in a particular way that characterizes one’s overall comportment. One who has 
acquired a hexis of moderation (sophrosunē), for instance, has a general ability or potentiality to 
modulate one’s actions and preferences so as to eat and drink the proper amounts.64 This ability 
gives rise to consistency in one’s actions and a disposition whereby one is disposed towards acting 
moderately on a regular basis, such that moderation becomes a character trait. In interpreting the 
concept of hexis dynamically, Ravaisson adds to Aristotle’s picture that habitual abilities and states 
                                                          
63 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1022b4-12.  
 
64 Specifically, for Aristotle a hexis is a “second potentiality,” an ability that one has acquired and can bring to bear 
in particular situations through voluntary action. Knowledge of mathematics is thus an example of a hexis, an ability 





of character not only develop slowly but that as they develop we become increasingly prone to 
express them in our actions. Whereas an ability can be actualized in voluntary acts, a dynamic 
reading of hexis suggests that habitual tendencies come to anticipate acts of will. What Aristotle 
calls a state or condition is in fact for Ravaisson a dynamic proneness or aptitude that grows over 
time and spontaneously gives rise to activity. 
Ravaisson’s dynamic reading of hexis also builds on Aristotle’s ontology to provide an 
alternative to the dualistic frameworks in which the phenomena of habit had been explained. 
Aristotle conceives of states of character, skills, and intellectual capacities all as types of hexis. To 
Ravaisson, this suggests that what Descartes had separated as substances of thought and extension 
can in fact be comprehended under one single principle, and he indicates that habit should be 
understood as a principle of ontological monism when he defines it as a “way of being” or “state 
of an existence” (H 25). Whether bodily or mental, habit refers to the way capacities have been 
exercised and have built a tendency to function. Ravaisson provides an ontological grounding 
specifically for habit as a dynamic phenomenon by reading Aristotle’s concept of hexis through 
the Leibnizian notion of active force, which Leibniz defines as an “act or entelecheia…mid-way 
between the faculty of acting and the act itself, and involves a conatus.”65 Leibniz’s use of the 
language of entelechy suggests that active force carries the same sense of actualizing a potentiality 
that the concept of hexis carries, but strengthens it by viewing the process of actualization as the 
production of a conatus, a striving or drive that impels an entity to motion.66 Ravaisson develops 
this notion of force into a principle of desire, which he calls an “obscure activity” that manifests 
                                                          
65 G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. Leroy Loemaker (Boston: Riedel, [1969] 2011), p. 433. 
 
66 Thornton Lockwood (“Habituation, Habit, and Character in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,”) and Pierre Rodrigo 
(“The Dynamic of Hexis in Aristotle’s Philosophy,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42 (1), 2011: 
6-17, p. 9) have recently argued that Aristotle’s concept of hexis should in fact also be read dynamically and not 
simply as a trait or ability. Whether or not this is true, the influence of Leibnizian dynamism allows Ravaisson to 





itself as a tendency persist in a particular way of being (H 53). Ravaisson’s preference for the term 
“desire” over that of “conatus” in his thesis suggests that the form of striving pertinent to habit is 
goal-oriented: “Desire is a primordial instinct, in which the goal of the act is fused with the act 
itself” (H 61) Desire is not simply striving but striving for something, and Ravaisson specifies that 
the desire of which habit consists is directed towards persisting in present ways of being. 
Ravaisson’s understanding of persistence or perseverance draws again on Leibnizian dynamism in 
which persistence is associated with inertia, the tendency of objects to stay in motion or at rest. 
Leibniz interprets inertia as an intrinsic power or force that actively resists external influence. 
Persistence in this sense is an urge inherent to entities to remain in a particular state, whether of 
stasis or change.67 In conceptualizing desire as persistence, Ravaisson thus views habit as an active 
striving to continue either in the same state in which one finds oneself, or in an ongoing process 
of change. Repetition produces a striving that impels us to actualize the abilities we have 
developed, thus giving rise to increasing proneness to act or react in certain ways. 
Applying his concept of tendency to the double law of habit allows Ravaisson to account 
for it in a non-dualistic fashion that ultimately provides a more successful explanation. Instead of 
indexing different types of habits to the mind or the body or to separate passive and active 
principles, Ravaisson’s conception of habit as the expression of desire treats it holistically as a 
process of responding to change. Ravaisson emphasizes the basis of habit in responsiveness to 
change when he claims that habit should be understood not simply as “acquired” but as but 
“contracted, as the result of a change, with regard to the very change which brought it into being” 
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(H 27).68 Ravaisson still uses the language of activity and passivity in his treatise, but his refusal 
to reify that language into separate principles in Blondel’s words “displaces” dualistic accounts 
and gives him the space to explain the phenomena they cannot.69 Changes, instigated either outside 
the entity or within, disrupt the desire to persist and when repeated force it to express itself in 
tendencies that respond to those changes. The desire to persist accommodates changes instigated 
from outside an entity such as sensations by adjusting the “tone” of consciousness to match that 
of the sensation, such that it no longer leaves an impression and recedes from attention (H 53). Yet 
as that sensation is repeated, it becomes a stable condition of the entity’s environment it desires to 
persist in. This results in a preference to continue experiencing particular sensations and 
discomfort when they are absent. Likewise, beginning a new form of movement is also a 
disturbance to the desire to persist that is experienced as effort, but as the movement is repeated 
the desire to persist accommodates it by training the muscles to perform it with greater ease and 
results in a need to repeat and develop that movement. The desire to persist is an “antecedent 
tendency” to both the will and sensation, independent from them and over time coming to 
anticipate them in the form of a tendency that includes a conscious preference (H 61). The settling 
of desire into a particular mode of expression in one’s manner of existence gives rise to an 
inclination for the acts and affections associated with it, such that the effects of the double law of 
habit are in fact nothing other than the growth and development of desire. 
                                                          
68 Ravaisson borrows the term “contraction” from the physiologist Xavier Bichat, for whom “contractility” 
(contractilité) names a principle of excitation and movement that gives rise to faculties within living organisms, to 
describe the process of habit as one that entails receptivity to change and results in the production of tendencies 
(Xavier Bichat. Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et le mort [Paris: Gabon, 1802], pp. 3-6). On Ravaisson’s use 
of Bichat’s “plurivitalism” see Jean Cazeneuve. La philosophie médicale de Ravaisson (Paris: PUF, 1958), p. 35. 
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 In solving the problem of the double law of habit “phenomenologically,” Ravaisson’s 
account is vulnerable to the objection that alternative accounts might explain the phenomena of 
habit more comprehensively and without some of his more problematic ontological commitments. 
In particular, Ravaisson’s dismissal of Bonnet’s neurological hypotheses is best interpreted in the 
context of the tentative understanding of the brain in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries and the 
deterministic way in which they are stated. Scholars have already noted the resonances between 
Ravaisson’s dynamic understanding of the double law of habit and ongoing research on brain 
plasticity, particularly what is known as “activity-dependent plasticity,” or the brain’s ability to 
forge lasting neural pathways as a result of its experiences as opposed to genetics, chemical effects, 
or injuries.70 The concept of plasticity is particularly relevant, as it indicates not simply flexibility 
but a resistance to change that suggests parallels between contemporary understandings of brain 
function and Ravaisson’s understanding of habit as tendency and his explanation of the double law 
of habit. Like Ravaisson’s habituated body, the brain is not simply patterned or organized but is 
actively oriented towards the circuits it practices. As synaptic connections are activated their 
efficacy in conducting signals between neurons increases, such that actions can be accomplished 
with a minimum of neural activity and hence with ease in movement and decreased attention.71 
This emerging picture of neural plasticity corroborates many of the dynamic attributes of 
                                                          
70 Leandro Gaitán and Javier Castresana. “On Habit and the Mind-Body Problem: The View of Félix Ravaisson,” 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 2014: n.p., Clare Carlisle. “The Question of Habit in Theology and 
Philosophy: From Hexis to Plasticity,” Body & Society, 19 (2&3), 2013: 30-57, pp. 30-34. For another philosophical 
account of the relationship between habit and brain plasticity that draws on Ravaisson’s work see Catherine 
Malabou. What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008), pp. 22-25. 
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Ravaissonian habit while avoiding his somewhat uncritical application of Leibnizian concepts of 
active force and natural inertia well after Kant’s critical objections.72 
Even if we reject the metaphysics of force to which Ravaisson appeals and instead 
ontologically ground his account of habit in neural processes, contemporary corroboration of his 
understanding of habit as a tendency, and its capacity to explain everyday observations concerning 
the effects of habit on human life that makes the notion an important contribution to theories of 
habit. In this regard, I would argue that even without Leibnizian metaphysics Ravaisson’s 
interpretation of habit as the expression of a desire to persist remains valuable for two reasons. 
First, it focuses attention on the active and goal-oriented nature of the process of habit more 
directly than the notion of plasticity. While discussions of plasticity go beyond mechanistic 
understandings of the brain and instead tend to view it as capable of self-regulation, Ravaisson’s 
use of the language of persistence draws attention to the drive-like characteristics of such 
maintenance.73 Habit entails an active process of producing tendencies and seeking out ways to 
maintain repeated changes that have effects on the mind and body as a whole, and the language of 
desire expresses more clearly than that of plasticity the intentional nature of this process. Second, 
the language of desire also highlights the progressive and affective dimensions of habit, its 
                                                          
72 The extent to which Ravaisson’s account of habit is dependent upon Leibnizian metaphysics is a matter of dispute. 
Andre Bellantone (“Ravaisson: Le ‘champ abandonné de la métaphysique,” Cahiers Philosophiques, 129 (2), 2012: 
5-21, p. 19) and Jeremy Dunham (“From Habit to Monads: Félix Ravaisson’s Theory of Substance,” British Journal 
of the History of Philosophy, 23 (6), 2015: 1085-1105, pp. 1099-1103) have argued that Ravaisson’s thesis on habit 
attempts to serve as a demonstration of Leibnizian monadology, while Sinclair (“Ravaisson and the Force of Habit, 
pp. 82-83) claims that Ravaisson’s description of habit does not rely on a “supersensible” or “dogmatic” notion of 
force, as the phenomena of habit nothing other than desire. I agree with Sinclair that Ravaisson’s understanding of 
habit desire is continuous with his larger metaphysics of nature but is not dependent upon it, but either way the issue 
is not central to my argument, as even if Ravaisson’s metaphysics cannot be sustained his understanding of habit as 
desire can be given an alternative ontological grounding.  
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subjective experience as a need for certain actions or sensations or as the enjoyment taken in 
repeating what one has done before.  
This view of habit as a desiderative, intentional process of responding to change culminates 
in an understanding of the body as permeated and oriented by desire that allows us to see Ravaisson 
as participating in the same project of challenging Cartesian mind-body dualism as Bergson and 
Merleau-Ponty. The phenomena of habit can only be explained by recognizing that the body is not 
merely extended but oriented and organized by desire. Ravaisson’s concept of habit thus 
challenges the body’s reduction (to paraphrase Sinclair) to a “third-person” object that can be 
understood independently of the self’s motivations and preferences.74 Insofar as consciously felt 
preferences are continuous with bodily tendencies, the body must be understood as a genuine 
aspect of subjectivity. One’s mannerisms and ways of acting reflect the desire to persist, such that 
conceptualizing actions as “behaviors” that can be comprehended in terms of statistical probability 
fundamentally misses their intentional nature.75 Bodily states and tendencies can only be 
understood as strategies by which one can persist in one’s way of being in the context of one’s life 
circumstances even as they change and develop. The body contains a principle of intelligence and 
of freedom that operates separately from consciousness and the will but is continuous with them, 
and it is to this principle that I will now turn. 
2. From Intelligence to Inclination 
 
So far, we have seen that the phenomena of habit cannot be explained if the body is 
understood solely as an object. I will argue in this section, however, that Ravaisson’s remarks on 
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75 For a genealogy of the elimination of “internalist” and “mentalist” conceptions of the passions and their slow 
replacement with objectively verifiable and measurable notions of “behavior” see Thomas Pfau, Minding the 





habit, although not stated in these terms, can be interpreted as constructing a unique picture of the 
body as subject. Ravaisson breaks with the Cartesian picture of the body by viewing it as animated 
by the desire to persist. Desire causes conscious goals to become states in which we tend to persist, 
such that through habituation the body functions as an intelligent and free agent capable of carrying 
out conscious goals in the absence of conscious acts of will. This this view of the body as an 
extension of conscious subjectivity anticipates contemporary conceptions of habit as skills, but 
also goes beyond them in certain respects. By grounding bodily intelligence and freedom in the 
desire to persist, Ravaisson is able to also articulate how they continue to develop once a set of 
habits has been acquired. Ravaisson’s concept of inclination articulates a process whereby 
habituation gives rise to purposive actions that also become easier and more immediate over time 
while also becoming imbued with an affective sense of familiarity and preference that can even 
become a need. Ravaisson can thus be understood as holding a dynamic theory of embodied 
subjectivity that follows from his understanding of habit as a tendency in which the body, while it 
continues to act in accordance with conscious goals, does so in an increasingly independent fashion 
from consciousness throughout the process of the acquisition and enactment of habits. 
Ravaisson does not go as far as we will see Merleau-Ponty do in arguing for mind-body 
unity, but instead argues that habit mediates between the two by incorporating consciously willed 
actions into the body’s tendencies. As we saw in the previous section, that habit is grounded in a 
form of desire indicates that it is in itself intentional and purposively oriented towards a certain 
goal, that of persisting in a particular way of being. This excludes any understanding of the actions 
that arise from habit as “rote” or blindly repetitive: habit instead entails a tendency that 
spontaneously adapts existing abilities in ways that allow the individual to maintain itself in a 





capacity of the body to carry out particular goals. Ravaisson thus regards the process of habit 
acquisition as one of forming the body in accordance with conscious goals, such that the body 
becomes an extension of conscious subjectivity: 
In reflection and the will, the end of movement is an idea, an ideal to be accomplished, something 
that ought to be, that can be, and which is not yet. It is a possibility to be realized. But to the extent 
that the end is merged with movement, and the movement with tendency, the possibility, the ideal 
is realized in it. The idea becomes being, the same being of the movement and the tendency that it 
determines. Habit becomes more and more a substantial idea. The obscure intelligence that succeeds 
reflection through habit, this immediate intelligence where object and subject are confused, is a real 
intuition, where the real and the ideal, being and thought are brought together. (H 55)  
 
Ravaisson’s language of the ideal and the real owes much to his metaphysical interests arising 
from German Idealism and in particular that of Schelling, whose lectures Ravaisson had attended 
a few years prior to the writing of his thesis, but for our purposes what is significant in this passage 
is his claim that in contracting a habit the body takes on a purposive character by gaining the ability 
to accomplish consciously willed goals through its own means.76 As a result, intelligence and 
agency cease to be the sole province of consciousness but are instead made “substantial” in the 
form of habitual tendencies. Habit is the extension of consciousness into the body in a way that 
allows it to be “realized:” goals proposed by consciousness are “ideal” representations that exist 
solely theoretically, and are actualized only insofar as they are embodied in the form of actions. 
Through habituation goals become literally incorporated, put into the body, in the form of 
tendencies that cause the body to function in an agential fashion and accomplish the will’s goals 
without any explicit acts of consciousness. Conscious intelligence and agency become diffused 
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throughout the body in the form of habitual tendencies, such that the body becomes an embodied 
subject that accomplishes conscious goals of its own accord. 
An example will help to clarify Ravaisson’s argument here. Insofar as subjectivity remains 
solely conscious, being a teacher is only an ideal representation or self-conception that serves as 
the goal of one’s actions.77 When one begins to teach, one must therefore consciously perform the 
actions associated with the goal of being a teacher (e.g., lesson planning, grading, classroom 
management). Repeating these actions over time, however, gives rise to a tendency and ultimately 
an inclination to act in ways appropriate to the role of teacher, and as one continues to encounter 
new situations in one’s teaching that inclination develops further into a set of abilities. To use 
Ravaisson’s terms, the ideal goal of being a teacher becomes “real” or “substantial” in the form of 
these habitual tendencies, and it also becomes more immediate as one needs to deliberate on how 
to perform the actions associated with teaching less and less. As a result, the body becomes as 
much of a teacher as consciousness, as it takes on the character of an agent that is capable of 
independently carrying out actions that realize the goal of being a teacher. One’s actions, bearing, 
and mannerisms all immediately conform to the goal of being a teacher, such that the distance 
between oneself as subject and the object of teaching decreases to the point of nonexistence. 
As the example of the teacher indicates, the status of the body as an intelligent agent grows 
gradually in the context of a particular set of goals. And indeed, Ravaisson’s understanding of 
bodily intelligence does not entail a static view of the body as a means to accomplish conscious 
ends but a dynamic one in which the body’s abilities to recognize how to accomplish a particular 
goal and to adapt itself in order to do so grow increasingly sophisticated. The body, in other words, 
is not simply an intelligent subject but one that learns. In a manner consonant with his 
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interpretation of the double law of habit, Ravaisson argues that goal-oriented actions become 
quicker, easier to accomplish, and more assured as the desire to persist inhabits organs and orients 
them to move in certain ways. Ravaisson now specifies that the strengthening of actions through 
habit entails the progressive cultivation of perceptual and bodily abilities. Just as the body develops 
the ability to engage in activities such as running with less effort through continual exercise, 
perception too becomes clearer and more distinguishing through habituation. In one of the few 
examples he provides in his treatise, Ravaisson argues that habituation increases a wine 
connoisseur’s ability to recognize and discriminate between ever more subtle differences in flavor, 
thereby gaining “taste” in wine (H 49). Ravaisson admittedly does not present a well-developed 
theory of perception, but his analysis of habit’s effects on perception closely follows that of Maine 
de Biran, for whom perception is an active faculty that is related to judgment and enables 
differentiation and comparison between objects. Perceiving something repeatedly or for an 
extended time gives rise to more distinct recognition of its features and an ability to differentiate 
them from others.78 Likewise, bodily and perceptual capacities allow ends to be accomplished 
without the need for deliberation. Through experience perception learns to recognize relevant 
features of situations as opportunities for action and primes bodily capacities to function in 
accordance with what is necessary to achieve a particular end. In this way habit allows goals to be 
accomplished unreflectively but precisely by “pulling down obstacles in front of them, and 
securing their means” (H 53) Through repetition this ability to grasp how to act in order to achieve 
a proper result becomes more immediate and less deliberative, and slowly becomes more 
sophisticated as well. 
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 In articulating this form of immediate coordination of perceptual and bodily capacities, 
Ravaisson anticipates many of the insights of contemporary discussions of habit as a form of 
“skilled” conduct. Ravaisson’s argument for immediacy in the relationship between habitual 
actions and conscious goals expresses in the language of German Idealism what contemporary 
skill theorists would call the “context sensitive” nature of skilled actions, their calibration to the 
opportunities afforded by a particular situation to achieve a desired end.79 Habitual actions are 
neither mechanical nor stereotyped but entail the spontaneous coordination of perceptual and 
bodily capacities to recognize what a particular situation requires with precision. In addition, 
Ravaisson’s argument that consciously undertaken actions become “by a succession of 
imperceptible degrees” tendencies that allow for the immediate unreflective accomplishment of 
goals describes in brief the process of gaining what Hubert Dreyfus for instance calls “expertise” 
(H 57).80 Dreyfus describes a process of skill acquisition in which processes of decision-making 
slowly through experience give way to perceptual and bodily responses to specific situations. 
When at first engaging in a particular activity a novice applies rules and plans strategies that 
sequence particular acts in order to achieve a goal. Through experience, however, the individual 
notices and remembers situational aspects of the activity in which they are engaged and constructs 
plans less through conscious deliberation and more through perception and memory in a manner 
                                                          
79 On the notion of context sensitivity see John Sutton et al. “Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes: Embodied Skills 
and Habits Between Dreyfus and Descartes,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 42 (1), 2011: 78-
103, pp. 79-80. 
 
80 The analysis of the process of cultivating “expertise” as an element of what he calls “skillful coping” as a form of 
intelligence in which perception and bodily capacities fluidly engage with situations has been a concern running 
throughout Hubert Dreyfus’ career, see chapter 8 of What Computers Can’t Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence 
(New York: Harper, 1972), and more pertinently for the concerns of this chapter “What is Moral Maturity? Towards 
a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise,” in Skillful Coping: Essays on the Phenomenology of Everyday Perception 
and Action, ed. Mark Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014: 183-201). I will return to Dreyfus’s concept 
of coping in Chapter Three. For a theory of skill acquisition that emphasizes “mindedness” or the presence of 
higher-level cognition in the acquisition of skills see Wayne Christensen et al. “Cognition in Skilled Action: Meshed 





strikingly similar to Ravaisson’s understanding of the manner in which bodily intelligence 
functions. For Dreyfus, habit is a form of practical knowledge that obviates the need for reason 
and problem-solving but allows goals to be achieved by “feel and familiarity” and through 
recognition what a particular situation requires.81 Like Ravaisson’s habituated body, an expert for 
Dreyfus does not act deliberatively but intuitively, to the point where she might not even by fully 
conscious of her actions. She simply sees what to do in a particular situation and allows her trained 
bodily abilities to carry it out.  
 Dreyfus’ account of expertise as a slowly developing ability nicely captures the sense of 
bodily learning Ravaisson is after. Yet in viewing habit not simply as an ability but moreover as a 
tendency, however, Ravaisson goes beyond Dreyfus’ by recognizing that embodied subjectivity is 
dynamic in yet a second sense, namely in that it conforms to the dynamism of habituation as a 
process of expressing the desire to persist. Ravaisson goes into greater depth than Dreyfus 
regarding the qualitative aspects of the process of bodily learning, the ways habitual actions are 
accomplished more quickly over time and as more of a need. Ravaisson expresses these qualitative 
aspects of habit by referring to what grows out of repetition of goal-oriented actions as an 
“inclination” (penchant) (H 55). The French term penchant refers both to a tendency to do 
something and a liking or preference for something, and Ravaisson plays on both of these meanings 
in order to express both the increased ease and rapidity with which habitual actions are 
accomplished and the conscious preference for them that grows over time, even to the point of 
becoming compulsive. Ravaisson refers to these aspects of habitual tendencies as spontaneity and 
taste respectively, and together they articulate how continued repetition causes habits to 
progressively strengthen such that the goals they achieve gain primacy in practical life. 
                                                          





As conscious goals become habitual, they too become states in which one strives to persist. 
As a result, habits that follow from the will’s initial movements begin not simply to operate 
independently of them, but do so moreover more quickly and easily. Desire, as we have seen, does 
not affect the body neutrally, but actively impels it to behave in a particular manner and not others. 
As this desire grows, the body experiences increased pressure to adapt itself so as to achieve 
conscious goals in new circumstances, and acts with greater immediacy. Focusing on the origin of 
habit in desire thus allows Ravaisson to attend to the dynamic nature of embodied agency in a 
manner that is absent in Dreyfus’ account. Embodied agency is affected by the dynamics of desire, 
such that the body cannot be understood as free in a simple fashion but instead as free to a varying 
degree that depends upon the strength of the desire to persist. Ravaisson expresses this variable 
form of freedom as “spontaneity” that is “equally opposed to mechanical Fatality and reflective 
Freedom” (H 55). The body, incapable of reflection and choice, follows the dictates of the will and 
hence does not act autonomously. The body is not therefore necessitated in a mechanical sense but 
is instead governed by the “necessity of attraction and desire” in which perceptual and bodily 
capacities immediately and without reflection coordinate in ways that are oriented towards the 
satisfaction of the desire to persist (H 57). The body’s freedom is thus a situated freedom, limited 
both by the extent of conscious goals, and also by the amount of pressure desire places on it at a 
particular time. Spontaneity expresses continuity between reflective will and the immediacy of 
instinct through which actions are calibrated to resolve needs with perfect automaticity. In 
Ravaisson’s words, spontaneity is a “mobile middle term” between will and instinct, a “dividing 
line that is always moving, and which advances by imperceptible progress from one extremity to 
the other” (H 59). Habit remains a second nature, an acquired nature, which cannot take over the 





and instinct is only one of degree, and through the contraction of a habit one increasingly acts 
without reflection or cause and tends towards automatism. This process results in skilled abilities 
that allow us to accomplish our goals, but it also slowly takes over from reflection and comes to 
be governed by the desire to persist through which actions become almost automatic. 
The same force of persistence also creates a felt preference to act in ways that accomplish 
goals that have become habitual inclinations. When one pursues habitual goals, the striving that 
underlies one’s acquired habits is temporarily satisfied. As actions become habitual they therefore 
become increasingly pleasurable as they require less effort to undertake compared to actions that 
must be consciously willed.82 This is experienced in everyday life as a sense of comfort or 
familiarity with accustomed ways of acting, and conversely discomfort or difficulty when acting 
in unfamiliar ways. Drawing on the physiologist Matthieu Buisson, Ravaisson uses the term “taste” 
to describe this familiarity as a tacit sensation that is often only noticed when one is in an 
unaccustomed situation or engaging in an unfamiliar activity.83 In keeping with his dynamic 
conception of habit, however, Ravaisson departs form Buisson in arguing that taste itself grows 
stronger through repetition. One’s comfort with a particular manner of acting can become more of 
a felt presence and fall upon a narrower range of activities, while the discomfort in the presence of 
difference grows stronger and more widespread. Ravaisson goes so far as to claim that actions can 
anticipate the will so greatly and become such strong preferences that they “degenerate into 
                                                          
82 This observation does not, as it might seem, fall afoul of the double law of habit. Pleasure, Ravaisson argues, is 
attached to action in the form of familiarity or comfort with it and does not recede from consciousness as pleasures 
associated with sensations do. The pleasure in each case is of a qualitatively different type, even though Ravaisson 
uses the same language to name them. 
 
83 Buisson refers to this pleasure as an “analogy” between ourselves and our lived environments where our bodily 
and mental capacities interact harmoniously with the external world. This analogy expresses an attunement between 
our mental and bodily capacities with the objects that surround us that comes to form our taste for those objects. 
Continued activity results in greater attunement with our environment, causing us to take pleasure in interacting with 
our surroundings and producing preferences through habit, such that in Buisson’s words “my habits are my joys.” 





convulsive ones, which are called tics” (H 51). Ravaisson mentions this possibility only in passing, 
but the claim appears to be that preferences towards certain actions can grow so strong that one 
feels a compulsion to repeat them. As a result, habitual actions cease, at least to a certain degree, 
to function intelligently and become needs to repeat specific acts more or less identically regardless 
of context. Habit again does not become machinic or routine but rather a kind of addiction that 
results from the force of desire reaching the nearest point to the irresistibility of instinct. 
The dynamically embodied subject is therefore not indifferently open to all possibilities, 
but actively oriented towards goals that have become habitual. This sense of being driven towards 
particular possibilities rather than others is absent in skill-based accounts of habit. Dreyfus 
recognizes a form of tension in the process of coping in the concept of “maximum grip” he adapts 
from Merleau-Ponty, where the calibration of habitual actions to particular situations is 
“motivated” by a draw towards an equilibrium of optimal control of a particular situation.84 Expert 
practitioners of a particular activity intuitively sense when a particular action or trajectory 
conduces to their overall aim and when it does not, and in the latter case experience discomfort 
that resolves to satisfaction when equilibrium is achieved.85 While the form of tension Dreyfus 
drives intelligent action in the context of achieving a particular goal, the notion of inclination leads 
Ravaisson to conclude that the key tension habituation produces pertains to the goal itself. As the 
goal-oriented exercise and coordination of bodily and perceptual capacities grows stronger, the 
body becomes increasingly oriented towards the particular goal over which they are set. At a 
physical level, Ravaisson notes that someone who is accustomed to hard physical labor loses some 
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85 Compare Dreyfus’ account of the subjective dimensions of achieving grip with the description of the enjoyment 
garnered from experiencing “feedback” from a particular activity in so-called “flow experiences” in Mihaly 





of their manual dexterity and writes less firmly.86 The change in bodily capacities that occurs 
through repetition increases skill in one area but decreases it in others. To return to the previous 
example, phrases one uses in teaching, ways of interacting with students, one’s bearing in the 
classroom, all gradually become integrated into one’s everyday comportment and can even extend 
outside the context of the school. In each case, as one’s actions become more immediate and 
preferred, they become more narrowly focused on a particular goal. This does not mean that actions 
become blindly repetitive, but rather that the goal towards which they aim becomes paramount in 
one’s practical life, or in Ravaisson’s words it “involuntarily, even convulsively, surpasses any 
end placed before one’s accustomed end” (H 59). The forms of behavior and feeling one acquires 
in one context overflows that context and irrupts into others involuntarily, such that one acquires 
a characteristic way of being that tends to dominate over other possibilities. 
While he uses this language specifically to relate will and instinct, it would not be unfair 
to say that habit for Ravaisson serves as the “mobile middle term” between mind and body. 
Through habit ideal goals become literally incorporated, put into the body in the form of 
inclinations. In this regard, Derrida is not incorrect to say that Ravaisson’s theory of mind-body 
unity is really a theory of mind-body “continuism,” even though his use of the term is 
disparaging.87 Ravaisson’s language of the real and the ideal is dialectical and suggests a mediated 
unity of mind and body that might not be satisfying to contemporary theorists of embodied 
cognition. In spite of this, Ravaisson’s concept of habitual inclination enriches our understanding 
of embodied subjectivity by emphasizing not only the body’s capacity for practical intelligence 
                                                          
86 Ravaisson again turns to physiology to provide evidence for his claims, in this case the vitalist Joseph Barthez, see 
Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair, “Editor’s Commentary,” in Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit, p. 103. 
 
87 Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005), p. 156. Derrida argues that Ravaisson “derives his axioms from Maine de Biran,” a claim my argument in 





but also its driven character. Ravaisson’s dynamic theory of embodied subjectivity anticipates the 
transition from conscious deliberation to the coordination of bodily and perceptual capacities in 
habitual action described by contemporary theories of skill, but applies his interpretation of habit 
as desire to demonstrate that the body is actively oriented towards goals that have become habitual. 
In doing so, I would argue that Ravaisson grounds the Aristotelian notion of “character” in his 
ontology of desire.88 By illustrating how habitual goals become increasingly spontaneous and 
matters of taste, Ravaisson explains how the mannerisms, projects, and preferences that qualify 
our behavior and differentiate us from others become engrained in us. The concept of inclination 
with its related aspects of spontaneity and taste develop the notion of tendency into an explanation 
of what it means for habitual ways of being to appear to be “second nature.” Ravaisson chooses as 
an epigraph for his thesis on habit Aristotle’s line from On Memory and Recollection that reads: 
“hōsper gar phusis ēdē to ethos,” which translates to either “habit is a second nature,” or more 
literally “habit is just like nature.”89 This invocation of the notion of second nature, I would 
suggest, is both literal and figurative. While on the one hand the notion of second nature is 
explained by the continuity between will and instinct the desire to persist represents, at the level 
of practice it indicates that as habits grow stronger they become more instinctive in the sense that 
they are accomplished with greater immediacy and from felt preference rather than from choice. 
As an inclination grows one’s actions become progressively less “minded,” such that the body, 
perception, and emotion take on increasingly agential roles in one’s actions. As a result, the ideal 
goals that consciousness and the will posit become realized in ever strengthening tendencies that 
cause those goals to come to define one’s practical life. The progress of habit blurs the distinction 
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between first and second nature, what is natural and what is acquired, as through the production of 
an inclination one’s habitual actions and preferences become the foundation for one’s way of being 
as a whole. 
Although I have attempted to defend Ravaisson’s concept of inclination as able to be put 
into conversation with contemporary discussions of habit and bodily intelligence, it is not without 
its flaws. In particular, Ravaisson does not fully resolve some of the questions that arise from his 
understanding of the dynamics of the production of habitual inclinations. Ravaisson’s claim that 
the strengthening of taste can cause habits to become compulsive is left underanalyzed. Ravaisson 
does not enumerate the conditions under which habit “degenerates” into addiction. This is a 
problem especially since the dynamics of his theory of habit conceive of habitual tendencies as 
progressively strengthening through repetition, which would seem to imply a propensity to fall 
into automatism that would ultimately weaken his argument for conceiving of habit as the basis of 
embodied intelligence. One way that this issue could be resolved is by articulating how different 
habits interact with one another and perhaps prevent each other from becoming too strong. The 
closest Ravaisson comes to a discussion of how different forms of action affect one another, 
however, is in his statement that habitual goals “surpass” non-habitual goals as a result of the 
retraining of the body, perception, and the emotions. While this argument is persuasive enough 
when it comes to explaining the difficulty of consciously willing actions that differ from one’s 
established habits, it is less helpful in articulating how different established habits affect one other 
(e.g., the habits associated with being a teacher, being a father, etc.). Ravaisson’s is ultimately a 
theory of habit, not of habits, and this causes his account of the dynamics of habit acquisition to 
become unidirectional in a way that introduces a tension between his central claims. While on the 





to explain how the gradually increasing strength of habitual inclinations does not overwhelm that 
intelligence and degenerate into addiction (H55). 
3. Ravaisson on Moral Pedagogy: Virtue and the Art of Life 
 
By relating the concept of inclination to the Aristotelian notion of character, Ravaisson 
already hints at the moral dimensions of his theory of habit. Ravaisson ultimately confirms 
philosophy’s value in changing everyday conduct by articulating a program of moral pedagogy 
that is grounded in his theory of habit. As a result, Ravaisson’s conception of moral pedagogy not 
only avoids Shusterman’s critique of intellectualism but also strengthens his claim that the body 
is an essential component of philosophical practice by constructing a powerful argument that the 
habituated body is the primary locus of moral agency. Ravaisson deploys his dynamic theory of 
embodied subjectivity to criticize what he views as intellectualist theories of moral pedagogy such 
as Aristotelian virtue ethics and the Stoic art of life. In doing so, Ravaisson demonstrates that the 
body is capable of learning to independently recognize and comport itself according to an ethical 
ideal. In place of conceptions of the moral subject that subordinate the body to rational capacities 
of deliberation and moral knowledge that only give rise to compliance with virtue, Ravaisson 
argues that the aesthetic imitation of models develops a gradually-increasing love of virtue that 
makes virtuous conduct into a skillful, spontaneous, and preferential state of being. In this regard, 
while Hadot is right to emphasize the importance of the aesthetics of grace in Ravaisson’s 
conception of philosophical practice, reading this aesthetics through his conception of embodiment 
reveals that Ravaisson’s appropriation of the Stoic art of life articulates a program of cultivating 
an embodied subject of virtue, which does not simply conform to but rather actively defines how 
to express virtuous commitments in particular situations, and thus serves as the basis of a strongly 





Although he does not put it in these terms in his treatise on habit, Ravaisson lays the 
theoretical groundwork for his interpretation of the art of life in a section of his treatise where he 
applies his concept of bodily intelligence to what he calls the “moral world.” Ravaisson argues 
that the same principles that explain how conscious practical goals become habitual apply to the 
project of achieving individual perfection. The moral world should be understood as merely an 
extension of the practical world as the “highest domain of freedom” in which it is the same person 
who “proposes its own end for itself, and who commands itself and who executes action” (H 71). 
Whereas in practical life it is possible to be carrying out another’s goals, be acting on another’s 
orders, or more generally be acting out of need, the moral world is delimited by one’s own 
understanding of the good and aspiration for “absolute perfection” (H 69). Moral pedagogy for 
Ravaisson is the project of achieving a particular state of character, a set of habitual dispositions 
that correspond to one’s conception of the good life. Making his parallel between the practical and 
ethical worlds explicit, Ravaisson argues that “morals and morality are formed” through repetition 
of willed actions that gives rise to an “inclination” to act in accordance with the good (H 69). Just 
as one becomes a teacher by practicing actions that accord with one’s understanding of what it 
means to be a teacher until those actions become habitual, one becomes good by creating a habit 
of acting in accordance with one’s understanding of the good. Through the process of habit 
acquisition one begins to act spontaneously, without reflection but intelligently, in accordance with 
the good, at the same time as one gains a preference or taste for doing so. 
In drawing this parallel between the practical and moral worlds, Ravaisson signals that 
embodied intelligence and freedom, rather than conscious intentionality, are the basis of ethical 
agency. Although moral formation begins for Ravaisson as a willed choice to act in accordance 





inclination that becomes a spontaneous, non-conscious way of being in the world. This suspicion 
is confirmed when we look at Ravaisson’s creative appropriation of the Aristotelian concept of 
virtue. While he retains Aristotle’s understanding of virtue as a state or disposition (hexis) of 
character, Ravaisson displaces Aristotle’s emphasis on the unity between intellectual and moral 
virtue and on the grounding of virtuous action in knowing choice and instead affirms a concept of 
virtue in which actions are not self-conscious but instead governed by bodily spontaneity and felt 
preference.90 Ravaisson devotes a brief section of his study of Aristotelian metaphysics published 
a year prior to his thesis on habit to the role of Aristotle’s metaphysical thought in his ethics, in 
which Ravaisson focuses on the relationship between virtue and pleasure. He interprets Aristotle’s 
claim that the sign of a virtuous state of character is the “supervening” of pleasure on action as 
describing harmony between the virtuous agent’s actions and feelings that allows for free choice.91 
Crucially, this harmony comes about through the acquisition of a virtuous habit, which he already 
calls the “interior reality of action.”92 In Ravaisson’s reading, actions become pleasurable such 
that they can be said to follow from virtuous states of character when there is perfect harmony 
between dispositions (hexeis) and acts, or in other words when there is no divergence between an 
                                                          
90 Clare Carlisle’s statement that Ravaisson’s theory of habit “provides a wider context” for Aristotelian moral 
psychology therefore does not seem to go far enough in articulating the differences between the two theories of 
virtue (“Between Freedom and Necessity: Félix Ravaisson on Habit and the Moral Life,” Inquiry, 53 (2), 2010: 123-
156, p. 136). While both use the language of habituation and second nature in describing the process of acquiring 
virtue, the dynamism in Ravaisson’s theory of habit results in a much greater emphasis on pleasure and spontaneity 
as marks of a virtuous character rather than the ability to deliberate well. 
 
91 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104b4: “Sēmeion de dei poieisthai tōn hexeōn tēn epiginomenēn hēdonēn ē lupēn 
tois ergois.” 
 
92 Félix Ravaisson, Essai sur la métaphysique d’Aristote, Tome I (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
[1837] 1963), p. 445. Ravaisson’s original Essai sur la métaphysique d’Aristotle was completed in 1834 and was 
then expanded into a volume published in 1837. The concluding chapter of the 1834 mémoire is published as Félix 
Ravaisson, De la Métaphysique d’Aristote: Mémoire sur la question mise au concours par l’Académie des science 
morales et politiques en 1833, in Raynald Belay and Claire Marin eds., De la nature à l’esprit: Études sur la 





ethical agent’s conscious choices and her “interior” preferences.93  While Ravaisson’s application 
of the language of interiority to Aristotle is questionable, the thrust of his reading is that taking 
pleasure from acting rightly creates a disposition to choose to act with knowledge of the good for 
its own sake.94 Through habituation, the virtuous agent becomes the possessor of a stable and 
lasting disposition that supports the achievement of her overall life goals, and gains the ability to 
deliberate on how to achieve those goals. 
That alignment between action and feeling is made possible through habituation in 
Aristotle provides Ravaisson with the opportunity to reconsider the nature of virtue in light of his 
theory of habit. For as we have seen, through the growth of habitual inclinations actions gradually 
recede from consciousness and become states in which the body desires to persist. As a result, 
reason will slowly cease to exercise a governing function over one’s actions as one’s bodily 
intelligence gradually increases in strength and skillfulness. The notion of simple “harmony” 
between reason and emotion that Ravaisson sees in Aristotle, therefore, cannot be sustained. It 
follows from the progressive nature of the acquisition of habits that eventually desire itself will 
become the basis of one’s actions instead of rational deliberation. From Ravaisson’s perspective, 
the conscious awareness of one’s own actions presupposed by the notions of choice and 
deliberation gradually diminishes through the development of a habitual inclination. The increased 
immediacy of bodily spontaneity removes the need for deliberation and choice, leaving conscious 
free instead for other matters. Indeed, as habits become preferences and even needs, one’s 
opportunities to engage in deliberation and choice will increasingly diminish as the body will act 
                                                          
93 Cf. Ravaisson, Essai sur la métaphysique d’Aristote I, p. 450: “Custom produces habit, habit produces desire, and 
desire produces action.” 
 
94 For an appraisal of Ravaisson’s interpretation of Aristotle see Pierre Aubenque, “Ravaisson interprète d’Aristote,” 





before consciousness can intervene. While Ravaisson’s own conception of virtue retains 
Aristotle’s emphasis on the linkage between pleasure and action, as a result of his concept of 
habitual inclinations it interprets the growth of pleasure through Ravaisson’s theory of habit in a 
way that overthrows the primacy of conscious choice and deliberation in virtuous action in favor 
of bodily spontaneity: 
Virtue is at first an effort, a cause of fatigue; by practice alone it becomes an attraction and a 
pleasure, a desire that forgets itself or is unaware of itself, and little by little approaches the holiness 
of innocence. This is the whole secret of education. Its art lies in attracting someone to the good by 
action, and in so doing fix the inclination for it. In this way, a second nature is formed (H 69). 
 
Ravaisson’s description of virtue acquisition fits neatly within his account of the double law of 
habit, in which habitual actions slowly grow easier to accomplish over time and eventually become 
pleasures. In this regard, echoes of the concepts of spontaneity and taste can be heard in this 
account: Ravaisson’s description of a slow progress of virtue acquisition that culminates in the 
formation of a “second nature” recapitulates the progress of spontaneity towards automaticity and 
indicates that the acquisition of virtue orients bodily intelligence and inclination towards the goal 
of becoming good.  
In reinterpreting virtue as an inclination, Ravaisson argues that being led by the pleasure 
associated with action is a more effective way to ensure adherence to one’s commitments than 
acting through deliberate choice. Habituation creates a non-self-conscious desire to act virtuously 
that impels one to act in accordance with the good. Aristotle’s understanding of the virtuous agent 
as someone who knowingly chooses to act rightly entails a static relationship with one’s 
commitments that is maintained in the course of one’s actions.95 If by contrast virtue is grounded 
in desire, then one’s attachment to it will grow over in the process of habituation: “love is 
augmented by its own expressions” (H 69). Virtue as a habit will grow more deeply engrained in 
                                                          





the agent in the course of a virtuous life, such that the sign of a virtuous state of character goes 
beyond agreement between reason and desire to the point where one’s desire to act rightly becomes 
so strong as to overcome self-awareness, such that one’s actions approximate perfect spontaneity 
and one achieves a state of “innocence.” The Aristotelian phronimos who deliberates and chooses 
right action is thus not the proper representation of the ethical subject, but rather the non-self-
conscious holiness of the recipient of divine grace. Ravaisson’s theological allusion indicates that 
habituation causes virtue to become so deeply embedded within individuals that the body appears 
to be spiritualized or animated in a manner that goes beyond ordinary human capabilities.96 
Quoting the “profound theologian” François Fénelon, Ravaisson claims that habit in the moral 
sphere functions as “prevenient grace,” a form of grace precedes action and the will and frees them 
from bondage to sin (H 71). For Fénelon, prevenient grace anticipates our acts of willing and 
provides us with whatever dispositions are required for our improvement.97 Grace is the assistance 
of god that allows humans to act in ways they could not otherwise, and for Ravaisson, habit can 
be analogized to grace in that it gives rise to immediate and preferential action in accordance with 
virtue that the rational subject cannot by itself achieve. By making virtue into an inclination, bodily 
spontaneity and intelligence function like a gift that allows that allows the will’s ends to be fulfilled 
more powerfully than consciously-undertaken action can accomplish. Conscious deliberation and 
choice is not the source of virtuous action, but rather the unconscious and spontaneous inclination 
that results from the contraction of a habit. 
                                                          
96 I do not discuss Ravaisson’s theory of nature in detail in this chapter. On Ravaisson’s understanding of nature as 
governed by desire and freedom see Jean-Ivar Linden, “Fin, finitude et désir infini. Quelques remarques sur 
l’aristotélisme de Ravaisson,” in Denis Thouard ed. Aristote au XIXe siècle (Paris: Septentrion, 2004: 171-207), and 
for discussion of the influence of Schelling in particular on Ravaisson’s association of freedom and nature see Gaëll 
Guibert, Félix Ravaisson: D’une philosophie première à la philosophie de la révélation de Schelling, Présentation 
de fragments inédits, (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2006), p. 106. 
 
97 François Fénelon, Traité de l’existence et des attributs de Dieu, Paris: Delagrave, 1872, p. 216, cf. François 





 Ravaisson’s case for an embodied theory of moral agency is stronger than Shusterman’s 
arguments for treating the body as a component of philosophical practice as it affirms the 
independence of the body as the subject of virtue. Shusterman’s arguments fall down two main 
lines98: first, in a manner reminiscent of Marcel Mauss’ view of the body as a technological 
instrument, Shusterman claims that the body is our primary tool or means by which to achieve the 
ends of rational thought and practical action. Caring for the body thus facilitates our ability to 
achieve our consciously-posited ends. And second, that the body is also in part the subject of 
aesthetic and emotional experience, such that improving its capacities enriches our overall 
appreciation of the cultural world. Ravaisson’s theological language, however, indicates that the 
habituated body does not simply take a subordinate role as consciousness’ tool or means but 
gradually outstrips even its abilities to engage in virtuous conduct. While moral goals are 
consciously posited, the acquisition of a habit of virtue replaces consciousness with the body as 
the governing principle of ethical action. Ravaisson’s case for bodily self-cultivation expands the 
range of embodied subjectivity outside of the practical and ethical domains to also encompass the 
moral domain and provides a more robust account of the role of the body as a subject of virtue. 
The body is capable of a desire for virtue that makes ethical conduct spontaneous in a way that 
rational deliberation cannot match, such that cultivation of the body is of primary importance in 
the pursuit of ethical commitments. 
 But how, precisely is the body to be cultivated to acquire virtue? It is surprising, given the 
centrality of the body as the primary subject of virtue, how little space Ravaisson gives to the 
methods of moral pedagogy in De l’habitude apart from the association of education with the 
production of desire cited above that is little more than a suggestion. He further hints that it is in 
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fact the good (or god) itself that gives rise to the desire to act according to the good, grounding his 
theory of virtue in a teleological metaphysics, but the process of becoming good can be understood 
entirely in terms of habit acquisition more generally (H 71). Yet this picture of moral formation is 
incomplete. Ravaisson articulates how virtue is acquired through habituation, but is silent on any 
notion of vice and has very little to say about the process of overcoming existing habits more 
generally. Ravaisson suggestively remarks that through the continuous – and likely painful – 
application of conscious effort, habitual actions can return to the sphere of consciousness and 
therefore to subordination to the will (H 57).99 Yet how bad habits are recognized as such, and how 
conscious attention is directed towards them, remain unanswered questions in this account.  
Ravaisson begins to answer these questions in his later work by providing an interpretation 
of Socratic self-examination that emphasizes the role of desire in overcoming bad habits. Socrates, 
Ravaisson argues, exemplifies a self-critical moment where one reflects upon one’s current ways 
of living and attempts to change them. Ravaisson’s interpretation of Socratic philosophy entails 
what Pierre Hadot would call a “return to oneself” in which one attempts to view and change one’s 
own way of living from the perspective of philosophical knowledge and methodology.100 
Significantly, however, Ravaisson understands this return to oneself as not primarily a rational 
project of self-examination, but an emotional one. In place of the process of elenchic testing in 
which values and aspirations are subjected to rational scrutiny, Ravaisson views the Socratic return 
to oneself as a process of changing one’s inclinations. A return to the self is necessary not in order 
to rationally evaluate one’s goals but rather to combat the “resistance posed by prejudice and 
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100 Hadot views the “return to oneself” as the first, self-critical moment in the process of conversion, which is 
followed by a self-externalization towards the truth, see Pierre Hadot, “‘Conversio’,” in Plotin, Porphyre: Études 





passions” to ways of living that differ from one’s current tendencies.101 This resistance is not 
simply laziness in thought but an active striving in which preferences for current ways of life 
struggle against one’s conscious commitments. Socratic philosophy entails a struggle between 
different aspirations, and philosophical practice effects the transition from one set of goals to 
another. 
Ravaisson’s invocation of Socrates clarifies the nature of the problems projects of moral 
formation face. The nature of habitual inclinations makes rational self-criticism insufficient as a 
motivator for change as it does not directly impact the desires that govern habitual actions. The 
active resistance of prejudice and passion arising from current ways of being, forms of resistance 
that can be interpreted as outgrowths of the desire to persist, must be countered by practice that 
directly replaces the specific form of desire that is their wellspring with another oriented towards 
the good.  
Ravaisson’s appropriation of the Stoic concept of the art of life attempts to solve the related 
problems of (1) becoming conscious of one’s current bad habits, and (2) weakening and replacing 
the desires at the heart of bad habits. The concept of the art of life appeals to Ravaisson as he is in 
sympathy with the ideal of self-perfection it represents. Ravaisson praises Stoic ethics as having 
achieved to the highest degree in antiquity the project of articulating principles of “measure and 
harmony” that human life can follow.102 For Ravaisson, the Stoic art of life entails the total 
integration of reason and action and the achievement of near-perfect harmony in individual 
character. By viewing wisdom as an art (ars, technē), the Stoics provide a pedagogical method in 
which individuals are trained to use a rational standard of measuring appropriate actions and 
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emotions and gradually develop a habit of self-judgment.103 In this way, the Stoic philosopher 
becomes conscious of her habits and gains an ability to criticize them, allowing her to pursue a life 
lived in accordance with the rationality immanent to the structure of the cosmos. Represented in 
the figure of the sage whose impulses are constantly submitted to rational examination, the Stoic 
ideal of “wisdom” provides an example of a pedagogy that is designed to solve the two problems 
associated with ethical formation and therefore of the seamless unity of philosophical commitment 
and everyday conduct Ravaisson hopes philosophy can provide. 
Despite Ravaisson’s general admiration for Stoic ethics, however, his placement of 
gradually strengthening desire at the foundation of moral character prevents him from simply 
taking on Stoic pedagogy or its ideal of rational self-control for his own theory of moral formation. 
Ravaisson agrees with the Stoics that philosophical practice as a form of art functions by 
establishing a criterion by which one can judge one’s character and use as a measure for achieving 
harmony between ethical commitment and action. Using a rational standard to accomplish this 
goal, however, fails to inspire lasting change in conduct. Ravaisson’s grounding of behavior in an 
ontological desire to persist is incompatible with what he views as the rationalistic basis of the 
Stoic unity of character, where reason unilaterally governs action and is placed in direct opposition 
to the passions.104 The Stoics deny that irrational nature has any ethical value, and this results for 
Ravaisson in the maintenance of the sage’s harmonious character through increasing tension of the 
soul or “force” (iskhus), rather than by spontaneous consonance between rational commitments 
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and desires.105 The perfect harmony between reason and action in the sage’s comportment is 
merely illusory, and Ravaisson argues that their failure to grasp the importance of desire as a 
component of our psychology explains the famous Stoic denials that there has ever been a living 
sage.106 That desire is at the foundation of our ways of being causes the Stoic art of life to devolve 
into rational domination of the passionate and affective aspects of one’s psychology, such that its 
failure to bring about harmony of character is inevitable. 
Instead of using a rational standard of judgment as the criterion for assessing one’s conduct, 
Ravaisson argues that applying aesthetic criteria solves the problems of becoming conscious of 
one’s habits and creating a desire to live better without falling into self-repression. Specifically, 
Ravaisson argues that imitating sensible models of ideal conduct engages the body’s capacity for 
learning and thus makes possible the stable cultivation of virtue. Crucial to Ravaisson’s argument 
is the claim that repeated experience with such models is sufficient to train perception and desire 
and hence cultivates a habitual inclination for the principle that model exemplifies: “habit is born 
from repeated action, or if not from an action itself, frequently reproduced simulations of action: 
the signs that give us a manner of feeling and thinking and have the general effect of engraining 
the disposition in us.”107 Frequent experience with examples of a mode of action produces a 
similar, if perhaps weaker, taste for that action as a “sign” of the virtue or goal it exemplifies. 
Recalling from the previous sections that Ravaisson considers perception to be a form of action, 
his argument here can be understood as a specific application of his theory of habit acquisition. 
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Examining models of virtuous action slowly develops more skillful perception of that virtue, an 
ability to discriminate between different forms that virtue takes in particular circumstances with 
increasing immediacy and ease. As this ability develops one gains an intuitive or aesthetic 
understanding of that virtue and learns to recognize it when it is instantiated in a particular action. 
At the same time, repetition also gives rise to familiarity with that virtue and ultimately a liking 
for it. In this way exposure to examples is able to produce a substitute habitual inclination that 
“engrains” a virtuous disposition in us even though one does not enact that virtue. 
 The practice of imitation thus solves the issues left unaddressed in Ravaisson’s early 
discussion of virtue by cultivating a skill of recognizing virtue that precedes the skill of enacting 
it. This kind of preparation engrains an aesthetic sense of virtue into one’s perceptual abilities, 
thereby changing one’s form of experience by allowing one to immediately interpret actions or 
individuals in terms of their virtuous qualities. This ability specifically allows one to recognize 
one’s own faults in contrast with the model’s perfection: imitation produces “good judgment of 
the eye,” an ability to recognize the mannerisms of a particular artist’s vision and to differentiate 
their style not only from others but – crucially – also from one’s own work.108 The training of 
perception and the cultivation of taste makes possible critical assessment of one’s own work in 
contrast to the model and a desire to develop an individual style that matches the beauty of while 
not simply replicating another’s work. Extending his analogy between aesthetic and ethical 
judgment, Ravaisson claims that just as one gains the ability to grasp an inner principle of aesthetic 
style through experience with works of art, examples of virtuous conduct trains perception to 
perceive and judge “character,” the “principle of the…will” that is the basis of their habitual 
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tendencies and that governs their actions.109 A state of character is grasped in the same manner as 
the serpentine principle in art, through perception that intuitively grasps the unifying principle 
behind an individual’s actions. Through experience with models of good conduct, one learns to 
recognize the virtue those models exemplify and to differentiate it from other forms of character, 
such that the principle behind those models serves as a criterion by which to judge one’s own 
conduct.110 The cultivation of taste and the training of perception work together to facilitate the 
Socratic return to oneself by producing a preference for virtuous ways of acting while 
simultaneously cultivating the ability to contrast oneself with a particular model. Contrast between 
one’s current mannerisms and those of the model creates dissatisfaction with oneself or 
“restlessness” in Ravaisson’s words through which a desire to be like the model arises.111 Imitation 
of models thus engages the ethical practitioner at the emotional level in a much stronger fashion 
than the memorization of rules or codes of conduct can. Moral education occurs not through 
learning to apply rules to particular cases but through the training of perception and desire that 
ultimately results in a “good impulsion to affections, sensibility, and the will.”112 
 Commenting on this theory of aesthetic education, Hadot argues that the goal of 
Ravaisson’s philosophical practice is to transform one’s perceptual experience of the world. The 
training of perception, Hadot rightly notes, is not limited to the cultivation of an ability to see 
particular actions as virtuous or vicious but extends to a change in our general way of interpreting 
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experiences.113 Our analysis of the dynamic nature of embodied subjectivity for Ravaisson allows 
us to understand why this is the case: repetition of interpreting actions and events in terms of their 
moral value gradually makes those forms of interpretation a tendency within the subject that comes 
to define their spontaneous comportment. For Hadot, this goal situates Ravaisson’s work not only 
within the tradition of ancient philosophy as a way of life as a whole, but specifically as sharing 
its characteristic existential concern with the stultification of everyday life. Hadot views Ravaisson 
as a precursor to Bergson, who we will see in the following chapter understands philosophy as a 
project of fundamentally changing our manner of experiencing and relating to the world away from 
the everyday and towards a state of self-consciousness.114 As a result, Ravaisson’s theory of 
aesthetic education is important to Hadot as it provides an example of how the ancient tradition of 
philosophy can be actualized in the present. By learning to see the grace and virtue in nature and 
in other people, following Ravaisson’s recommendations makes achieving the aim of ancient 
philosophical practice of attaining consciousness and mastery over oneself possible without having 
to take on their theories of perception and nature. 
 We will look in greater detail at the relationship between Ravaisson and Bergson’s forms 
of philosophical practice in the following chapter, but contextualizing Ravaisson’s understanding 
of aesthetic education as an outgrowth of his theory of embodied subjectivity allows us to see how 
his aesthetic education’s transformation of our habits of perception do not result in conscious self-
mastery but in the body’s own active orientation towards virtue. Against Hadot’s valorization of 
conscious knowledge and control of oneself, Ravaisson’s preference for aesthetic over rational 
training avoids Stoic rationalism and serves to complement his early criticism of the Aristotelian 
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notion of deliberation by arguing that moral education is undertaken most effectively when the 
body functions as the subject of its own cultivation. On the one hand, setting up reason as the 
governor of one’s conduct is unnecessary as the habituated body is capable of governing itself. 
More importantly, however, when pedagogy activates embodied subjectivity it gains the advantage 
of the skillfulness and preferentiality of habitual action. Treating the body and desire as self-
regulating subjects instead of irrational principles to be excised from the philosophical life as the 
Stoics do allows imitation as a form of moral pedagogy to use inherent dynamism of habit to impel 
the body to learn to recognize virtue and desire to approximate it for itself. Once perception has 
been trained to recognize virtuous ideals and to differentiate them from other forms of conduct, 
including one’s own, the body gains both the ability and the motivation to conform to that model. 
In doing so, the art of life as imitation effects a return to oneself that entails self-criticism but in a 
way that satisfies the need to engage with oneself at the level of one’s desires. Imitation coaxes 
desire and perception to orient themselves towards virtue and thus avoids having to rely on 
unsustainable forms of internal coercion as the Stoics do. 
Orienting desire in this manner is crucial to the success of ethical pedagogy as it provides 
the impetus to overcome the active resistance of bad habits. Through imitation one gains a habitual 
taste for one’s ethical ideal and comes to recognize oneself as failing to live up to it. The 
restlessness that results from this tension, however, arises only when emotion is treated as just as 
if not more important to the process of ethical formation than reason. Desire is indeed shaped in 
accordance with one’s rational ethical commitments, but it is ultimately desire itself, and the 
associated emotional sense of self-dissatisfaction, that drives one to act according to the ideal 
rather than reason. Just gaining a rational understanding of virtue and attempting to enact that in 





in the desire to persist. While the moral life is inevitably a struggle for Ravaisson, rationalist forms 
of moral pedagogy deny themselves resources that help them to succeed in that struggle. Even if 
we do not ultimately agree with Ravaisson’s strong claim that the Stoic art of life inevitably 
degenerates into self-repression, it seems fair to say that orienting desire makes moral pedagogy 
easier and makes possible a deeper form of commitment than simple conscious adherence and 
assent. Ravaisson goes so far as to say that cultivation of the desire to live rightly through imitation 
makes possible “purity of heart,” where “heart” is understood as “a feeling for things of the moral 
order, for what relates to the affections, to the will, to the love that is their ground.”115 Although 
he does not use the language of virtue in this passage, it is possible to see how imitation produces 
the specific form of virtue he articulates in his early work in which one is led by habitual inclination 
to act rightly. By transforming the “serpentine” principle of desire from which one’s actions stem, 
imitation makes possible spontaneous action through which ethical ideals are expressed even in 
the absence of conscious deliberation.  
The combination of the desire to act according to virtue and the trained perceptual ability 
to recognize it in others as well as in oneself culminates in a bodily and perceptual ability to 
construct new forms of virtuous action, such that the body comes to take an active role in enacting 
and ultimately defining ethical commitments. Once the skill of recognizing virtue has been 
acquired, it can be applied in one’s everyday life as an intuitive knowledge of how to act rightly 
in particular circumstances. Ravaisson emphasizes that this ability is fundamentally creative as a 
form of “invention,” an ability to imagine new forms of virtue that follow from one’s cultivated 
habits.116 In his aesthetic work, Ravaisson understands invention as the skill that results from the 
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training of perception in which one learns not only to recognize different forms of artistic style but 
moreover to view objects according to one’s own style and to produce works of art that express 
that vision. Imitation gives rise to this ability when perception is trained to such a point that one is 
capable of imagining objects according to one’s aesthetic style and representing them in one’s 
work without engaging in conscious analysis of those objects.117 Invention that produces a new 
and unique work that application of rational technique cannot achieve. Unlike geometric or 
mechanical constructions of objects, invention entails the immediate application of one’s 
developed perception that allows one to grasp objects in an individual light and to represent that 
experience through one’s bodily abilities.118 For Ravaisson, while such an ability can be taught, it 
cannot be reduced to a set of techniques but only occurs spontaneously through one’s habituated 
skills. Through invention therefore absolutely new works of art can be produced that cannot be 
reduced to what can be achieved through use of instruments or to works of other artistic styles. 
Applying the concept of invention to the moral sphere allows Ravaisson to add to his earlier 
argument concerning the superiority of the body over rational deliberation as the subject of virtue 
the fact that through imitation one’s adherence to ethical commitments becomes not only more of 
a desire but also more of a skilled. The trained body is capable of constructing new forms of 
virtuous conduct in different contexts that rational deliberation is incapable of imagining. Just as 
the skilled artist does not apply mechanical or rational techniques to see objects but instead applies 
their unique aesthetic vision, the virtuous subject also does not rationally analyze situations but 
instead immediately grasps them as opportunities for virtuous action. This perceptual ability 
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operates as a skill that grows over time along with the body’s ability to carry out the particular 
actions that are imagined. Having acquired this ability through practice, the virtuous person can 
create new ways of acting that conform to an ethical ideal but whose relationship with that ideal is 
imaginative and felt, rather than rational. As with aesthetic invention, then, invention in the moral 
sphere entails the production of absolutely new forms of action that are irreducible to what can be 
produced by conscious deliberation. Reason, Ravaisson argues, serves only a negative function in 
distinguishing “the possible from the impossible,” what strictly violates a particular virtue.119 
When it comes to acting in particular cases, it is the perceptual and bodily ability, oriented by 
desire, to immediately recognize both what a particular situation requires and what constitutes a 
virtuous response to that situation that governs action. 
Ravaisson’s application of the notion of skill to his understanding of the virtuous subject 
ultimately vindicates the social value of philosophy in a way that also demonstrates the 
independence of his form of philosophical practice from those of antiquity as Hadot understands 
them. The body’s ability to imagine new forms of virtuous action that conscious deliberation 
cannot allows the trained body to enact virtue under any set of social circumstances. Ravaisson 
even goes so far as to say that his method of teaching can be applied in public schools as a method 
of cultivating the “more elevated” faculties of bodily and perceptual imaginative intelligence that 
allow for students going into any field, particularly industrial ones, to express love of beauty and 
the good.120 By introducing this pedagogical method into public schooling in this manner, 
philosophy can be made into a universal practice that makes the kind of liberal education that had 
been previously been a privilege of the few into a public good, something which Ravaisson argues 
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would exercise an equalizing impact on a social world riven by class conflicts.121 The socially 
melioristic function of education operates, however, precisely by avoiding the kind of self-
knowledge and rational self-mastery Hadot argues Ravaisson and the ancients idealize and instead 
changing students’ spontaneous ways of engaging with the world. Rather than utilize aesthetic 
ability as a tool in the service of conscious self-direction, Ravaisson hopes in his program for 
public education to allow it to actively impel students to exercise virtue in whatever field they 
enter. Cultivating an embodied ability to imagine virtue will therefore change in Ravaisson’s view 
a student’s way of approaching whatever social situations they encounter or occupation they enter, 
such that philosophy will be able to change not just individuals but social life as a whole for the 
better. Ravaisson’s vision for how philosophy can prove its social value depends, in other words, 
on departing from what Hadot sees as the characteristically ancient project of achieving self-
mastery and instead allowing the “abandon” of the habitual love of virtue to govern individual 
conduct. 
Ravaisson’s arguments that the body is capable of learning to recognize and enact virtue 
more effectively than through reason, and his claim that the trained body and perception are 
capable of inventing new forms of virtuous action, thus culminate in the recognition of the body 
as a genuine subject of philosophical practice. We have already seen that Ravaisson’s criticism of 
Aristotelian deliberation deepens Shusterman’s argument for viewing the body as an independent 
criterion for projects of aesthetic self-formation by claiming that the desire to live virtuously is a 
more effective form of adherence to virtue. Ravaisson’s appropriation of the art of life takes these 
claims further by demonstrating that the habituated body not only does not need but in fact 
                                                          
121 Cf. Ravaisson, “Métaphysique et morale,” p. 453. I do not in these remarks wish to romanticize Ravaisson’s 
program of liberal education. While he does argue for the universal liberal education rather than for education 
segregated by class, his claim that such education will resolve class conflict by alleviating the condition of workers 





functions better in the absence of conscious rational governance. Against Hadot’s interpretation of 
his theory of artistic education, the imitation of models bypasses conscious rationality entirely and 
instead installs the idea of ethical perfection as an aesthetic ideal that allows one to recognize 
oneself as an imperfect moral being and thus to be inspired to act better. Focus on perfecting 
aesthetic skills instead of rational knowledge of virtue thus gives the body the ability to itself learn 
how to act virtuously and ultimately to invent forms of virtuous action in particular contexts. 
Ravaisson thus goes beyond Shusterman’s identification of the body as an instrument that carries 
out pre-determined conscious projects of self-perfection and instead allows the body to itself posit 
the definition of virtue in specific settings. Ravaisson’s appropriation of the art of life articulates 
a primary place for the body in the philosophical life, and his criticisms of the deliberative subject 
of Aristotelian virtue ethics and of Stoic rationalism articulate a powerful case for why self-
cultivation is undertaken most effectively through practice that constructs embodied habits. The 
cultivation of a habitual inclination that aligns with the virtue of generosity allows the subject not 
simply to conform his conduct to particular virtues but rather to fully inhabit them, to make them 
into the foundation of the desires, perceptions, and abilities through which the subject engages 
with the world and thereby cultivate an active skill in and love of virtue. 
4. Conclusion: Ravaisson’s Virtues 
 
Ravaisson’s tendency to mine antiquity for resources in constructing forms of moral 
pedagogy may seem a strange method for vindicating the social value of philosophy for the present 
day. As we have seen throughout this chapter, however, Ravaisson leaves none of the ancient 
theories and forms of philosophical practices he references untouched. His strategy is rather to 
reread them through his own theories of pedagogy and of the body in a way that makes them into 





virtue theory and the Stoic art of life treats the body as an active subject of philosophical practice 
that both learns the ideals that guide self-cultivation and also defines them in specific contexts in 
ways that rational deliberation is incapable of accomplishing. This claim relies, however, on 
modernizing these ancient theories by filtering them through his own philosophical commitments. 
First is Ravaisson’s theory of artistic pedagogy, which affirms the role of perceptual and bodily 
training over the use of geometric and rational methods as a way of creating a preferential skill of 
virtue. This theory of pedagogy, however, relies further on Ravaisson’s dynamic conception of 
embodied subjectivity, which is itself based his theory of habit as a form of desire. Ravaisson’s 
advances over Shusterman regarding the body’s capacity to independently learn, define, and 
adhere to ethical ideals stem from his conception of habit as the expression of a desire to persist 
that expresses itself as gradually deepening skillful abilities and inclinations to act in a certain way. 
Ravaisson’s appeal to antiquity therefore avoids nostalgically holding antiquity up as a lost ideal 
that we can only hope to recapture. By rereading the ancients through current theories of habit and 
pedagogy, Ravaisson makes them into contemporaries whose thought can affect how philosophy 
is understood and practiced in the present day. 
Because his theory of philosophical practice relies on his theory of habit, I believe that it 
is a contemporary of ours as well. Working through Ravaisson’s criticisms of the post-Cartesian 
philosophical tradition reveals not only that the questions he asks are similar to the ones we do, 
but also that we can learn from the answers he gives to them. I have attempted to defend 
Ravaisson’s interpretation of habit as a tendency grounded in desire both at the ontological and at 
the experiential level, and that the form of embodied subjectivity that results from it can add to 
current ones. Despite his adherence to outdated theories of active force taken uncritically from 





phenomena associated with habit in a way even Dreyfus’ concept of skills cannot, allows it to be 
taken seriously as a viable conception of habit. It follows, therefore, that his conceptions of the 
process of virtue acquisition and of the body as the agent of philosophical self-cultivation also 
deserve to be put into conversations with contemporary discussions.  
I will therefore conclude this chapter by contrasting Ravaisson’s manner of appropriating 
Aristotelian virtue ethics and the Stoic art of life with contemporary theories of virtue in order to 
better appreciate the novelty of his approach. In this regard, I would point out two features of 
Ravaisson’s form of philosophical practice that distinguish it from current ways of conceiving of 
virtue acquisition. First is Ravaisson’s preference for examples over rules and for spontaneity over 
decision-making. Ravaisson prefers not to articulate the virtue of generosity in terms of a rational 
principle but rather through description of what a generous person is like. Ravaisson does not 
develop what Rosalind Hursthouse would call a “v-rule,” a general statement of how one should 
act that employs a virtue term (e.g., “be honest,” “do not be uncharitable,”), and that can be 
consciously applied in particular circumstances.122 Models do not give guidance on how to make 
decisions in particular cases but rather indicate, or in Ravaisson’s words provide a “sign” of what 
the virtuous person is like. The task of the model is to train perception and desire to recognize 
virtue, to desire to live in accordance with it, and to intuit how virtue should be expressed in 
particular circumstances. Ravaisson’s emphasis on perception over conscious application of rules 
in acquiring virtue stems, as I have argued, from his affective understanding of the project of self-
cultivation grounded in his theory of habit. For philosophy to become the basis of everyday 
conduct, ethical truths must be expressed in a fashion that can inspire self-transformation. It is a 
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mistake, Ravaisson argues, to reduce philosophical truths to the “dryness of principles” in the form 
of rules or codes of conduct as they are not in themselves sufficient to overcome the resistance of 
current habits and give rise to virtuous action.123  
It is equally important, however, to note the implications this understanding of virtue 
acquisition has for the form of character it produces. The goal of philosophical practice is not to 
produce an ability to engage in knowing choice of good actions for their own sake but instead to 
change one’s desires and as a result to alter one’s ways of acting. Rational choice does not enter 
into Ravaisson’s account of the virtuous person: her conduct is instead grounded in an infusion of 
virtue within our habitual tendencies such that it instantiates itself within our way of being 
“incessantly and without any effort on our part.”124 It is not consciousness that governs virtuous 
actions but habitual inclinations themselves impelling us to act spontaneously yet intelligently to 
express virtue in particular circumstances. Ravaisson’s understanding of virtuous conduct thus 
departs from Lovibond’s ideal of rational deducibility in conduct in two ways.125 First, Ravaisson’s 
virtuous agent does not need to possess a rational concept or a propositional definition of a 
particular virtue in order to act virtuously. While nothing in Ravaisson’s account prevents the 
virtuous agent from possessing such knowledge, not only is it unnecessary to acquiring a virtuous 
state of character, but Ravaisson’s theological language also suggests that in practice it is not 
essential to the virtuous agent’s conduct and perhaps even distant from the virtuous agent’s non-
self-consciousness. The virtuous agent instead operates on the basis of her trained perceptual 
ability to recognize what constitutes virtue and thereby to imaginatively “invent” ways of 
                                                          
123 Ravaisson, Testament Philosophique, p. 99. 
 
124 Ravaisson, Félix. “Éducation,” Revue Bleue, 24 (17), 1887: 513-519, p. 516: “What is finally sought, what is 
principally aimed at, is to become a sage and not just a scholar (savant), where wisdom is understood as involving a 
way of life which is dominated not by incessant struggle but by peace of mind and a set of habits…” 
 





virtuously responding to situations. This observation leads to the second difference between 
Ravaisson’s conception of virtue and the ideal of rational deducibility, namely that “invention” as 
Ravaisson understands it suggests a different process of coming to act from “deduction.” Whereas 
deduction preserves the principle from which a particular action is deduced, invention implies the 
creation of something new. For Ravaisson, the creativity in a virtuous state of character arises from 
the coordination of perception and bodily aptitudes that allows for spontaneous production of new 
forms of action that extend one’s aesthetic sense of virtue to encompass a new situation. Since this 
expression takes place directly through perception and the body, consciousness does not reflect on 
how a particular action relates to one’s moral commitments. Reason, as noted above, tells the 
virtuous agent nothing more than what is possible and impossible, what falls outside of virtuous 
conduct and what is permissible. That reason articulates an absolute limit to the possibilities for 
virtuous conduct precludes a radically open conception of virtue, it remains the case that virtuous 
action entails not merely performance but production of forms of action that are appropriate to the 
situation and to one’s aesthetic sense of virtue. The connection between particular actions and 
ethical ideals is thus not rational but aesthetic, as the virtuous agent continually invents new ways 
of acting that appear and feel appropriate to one’s commitments.  
The second connection I would draw between Ravaisson’s conception of philosophical 
practice and current ones is that it follows from his conceptions of virtue and of invention that the 
state of character the practitioner of the art of life acquires constantly develops. In this sense, 
Ravaisson’s conception of virtue as intelligent comes close to that of Julia Annas, for whom virtue 
is “not a once for all achievement but a disposition of our character that is constantly developing 





and improvement).”126 Whereas for Annas, however, the enlarged understanding of the nature of 
a particular virtue experience provides is rational and develops one’s ability to account for one’s 
actions127, for Ravaisson “understanding” is attached to the body and to perception themselves. 
Grounding his theory of virtue in what I have attempted to argue in this chapter is best understood 
as a principle of bodily intelligence, the form habit takes in the body, allows Ravaisson to articulate 
a concept of ethical formation that entails constant progress in one’s state of character. As a 
specific form of habitual inclination, a virtuous habit, when enacted, becomes increasingly 
sophisticated, both in terms of the bodily capacities that are brought to bear to accomplish virtuous 
actions and of the perceptual abilities that recognize how to act virtuously in particular cases, at 
the same time as the desire to be virtuous strengthens. Ravaisson’s invocations of the theological 
notion of grace can thus be grounded in his theory of habit. That virtuous action gradually becomes 
un-self-conscious and thus increasingly leaves the sphere of conscious agency to the point that it 
appears to be a gift or a form of possession results from the nature of habit itself, which entails 
momentum and the gradual deepening of dispositions that takes them outside of the sphere of 
consciousness and makes them desires, even needs. In terms of virtuous conduct, Ravaisson’s 
dynamic conception of habit results in a growing ability to intuit proper responses to situations and 
increased immediacy in doing so. However, since habitual inclinations ultimately replace 
conscious agency according to Ravaisson, the virtuous agent will not be able to predict or to 
articulate how her character changes over time. Whereas for Annas the development of virtue 
entails the heightening of conscious rational knowledge of one’s actions, Ravaisson argues that 
self-consciousness in fact decreases over time and is replaced by perceptual skill in acting.  
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What results from Ravaisson’s conception of virtue, then, is an understanding of the self 
to be produced through the art of life as in a continual process of development and whose unity of 
character is aesthetic rather than rational. Ravaisson’s conception of the art of life thus departs 
from the existentialist concerns that motivate programs of philosophical practice as Hadot 
understands them and instead allows us to think beyond ways of living philosophically where 
rational knowledge and a conscious self-model guide actions and states of conduct, and opens the 
space to think of philosophical practice as what I call an indefinite process of self-cultivation in 
which the specific ways the virtuous person acts and her state of being constantly changes and 
hence eludes definition. While Ravaisson argues that philosophical practice results in adherence 
to a particular virtue, his reinterpretation of ancient concepts of virtue and the art of life through 
his theory of habit culminates in an original theory of philosophical practice in which the state of 
character to be achieved constantly develops in ways of which one is at best only partially 
conscious. Ravaisson’s concepts of invention and virtue articulate an emergent state of character 
in which actions are undertaken through embodied intelligence. Instead of undertaking action 
through the application of rules or engaging in conscious deliberation, perception of opportunities 
to act well and an increasing preference for doing so develop and increase the sophistication of 
virtuous dispositions and redefine the nature of virtue in particular settings while also making them 
more immediate. Rather than attempting to achieve conscious agency over our states of character 
and actions as in Hadot’s understanding of philosophy as a way of life, the art of life as Ravaisson 
understands it entails giving up reflective governance of one’s habitual tendencies and allowing 
those tendencies to themselves become the source of one’s actions. If the art of life “forms” or 





continues to form itself in ways that preserve the virtue to which it adheres but in ways that reason 
can only grasp in retrospect and incompletely. 
In arguing that Ravaisson’s theory of philosophical practice expands theoretical 
possibilities for conceptualizing projects of self-cultivation, I have emphasized throughout this 
chapter that practice as he understands it is indefinite not because of any idiosyncratic preferences 
on his part but because it is the logical outcome of his theory of habit as a tendency. Because his 
understanding of virtue and invention depend on this theory, however, the concern I articulated in 
the second section concerning the possibility that habit “degenerates” into addiction applies to 
Ravaisson’s theory of practice as well. Since virtue is dynamic in the way all habitual inclinations 
are for Ravaisson, it runs the same risk of becoming a need and losing its intelligent character. 
There is a possibility given Ravaisson’s theory of habit for desire to become fixated on a particular 
manner of acting and to strengthen to the point of becoming unmovable, under which 
circumstances the ability of habitual inclinations to “invent” new forms of action would be 
curtailed. Rather than exhibiting the immediate intelligence and perfection of the graced body, the 
conduct of the virtuous person could become increasingly rigid not out of adherence to rules but 
due to the very necessity implied in Ravaisson’s concept of desire. Ravaisson’s theories of virtue 
and of philosophical practice provide great insight into how habits are formed, but are lacking in 
an account of how habits can maintain their intelligence and freedom against their proneness to 






Chapter 2: The Fossilized Residue of a Spiritual Activity: Intuition and Philosophical 
Therapy in Henri Bergson 
 
While Ravaisson merely provides Hadot with an example of a modern thinker supposedly 
animated by ancient concerns, Henri Bergson helps Hadot articulate the existential interests that 
are definitive of philosophy as a way of life. Bergson remains an inspiration to Hadot throughout 
his career, and is a key figure in his argument for the enduring viability of the ancient conception 
of philosophy. In 1939, he wrote his bac au philosophie on Bergson, in which he commented on 
the latter’s statement that philosophy is “not the construction of a system but the resolution, once 
taken, to look naively in oneself and around oneself.”128 Bergson’s understanding of philosophy 
as a decision or an attitude that the philosopher voluntarily adopts was one of the first instances of 
philosophy being treated not primarily as a theoretical system but as a way of life Hadot was 
confronted with, even prior to his studies of Neoplatonism and ancient philosophy more generally. 
For Hadot, however, the form of Bergson’s philosophy as a form of practice is intimately linked 
to its content. Philosophers must engage in what Hadot calls a “transformation of perception” and 
learn to view the world “naively” because of the banality of everyday life. Hadot argues that 
Bergson’s claim that the task of philosophy is to transform our non-reflective and automatic being 
in the world is based on the opposition mentioned in the previous chapter between mundane 
everyday perception and that of the artist or philosopher, who grasps the world without the 
interference of habitual concerns. Signaling the importance of this opposition, Hadot reminisces 
to Arnold Davidson that studying Bergson’s notion of learning to look naively at oneself and at 
one’s world was one of the first times he was exposed to what he would later call a “spiritual 
exercise,” a practice by which the philosopher’s subjectivity is transformed from one lost in 
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practical concerns to one conscious of itself as a free and rational being who is in control of its 
own comportment. Bergson’s form of philosophy gives insight into the concerns Hadot would 
eventually find operative throughout ancient philosophy and ultimately as perennial issues 
animating philosophical practice as a whole. 
If Bergson helped to inspire Hadot’s early musings on the nature and function of 
philosophy, his work is equally important to this dissertation’s narrative. It is well-known that 
Bergson develops a theory of habit that both responds to Ravaisson’s work while also departing 
from it in significant ways. In this chapter, I intend to bring conversations regarding Bergson’s 
theory of habit and his conception of philosophical practice that have typically been kept apart in 
commentarial literature together.129 Doing so will involve contextualizing Hadot’s interpretation 
of Bergson within the latter’s theory of habit in order to better understand the motivations behind 
Bergson’s form of philosophical practice. Bergson attaches the existential concerns regarding 
perceptual experience of the world to the loss of individual agency and self-determination in 
everyday conduct. Insofar as it attempts to not only garner a richer perceptual experience of the 
world, but also to regain this lost agency, Bergson’s form of philosophical practice is therefore 
therapeutic. Bergson’s philosophical practice is structured by an opposition between conscious 
determination of one’s own actions and their external determination by mechanical or social 
necessity. What connects Hadot’s analysis of Bergson’s philosophical practice and the interests of 
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this dissertation is that for Bergson habit is what causes our behavior to become externally 
determined, such that the transformation of perception functions by overcoming the effects of 
habit. Whereas in the previous chapter we saw that Ravaisson regards habit as the seat of bodily 
intelligence and spontaneity that gives rise to invention, Bergson equates habit with materiality, 
pure repetition that contains in itself no principle of change.130 For Bergson, habit acquisition 
entails limitation of an individual’s possibilities of action and perception, which while helpful and 
even necessary in practical life closes one off from seeing new ways of living and causes one to 
think and act in a deterministic fashion. I will argue that Bergson’s concept of “intuition” should 
be interpreted as a practice of philosophical therapy that overcomes the external determination of 
actions caused by habit. What Hadot calls the “transformation of perception” is in fact the training 
of perception to experience the flow of qualitative states Bergson calls duration. Grounding one’s 
perception in this experience of novelty makes it possible to grasp and enact possibilities that arise 
from one’s own consciousness rather than from the outside.  
Section one will demonstrate against the claims of recent commentators that Bergson’s 
theory of habit does not entail either a rejection or a misinterpretation of Ravaisson’s work but an 
attempt to interpret habit naturalistically while retaining key elements of his understanding of 
bodily intelligence. While Bergson interprets habit as a form of mechanism, he does not therefore 
return to post-Cartesian pictures of the body but instead articulates a form of embodied practical 
intelligence that allows it to be viewed as inherently purposive. Habit acquisition adds to the body’s 
capacity to resolve needs and achieve goals by producing channels within the nervous system that 
Bergson calls “motor mechanisms” defining specific and closed sets of motions that are enacted 
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according to the exigencies of particular situations. In concurring with Ravaisson that the body is 
goal-oriented, Bergson in fact develops the former’s position by showing how habit acquisition 
directly impacts perception by limiting it to aspects of entities relevant to particular actions. The 
actual departure Bergson makes from Ravaisson is in viewing habit and the habituated body as 
mechanically determined and hence as incapable of producing new forms of activity. Whereas 
Ravaisson argues that habit is the ground of invention, for Bergson habit in itself contains no 
principle of spontaneity and hence can only repeat previously undertaken actions. While in 
everyday life actions are “skilled” in the sense discussed in the previous chapter to the extent that 
consciousness and habit interact in order to alter and adapt actions to particular circumstances, the 
more actions become habitual the more they become mechanically determined.  
Section two will engage more directly with Hadot’s reading of Bergson, and will argue that 
Bergson’s call for a transformation in perception is in fact motivated by therapeutic concerns. 
Whereas Hadot simply notes that perception is cut off from the unfolding of duration, we will see 
that this separation is in fact the result of a dynamic relationship between habit and consciousness 
that forces consciousness to exert increased amounts of effort to see the world as it truly is. 
Understanding this dynamic will allow us to see that habit can cause us not simply to lose our 
ability to view the world correctly, but also to lose agency over our actions. Habit lowers the level 
of consciousness’ tension to the point that it cannot resist the pressures of practical and social need. 
As a result, we lose the ability to hesitate and choose our actions, such that they become 
mechanically determined. Bergson argues that two negative conditions of life result from this loss 
of agency. First is an inflexibility of character that prevents one from engaging with new situations, 
a claim Bergson makes directly in opposition to Ravaisson. Bergson also goes beyond Ravaisson 





secondly in conformism and blind adherence to social custom. These are the problems it is the task 
of philosophical therapy to resolve. 
Section three will finally turn to Bergson’s concept of intuition, which serves not only as 
an epistemological method but also as a philosophical therapy designed to restore conscious 
agency in everyday life. Intuition entails the effortful exertion of conscious attention to our 
perceptual environment in a way that not only reopens us to experiencing novelty but also 
ourselves as freely self-creating entities. Intuition functions by raising the level of conscious 
tension, thereby making us capable of creating ourselves in actual fact. As a result, intuition differs 
from other forms of philosophical therapy in that it is not merely applied contextually to resolve 
disturbances when they arise but also forms the basis of a way of life in its own right. By thrusting 
perceptual experience into duration, intuition gives rise to what Bergson calls good sense, a form 
of radical self-creation in which through the application of effort one constantly invents new forms 
of action in response to circumstances and gains consciousness of oneself as an individual. In this 
way intuition resolves the issues of inflexibility and conformism at the same time as it makes 
possible what I call a “radical self-shaping” that entails constant production of radical novelty 
within oneself. Intuition should thus be understood as an indefinite form of philosophical practice 
that affirms radical novelty in a stronger manner than Ravaisson, though I will argue in the 
conclusion that it is best understood as a component of Ravaisson’s philosophical practice rather 
than a competitor to it. 
1. The Logic of the Body: Ravaisson and Bergson 
 
Assessing the relationship between Bergson and Ravaisson’s theories of habit is made 
difficult by the lack of explicit evaluation on Bergson’s part. Bergson’s Notice concerning 





a difficulty in interpreting the latter’s works. Ravaisson’s ideas, he says, have become classic to 
the philosophical tradition despite the brevity of his career as a philosopher, such that 
reconstructing them “in their original form,” untouched by later interpretations or current 
knowledge of the issues he addresses, has become difficult. Bergson’s solution, to do justice to 
Ravaisson’s claims by “extending” them, has led to a great deal of disagreement among 
commentators in regards to how Bergson’s theory of habit should be situated with respect to 
Ravaisson’s and to the problems of the relationship between mind and body to which it responds.131 
What Bergson means precisely by “extending” Ravaisson’s arguments, and whether he extends 
them to his own theory of habit, are left unclarified, and as a result there has been little agreement 
among commentators except in regards to the basic fact that Bergson’s theory of habit departs 
from Ravaisson’s in crucial respects.  
The position I will defend in this section is that Bergson’s mechanistic theory of habit 
attempts to reinterpret Ravaisson’s conception of bodily intelligence in a way that does not rely on 
its metaphysical underpinnings. While Bergson’s interpretation of habit as a physical mechanism 
appears to retreat to the dualistic theories of the body we saw criticized in the previous chapter, it 
is in fact part of a naturalistic account of the human body as inherently purposive. Habitual “motor 
mechanisms” function as a stock of possible actions available to be enacted to resolve particular 
needs, and Bergson argues that these possibilities constitute the body’s orientation towards action. 
While habit for Bergson plays an important role in the production and maintenance of bodily 
intelligence, he departs from Ravaisson in denying habit an inherent principle of freedom. Habit 
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for Bergson is purely passive and mechanically caused, such that habit only entails the 
reapplication of actions undertaken in the past rather than the construction and alteration of new 
ones. In opposition to Ravaisson’s argument that as habits develop they become increasingly 
skillful, for Bergson the formation of habit results in increased automatism and decreased 
adaptability to new circumstances in one’s manner of action. As a result, to the extent that our 
actions are governed by habit they are governed by mechanical causality and necessity. 
The question of whether and how Bergson’s theory of habit is an extension of Ravaisson’s 
arises due to the different ways they attempt to explain similar phenomena, namely the body’s 
capacity to acquire new possibilities of action. Ravaisson’s and Bergson’s accounts of habit 
explain how new forms of action are learned and preserved within the body. The three features of 
habitual action Bergson enumerates, however, reveal the differences between those accounts. 
Habitual action according to Bergson: first, is acquired by “repetition of the same effort;” second, 
requires “first the decomposition, and then the recomposition of the whole action;” and third, is 
preserved as a “mechanism that is set in motion by an initial impulse, in a closed series of automatic 
movements, which succeed each other in the same order and take the same amount of time to 
complete.”132 While the first feature of habit is shared with Ravaisson, the second and third 
evidence an opposition between active and passive roles of consciousness and the body that is 
alien to his approach. Consciousness plays an active and causal role in the process of habit 
acquisition, instigating the process and ultimately functioning as the sole agent of learning. 
Learning occurs through the conscious analysis or “decomposition” of an action into particular 
motions that the body repeats, followed by their “recomposition” into a complete action through 
the application of conscious effort. Learning a poem by heart entails breaking it up into individual 
                                                          





parts that can be remembered more easily.133 Having done so, the student then repeats each 
individual part until it is remembered and then links each part together until the whole is 
remembered. While Ravaisson does not demand that habitual actions originate in explicit acts of 
will, Bergson argues that all actions are learned through application of conscious effort. Conscious 
effort mediates each stage of the learning process, and only while it is in activity does change in 
one’s actions occur.  
 While consciousness is the agent of learning and habit acquisition, the body takes on an 
entirely passive role. Bergson’s third feature of habitual action in particular associates the 
habituated body with a principle of passivity in the manner of philosophers such as Butler, Hume, 
and Maine de Biran discussed in the previous chapter. For one, viewing habit as a mechanism 
indicates that it does not possess a principle of freedom but is rather determined by the laws of 
efficient causality. Once an “impulse” is delivered to the habituated body it responds necessarily 
and immediately. Rather than interpreting the freedom of the habituated body as a continuum of 
spontaneity that moves between reflective freedom and mechanical necessity and only touching 
the latter extreme through a process of degeneration, Bergson regards habit as in itself 
automaticity, an immediate response to a stimulus that occurs invariably. The passivity of the 
habituated body also entails a lack of adaptability. Whereas Ravaisson argues that habitual 
inclinations adapt to new circumstances and coordinate an individual’s ends with bodily and 
environmental means, for Bergson the motions associated with habits are “closed” and do not 
change. They follow each other in an invariable order and take an invariable amount of time. Habit 
in Bergson’s definition cannot be understood as a dynamic ability that makes possible a range of 
actions: it is instead a pathway that exists within the nervous system and subtends a specific and 
                                                          





closed set of motions, or in other words, a single and complete act. As a passive and non-adaptive 
entity comprised of various mechanisms, the body appears in Bergson’s theory of habit appears to 
lack any principle of freedom but seems to reside entirely within the realm of causal necessity. 
 Bergson’s theory of habit as a mechanism presents a problem because it appears to be at 
odds not only with Ravaisson’s theory but also with his own identification of the body as a “center 
of action.” The human body is unique among objects according to Bergson in that it is capable of 
escaping causal necessity and exercising a “genuine and therefore a new action upon the 
surrounding objects”.134 The body’s capacity for undetermined and novel actions is in tension, 
however, with the determined and passive nature of habitual motor mechanisms. Ravaisson 
explains the body’s freedom through the concept of inclination, in which the desire to persist gives 
rise to the constant calibration and adaptation of bodily potentialities to new situations. Since for 
Bergson it is only consciousness that changes and learns actions, however, the habituated body 
appears to do no more than reenact learned actions when determined to do so by reception of a 
stimulus and as a result has no role in freedom.  This tension in Bergson’s account has led some 
commentators to read his mechanistic and materialist understanding of habit as weakening his 
assertions regarding the human body’s intelligence and freedom and ultimately as a retreat towards 
mind-body dualism.135 Indeed, one could even say that Bergson’s grounding of habit in 
neurological changes associates his theory with the “physicalist” accounts that we saw Ravaisson 
criticize in the previous chapter. Such an interpretation appears to be confirmed by the distinction 
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Bergson draws between “dynamic” and “mechanistic” explanations of habit in his early lectures 
and his stated preference for the latter.136 Bergson correctly recognizes that Ravaisson participates 
in a tradition stretching back through Leibniz to Aristotle that regards habit as the effect of an 
interior force of spontaneity rather than of mechanism. Against this tradition, however, he argues 
that recent developments in the scientific understanding of inertia and the brain vindicate the 
accounts of Descartes and Malebranche, who argue that matter “stores” (emmagasine) actions as 
habits in the “animal spirits” or nervous system.137 In articulating his theory of habit, Bergson 
appears to be primarily interested in making his account cohere with recent developments in the 
physical sciences and as a result retreats from Ravaisson’s conception of embodied subjectivity. 
 To suggest on the basis of these differences, however, that Bergson either rejects 
Ravaisson’s theory of habit and returns to Cartesian dualism, or that he misinterprets it in an 
otherwise “elegant and perceptive appreciation” of his work, misses Bergson’s critique of classical 
materialism and therefore what is original about his theory of habit.138 Instead of rejecting 
Ravaisson’s association of habit with freedom and bodily intelligence and reinserting 
Cartesianisms into his conception of the body, Bergson attempts to read Ravaisson naturalistically 
in a way that still affords habit a role in bodily intelligence and freedom, albeit a very different one 
from what Ravaisson believes it to be. Bergson affirms “the reality of spirit and the reality of 
matter” in a perspective that is “frankly dualistic” but that does not fall into the trap of viewing 
bodily movements as either the cause or the occasion for mental representations, instead rejecting 
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representationalist theories of consciousness altogether.139 While habit is in itself determined, 
automatic, and closed, it is not therefore divorced from conscious freedom but is rather its 
preservation in material form. Bergson presents this view at the end of a statement summarizing 
Ravaisson’s theory of habit: 
For motor habit, once acquired, is a mechanism, a series of movements which determine one 
another: it is that part of us which is inserted into nature and which coincides with nature; it is nature 
itself. Now, our inner experience shows us in habit an activity which has passed, by imperceptible 
degrees, from consciousness to unconsciousness and from will to automatism. Should we not then 
imagine nature, in this form, as an obscured consciousness and a dormant will? Habit thus gives us 
the living demonstrating of this truth, that mechanism is not sufficient unto itself: it is, so to speak, 
only the fossilized residue of a spiritual activity.140 
 
Without repeating the objections to this statement as an accurate reading of Ravaisson, it is 
important to note the manner in which it “Bergsonifies” Ravaisson’s theory of habit. Despite his 
use of the language of stimulus and response in his description of habit, Bergson nevertheless 
insists that habit demonstrates the insufficiency of mechanism taken by itself as a principle with 
which to account for the body. Regarding habit simply as retention of physical change ignores our 
conscious experience of it as resulting from our own actions. Memorizing a poem cannot occur 
through efficient causality alone: a genuine principle of conscious freedom is required to explain 
the various stages by which such learning occurs. Habit can only be understood as the preservation 
or storing of freedom in a “fossilized” form, one that can no longer change but that retains the 
originally free act and allows it to be repeated when necessary. Habit is indeed an “enmattering” 
of freedom that transforms it into mechanism, but the phenomenon of habitual learning 
demonstrates complementarity between matter and freedom that is incompatible with a reduction 
of the body to simple geometrical extension.  
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Bergson’s use of the language of mechanism in describing habit does not constitute a 
rejection of bodily freedom and intelligence, but is instead part of an attempt to derive them from 
a principle other than from “hyperorganic” forces as Ravaisson does. Bergson’s statement of 
preference for mechanical theories of habit arises in the context of arguing that the concept of 
physical inertia as developed by philosophers who respond to Ravaisson’s work such as Auguste 
Comte, Émile Boutroux, and the “ingenious writer” Léon Dumont, serves precisely this 
function.141 At that time, however, Bergson was also deeply engaged in the study of recent 
psychological and neuroscientific research, and in his 1896 work Matter and Memory Bergson 
presents a fully neurological theory of habit that grounds its role in bodily intelligence in its effects 
on perception.  Even though habit is externally determined, Bergson argues, it facilitates goal-
oriented activity by deepening and maintaining the connections perception makes in the nervous 
system between stimuli and actions. Perception is action- rather than knowledge-oriented, and 
Bergson derives bodily intelligence from its function of filtering, or in Mullarkey’s words 
“subtracting” from, the innumerable facets of the external world and their mutual interactions to 
only those that pertain to the individual’s interests and needs.142 This process of filtering is the 
opposite of representationalist theories of perception in which a layer of subjectivity is added to 
the world, and instead entails the selection those aspects of it relevant to possible actions the body 
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can perform. Perception in this sense is a bodily, or more specifically a cerebral, movement that 
consists of a “virtual action” or the preparation for a possible action of the body on the world.143 
This process of subtraction occurs through the production of channels that link the peripheral and 
central nervous system and index perceptions to specific bodily actions, thereby creating a 
practical schema that bears resemblance to the Heideggerian notion of Zuhandenheit.144 Insofar as 
perception is action-focused and not a “speculative” faculty it is crucial to the body’s status as a 
center of action in which the nervous system “choose[s] intelligently” the actions that accomplish 
particular goals.145 For Bergson, perception is a principle of bodily intentionality that constitutes a 
purposive and hence intelligent stance towards the world.146  
While not strictly necessary to the purposiveness of the body, the acquisition of motor 
mechanisms adds to its capacity for intelligent action by increasing the number of potential 
motions to which perception can attach stimuli. In making this claim, Bergson’s account of the 
role of habit in bodily intelligence draws a closer connection between habit and perception than 
Ravaisson does. Habit cannot be understood as mediating or coordinating between perceptual and 
bodily capacities, because for Bergson perception is not only in itself a form of action but also 
directly instigates actions and is therefore intimately tied to the body. The construction of motor 
mechanisms instead facilitates the intelligent selection of possible actions by making travel along 
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the pathway running between perception, the brain, and muscles automatic.147 Bergson even 
suggests a continuity between habit and perception by referring to habit as a form of memory, not 
because “it conserves past images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present 
moment.”148 So-called “habit memory” preserves specific responses from past situations in the 
form of mechanisms that can serve as the termini of the pathway from perception to action. Motor 
mechanisms provide a “ready-made response” to the “question” perception poses to the body of 
what action should be undertaken to achieve one’s goals in a specific set of circumstances that 
“renders the question unnecessary.”149 The process of habitual learning results in a stock of actions 
that are available to be called up when necessary, and in storing these actions in the nervous system 
and the muscles habit causes them not only to conform to the interests of the free individual but 
also to make the achievement of those interests automatic. The more such motor mechanisms are 
preserved, the greater a reserve of possible actions one possesses, and the more nuanced and 
contextual one’s actions can be. Habit memory thus effects what Bergson calls the 
“correspondence to environment” that allows efficient selection of actions appropriate to achieving 
goals in specific settings.150 While habitual actions are themselves determined mechanistically, 
when aggregated they add to the body’s capacities to respond to new requirements and needs and 
over time become the material basis of its intelligence. 
 Bergson’s theory of habit parallels Ravaisson’s to the extent that it places habit at the center 
of the body whose intelligence is defined by its ability to achieve goals automatically. What 
Bergson’s theory of habit lacks, however, is a principle of freedom. The fundamental difference 
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between the two in fact lies in Bergson’s insistence that habit is a passive phenomenon that is 
incapable of spontaneity and hence cannot give rise to new forms of action. While for Ravaisson 
habit entails the continuous calibration of bodily potentialities to external conditions, Bergson 
claims that it is consciousness alone that is capable of such creativity. Bergson’s understanding of 
bodily intentionality entails only the intelligent application of past actions to present 
circumstances, not the production of new forms of action. Bergson instead accounts for bodily 
adaptation and freedom dualistically, as the interplay between habit and the opposed principle of 
consciousness. Specifically, Bergson focuses on the power of conscious attention, an effortful 
process of supplementing filtered images with ones drawn from “image memory,” retained images 
of past experiences.151 While habit acquisition determines the body to act according to a particular 
mechanism, attention introduces indeterminacy into the body by expanding the possibilities for 
action. Attention opposes the tendency of perception, aided by habit, to limit itself to what is 
immediately relevant for action by synthesizing filtered images and memory images to create a 
composite in which new possibilities can be recognized and chosen.152 In doing so, attention 
introduces a temporal delay between stimulus and response that opens the space for free choice of 
actions rather than replication of past ones.153 These two elements of enriched images and a 
temporal delay result in the possibility of creating “genuine and new action” that cements the 
body’s “privileged position” among objects: instead of automatically repeating what one has done 
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in the past, attention makes possible the composition of novel forms of action of which the 
individual is the genuine author.154 If habit preserves freedom in the form of mechanisms, 
conscious attention actualizes freedom by producing the conditions for the construction of 
genuinely novel and unconditioned actions. 
 Bergson accounts for skilled behavior by interpreting the body as a site of productive 
tension between the determinism of habit and the freedom achieved through conscious attention.155 
For Bergson, habit and consciousness require each other: if habit alone is unable to instigate and 
alter actions, consciousness alone is too inefficient to be the sole basis of everyday conduct. Having 
to compose and choose each individual action anew would require amounts of time and mental 
effort that would ultimately make everyday functioning impossible, and the possession of 
automatic mechanisms for action frees consciousness to attend to other matters.156 Habit and 
consciousness are theoretically independent principles and function in opposed ways, but for 
precisely this reason they are in practice interdependent, and their interaction results in adaptation 
of action to circumstances. Bergson illustrates the interaction between consciousness and habit 
with the image of an upside-down cone, whose wide base consists of inert memory images and 
whose tip is the habit memory that produces instantaneous action. This cone is formed by the 
relative degrees of strength of consciousness and of habit, and bodily states result from their 
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equilibrium. Skilled activity results when the body exists in a state where consciousness and habit 
both possess moderate degrees of strength or “tension,”157 such that recall of image memory can 
take the role of “guiding” motor mechanisms and giving them “the direction suggested by the 
lessons of experience” without inhibiting them to too great a degree.158 At this equilibrium, while 
the body does not learn new actions it does become capable of altering existing motor mechanisms 
by continuing the process of decomposition and recomposition conscious activity had started. 
Through the guidance of image memory, the body is able to differentiate elements of its actions 
and refine them in light of new circumstances. In doing so, the body develops the “internal 
structure” of actions, defining and differentiating the motions of which the action is composed and 
thereby giving the action greater complexity and potential to respond to new situations.159 While 
habit is in itself incapable of giving rise to adaptability, its interaction with conscious attention at 
varying levels of tension gives rise to not only intelligent but also fluent and near-automatic 
interaction with the world. 
 While Bergson has room to account for the adaptiveness and freedom of bodily acts, that 
he must appeal to consciousness to do so highlights the essentially deterministic nature of habitual 
actions. Bergson’s mechanistic theory of habit attempts to ground a conception of bodily 
intelligence in naturalistic and ultimately neurological principles rather than in a metaphysics of 
desire. While habit plays a crucial role in the production and expansion of that purposiveness, 
however, it takes the form of a static logic that coordinates particular ends with existing means 
rather than the dynamic coordination and adaptation of potentialities Ravaisson describes. 
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Whereas in Ravaisson habit entails the progressive expansion of capacities, Bergson’s rejection of 
the Aristotelian ontology of hexis in favor of contemporary neuroscience causes him to view habit 
as a set of acts that are learned and preserved as a stock that can be called up when necessary. 
Bodily intelligence, in other words, is not a creative intelligence as it is in Ravaisson. While 
Ravaisson considers automatism and the inability to adapt to new situations as the degeneration of 
habit, for Bergson these are its fundamental characteristics as a form of physical mechanism. It is 
therefore consciousness alone that is capable of acquiring new forms of action and of adapting 
existing ones, such that it is only through application of conscious attention and effort that the 
body is capable of freedom. By viewing the body as the site of tension between consciousness and 
the body, Bergson is capable of accounting for an embodied form of freedom, but that freedom is 
merely preserved in habit rather than actualized through it. The body’s indeterminacy and 
capability to determine itself arises only through conscious effort, not through habit in itself. 
 I will return to the issue of relating Ravaisson and Bergson’s accounts of habit in this 
chapter’s conclusion, but for the present I would suggest that what Bergson’s theory of habit 
highlights over and above Ravaisson’s is the phenomenon of routines, or what Gilbert Ryle would 
call “single-track” dispositions.160 Single-track dispositions are manifested only when instigated 
by an external cause and only in one way, as opposed to multi-track dispositions that can manifest 
themselves spontaneously and in different ways. Such openness (and I would add, skillfulness) in 
one’s ways of acting is for Bergson only possible through the application of a certain amount of 
conscious effort. Instead, what Bergson’s theory of habit gives insight into are the mass of 
routinized actions that do not adapt to new circumstances but are equally necessary to our practical 
life. To take an example from Julia Annas, when one drives the same route every day one ceases 
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to notice the specific acts associated with driving (e.g., putting one’s keys in the car, disengaging 
the parking brakes, etc.). These acts become routines in the sense that conscious thought becomes 
disengaged with these action, such that they occur automatically and unchangingly.161 By viewing 
habit as the “fossilization” or material preservation of freedom rather than as a principle of 
spontaneity, Bergson allows us to consider even “mere routines” are constituents of embodied 
practical intelligence. Even though habit operates according to mechanical causality, their 
existence as a stock of available actions frees consciousness from having to attend to each 
individual act and instead allows particular motions to respond to situations automatically. 
2. Habit, Duration, and Conscious Freedom 
 
Interpreting Bergson on habit is also difficult because of the differing ways he evaluates it. 
While we saw in the previous section that habit for Bergson performs a necessary and useful 
function in practical life, on other occasions he focuses negative attention on its passivity and 
automatism. He is particularly concerned with the effects of habit on our ability to freely determine 
our ways of acting, at times referring to automatism as the “degradation” of conscious freedom, a 
“menace,” and as something that “stifles” our creative impulses.162 Disentangling these differing 
evaluations of habit by examining the way Bergson argues it affects conscious experience will 
provide insight into how and why Bergson’s philosophical practice is therapeutic. Bergson acts as 
a diagnostician who identifies a persistent behavioral problem or condition, the lack of individual 
agency over actions, that afflicts us in our everyday lives, and provides a causal explanation of it, 
namely the dynamic effects of habit on consciousness. Doing so will also deepen Hadot’s 
interpretation of Bergson’s form of philosophical practice. Hadot is correct that the practical 
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orientation of everyday or non-philosophical perception is closed off from experience of the 
metaphysically true world, and that the “force of habit” forms part of the constraints on perceptual 
experience.163 While Hadot treats habitual perception and unmediated experience simply as 
separate phenomena, however, Bergson in fact makes the stronger claim that habit exerts dynamic 
pressure on consciousness that prevents it from experiencing the continuous flux of qualitative 
states Bergson calls duration. Whereas Hadot’s interpretation views the transformation of 
perception to experience duration as good in itself for Bergson, equally of concern to him is that 
the limitation of perception weakens our ability to make choices and causes to act 
deterministically. This loss of conscious agency expresses itself in two symptoms. First, by 
preventing us from uncovering new ways of thinking about and experiencing the world, habit 
makes it more difficult to see alternative possibilities of action, causing us to repeat old ways of 
acting such that our character becomes inflexible. And second, habit causes us to automatically 
accept ideas drawn from social custom and prevents independent thought. As a result, we tend to 
conform to social custom instead of independently choosing our ways of being.  
Bergson’s evaluations of habit as both necessary and as pathological stem from the same 
cause, namely its tendency to limit conscious experience of the world. Specifically, both follow 
from Bergson’s “dynamic” account of consciousness that views it as being actively limited by the 
pressure or force the automaticity of habit exerts upon it. Interpreting consciousness dynamically 
allows Bergson to explain some of the phenomena noted in the previous section, in particular the 
variable extent to which consciousness can add memory images to perceptual experiences. For 
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Bergson, consciousness’ inability to access these images results from a force or pressure habit 
exerts on it. A brief return to Bergson’s image of the cone will clarify this claim. While we saw 
that the cone in one sense articulates the level of adaptability of bodily actions, Bergson presents 
this image in the context of arguing that habit memory actively inhibits the addition of image 
memories to perceptual experience through conscious attention. The automaticity and action-
oriented nature of habit exerts pressure on the nervous system to limit experience to only aspects 
relevant to immediate action, thus limiting conscious experience to what is at the tip of the cone. 
At its wide base perceptions and the image memories that lie at their margins interpenetrate and 
merge indifferently like in dreams, but habit enforces the demands of physical need and conscious 
interest and actively excludes irrelevant image memories.164Acquiring a habit thus not only creates 
a motor mechanism but also “solidifies” a particular aspect of conscious experience into a “general 
idea” on the basis of which future situations are immediately recognized and one can automatically 
apply a motor mechanism to respond to it.165 In his work Creative Evolution, Bergson goes so far 
as to speculate that the inhibiting force habit exerts on consciousness might even have an 
evolutionary basis in the need to secure the necessities of self-preservation.166 Consciousness’ 
openness to memory images is made actively difficult by the need, enforced by habit and 
strengthened by evolutionary imperative, to concentrate on purposive action. 
Hadot’s interpretation of Bergson focuses on the result of this process, namely the inability 
of consciousness to access reality in an unmediated fashion. And indeed, our being cut off from 
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an immediate experience of the qualitative flux of duration that is for Bergson metaphysically real 
is indeed a critical component of his argument in that it causes us to experience the world in terms 
of discrete concepts rather than in its qualitative richness. Hadot reasons from Bergson’s 
distinction in the Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness between “immediate 
consciousness” and “reflective consciousness” that the force of habit gives rise to two opposed 
modes of experiencing the world, and justifies his claim that philosophy is a transformation of 
perception in that it frees us from the habitual “world of everyday perception.”167 Distinguishing 
between two forms of consciousness is useful for Bergson as it reveals precisely that from which 
habit closes us off. Reflective or “everyday” consciousness represents the “data” of consciousness 
as generalized by habit into spatially extended units that can be defined and measured. These units 
comprise a “numerical multiplicity” of discrete entities that are recognized as separate through 
their juxtaposition in homogenous space and that can therefore be treated as individual objects.168 
This presentation of the world as distinct sets of entities permits comparison and contrast between 
objects and their being grasped linguistic means in a way that facilitates practical life.169 Immediate 
consciousness, by contrast, is not mediated by habit and symbolic representation and consists of 
direct encounter with reality. Against psychophysicists like Fechner who attempt to measure 
conscious states in terms of mathematical properties of magnitude and intensity, Bergson argues 
that the immediate data of consciousness is of duration, qualitative states that interpenetrate and 
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form a confused mass that can only be separated through mental effort.170 Such qualitative states 
can be neither spatially represented nor treated as numerically distinct and are therefore 
symbolically unrepresentable. The experience of immediate consciousness is of a “qualitative 
multiplicity” in which qualitative states that cannot be reduced to one another flow together in a 
movement that cannot be described spatially but only as temporality. Despite being metaphysically 
real according to Bergson, this level of perceptual detail is in the main irrelevant to immediate 
practical action. Perception and the body cannot interact with symbolically unrepresentable and 
mutable fluidity, such that the pressure habit exerts on consciousness has the function of actively 
excluding it from our perceptual experience. 
What Hadot misses, however, is that although Bergson posits a difference in kind between 
these two forms of consciousness, the distinction is ultimately a heuristic, and Bergson later 
clarifies that consciousness in fact exists in varying states of “tension” that define a relative degree 
of openness to material that is not immediately relevant to practical action. While this distinction 
is subtle, it is not, so to speak, without a difference, as it indicates that the dynamic pressures on 
consciousness have a causal impact on how open our experience is.171  Consciousness does not 
simply exist in states of reflectiveness or immediacy but rather possesses a certain tension or 
“disposition” to contract immediate experience according to a certain “rhythm” or “tone,” a degree 
of condensation.172 What follows for Bergson is that as the tension of consciousness decreases, 
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one lets oneself think in terms of general ideas that emphasize similarities between experiences 
and which are correlated with immediate action increases with it. Although one’s ways of thinking 
are open to alteration through synthesis with additional memory images, habit decreases the level 
of consciousness’ tension and strengthens its disposition to condense conscious experience into 
determinate objects and general ideas.173 Change in one’s thinking is thus made more difficult 
through the strength of habit, with the result that one increasingly tends to apply existing notions 
to interpret experiences. When one interacts with the world by means of habits, one tends to think 
in a more general fashion as one’s reactions are automatically applied. 
Our understanding of the dynamism of the relationship between habit and consciousness 
allows us to add to Hadot’s account the claim that habit acquisition makes experiencing duration 
progressively more difficult, such that consciousness can only encounter qualitative multiplicity 
and “leap” into immediate consciousness through the application of effort, a point that will be 
crucial to his notion of practice. The qualitative multiplicity Bergson argues immediate conscious 
can access lies in a continual state of becoming and interpenetration whose tendencies cannot be 
predicted or determined in advance. Unlike the data of reflective consciousness, qualitative 
multiplicity cannot be represented spatially but can only understood as a temporal unfolding. 
Duration is difficult for reflective or everyday consciousness to access because of the radical 
novelty it entails: the overlap and interpenetration of states give rise to new states that are 
continuous with yet irreducible to the old, such that grasping them in their purity requires continual 
attention on the part of consciousness. Consciousness must actively resist the tendency, 
strengthened by habit, to reduce qualitative flux to symbolically representable units and to interpret 
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duration simply as the rearrangement of prior elements.174 If it does, consciousness in its 
immediate mode is capable of experiencing the unfolding of duration, an unfolding that Bergson 
argues is metaphysically primordial to the symbolically mediated world. In keeping with his theory 
of perception, Bergson does not regard consciousness as adding anything to the world as it is: the 
world endures, and it is only through an act of reduction that it is separated into discrete objects 
and experienced as homogenous space and time.175 Because in our everyday lives habit puts 
pressure on consciousness to encounter the world through the reductions of reflective 
consciousness, however, we gain access to this level of experience only in infrequent experiences 
of lucidity in which a certain qualitative state irrupts into consciousness, such as when a clock 
strikes multiple times but only the last strike is noticed or, a point to which we will return, in 
experiences of aesthetic beauty.176 Normally, such experiences lie “below” the level of ordinary 
consciousness and can only be uncovered through the application of intellectual effort. 
Understanding the dynamic between habit and consciousness also allows us to better 
appreciate why Bergson feels the need to articulate a form of philosophical practice that opposes 
the force of habit. For one the one hand, Bergson insists that the limiting function habit places on 
consciousness facilitates efficient and purposive action that is necessary to our practical lives. This 
form of thinking in terms of general, communicable concepts rather than expressing the 
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indeterminate flux of duration is in general beneficial for practical life as it prevents consciousness 
from falling into a dream-like state of lostness in the flow of memory images. However, Bergson’s 
dynamic understanding of habit suggests that the state of consciousness’ tension can be made too 
low, such that habit begins to operate in a pathological fashion, specifically by causing us to lose 
agency over our actions. As consciousness becomes increasingly constrained through the force of 
habit, we become increasingly unable to think outside of the general ideas that facilitate automatic 
action. To put it dynamically, consciousness is lowered to a state of tension that hinders adaptation 
to new circumstances and conforms to the logical yet inflexible structure of the habituated body. 
As a result, for Bergson we become less able to choose our own actions and instead act according 
to the mechanical necessity of habit. Choice, for Bergson, requires conscious effort: in order to 
choose something, we must remain aware of our possibilities, remember past consequences and 
project future ones, and consider how we can act in a different way from in the past in order to 
respond to a situation’s specific needs.177 By contrast, when one acts habitually, one acts 
immediately by applying a particular motor mechanism. The level of conscious tension, in 
Bergson’s words, is the “measure of its power of acting, of the quantity of free creative activity it 
can introduce into the world.”178 As one’s actions become increasingly habitual, one’s power to 
consider options and to choose and improvise solutions decreases and one begins to act 
mechanically. 
For Bergson, the loss of agency over one’s actions manifests itself in two negative traits of 
human character found in everyday life. First and most generally, the loss of agency takes the form 
of comic inflexibility in one’s character that results from the application of existing ways of 
                                                          
177 Bergson, L’énergie spirituelle, p. 10/10. 
 





thinking and acting rather than learning and choosing specific forms of action in response to them. 
What follows from Bergson’s arguments concerning choice is that at a certain degree of tension 
habit can cease to facilitate practical life and in certain ways come to hinder it. Bergson in fact 
calls individuals “impulsive” who think solely in terms of general ideas, possessing great facility 
in immediately resolving familiar situations but who cannot respond to unfamiliar ones.179 As the 
level of tension in their consciousness decreases, impulsive people gradually lose their ability to 
respond to unfamiliar situations that require greater exploration and inventiveness and merely 
repeat old ways of thinking and acting. With limited possibilities of thought that mirror the 
habituated body’s limited possibilities for acting, the impulsive person fails to confront novel 
circumstances and becomes rigid. In his essay on comedy, Bergson goes so far as to say that the 
inability of habitual consciousness to adapt to new circumstances constitutes an “inelasticity” that 
is paradigmatic of comic characters whose machine-like movements are so rigid as to appear 
inhuman.180 When the force of habit grows too strong, it gives rise to a rigid state of character that 
acts not as an individual who can determine their own actions but as what Bergson calls a 
“conscious automaton” who merely enacts automatically past ways of acting and thinking.181  
Second and more important for Bergson is the alienation from oneself habit brings about 
and the consequent determination of one’s ways of thinking about oneself and one’s possibilities 
by social custom. To his earlier arguments that the reduction of conscious experience through habit 
facilitates practical life Bergson adds that it also is the basis of social existence. Since duration 
entails the continual production of what is absolutely new, experiences of it inevitably overflow 
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our ability to linguistically express them. It follows that communication between individuals 
requires a certain degree of reduction of conscious experience through habit. As with practical life, 
social life would be impossible without the work of habit, but Bergson worries again that when 
habit causes consciousness to lower to a certain degree of tension one becomes unable to think of 
oneself outside of one’s social identity. Bergson argues that alienation begins through the reflexive 
application of reflective consciousness. Interpretation of one’s conscious states through general 
concepts causes individuals to in Bergson’s words “lose sight of” our “fundamental” or “deep-
seated” self that experiences the world through immediate consciousness.182 Habit alienates us 
from our individual experience of the world and causes us to understand ourselves through the 
medium of linguistically articulable concepts. While this reduction makes possible communication 
with others, for Bergson it ultimately produces a “superficial self,” a mode of experiencing oneself 
solely through shared concepts and that is as a result cut off from one’s individuality and “inner 
life.”183 As a result, our experience of the world becomes increasingly repetitive and in Bergson’s 
words “banal.”184 Bergson parodies the Ravaissonian and Aristotelian notion of “second nature” 
in claiming that habit gives rise not to a virtuous but an impoverished way of being in which one 
understands oneself through general ideas rather than by entering into the flow of one’s conscious 
states. As habit causes our experience of the world and of ourselves to become more 
communicable, it also makes them increasingly impersonal, reduced solely to terms drawn from 
our cultural context and without reference to our individual and unique experiences of duration. 
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Without access to individual experience, people become susceptible to the conformism that 
tends to result from the process of socialization. In his last major work, The Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, Bergson clarifies his earlier account of habitual alienation by arguing that 
the concepts we repetitively apply are in fact derived from socialization. Instead of a “superficial 
self,” Bergson argues that socialization adds a “social self” to our individual selves, a conscious 
identification of ourselves with a social label and of our individual experiences with ideas drawn 
from the social groups in which we participate.185 Like the superficial self, the social self is also 
cut off from individual experience, but it is produced by the internalization of ways of experiencing 
the world drawn from society that become automatic through habituation.186 In Bergson’s telling, 
this process of internalization is mediated at all stages through prohibition and obedience and gives 
rise to a tendency in us to conform to the dictates of authority. As children, we learn to obey our 
parents and teachers and to defer to their authority on matters of our conduct. Deference and 
obedience to the prohibitions that arise from it over time become habits in such a way as to 
reinforce a difference of status between us and those whose authority we come to respect 
automatically. As we grow older, we come to recognize that our parents and teachers are 
themselves merely actors who are playing roles in a larger drama directed by the society in which 
they live as a whole. The particular social characteristics that conform to one’s social self therefore 
consist in fact of internalized prohibitions that limit our ways of thinking and acting to ones that 
conform to others around us and the authorities we have become accustomed to follow. 
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Conformity to others that is an inevitable result of socialization, however, is in danger of 
becoming conformism when combined with the pressure of habit. The inability to think and act 
outside of existing possibilities come together in the case of acting outside of social customs. The 
conscious tension habit institutes makes even the accidental violation of social norms difficult, and 
Bergson argues that when such a violation does occur it is experienced as a painful, tension-filled 
deviation from one’s everyday tendencies.187 It requires effort to maintain oneself in this state of 
tension: consciousness attempts to resolve the struggle by returning to one’s socially-informed 
ways of thinking and acting and thereby eliminating the deviation. The force of habit increases the 
effort it requires to persist in independent action, such that we tend to passively accept the 
limitations of social custom in our daily lives. Habit thus gives rise to conformism, not merely in 
matters of explicit duty but even in the countless decisions made daily regarding how to undertake 
all manner of tasks. How one interacts with one’s family and follows one’s profession, for instance, 
and the way one negotiates the demands of the two, is a matter of rules grounded in models of 
one’s selfhood, as is when and how one goes about one’s shopping or takes strolls. How, when, 
and where one undertakes these tasks is a matter of custom, and in our everyday lives it is simply 
easier to follow social custom, and so we do: “A choice,” Bergson says, “is imposed upon us at 
every instant; and we naturally opt for the choice that conforms to the rule. We are hardly conscious 
of this; we do it without effort. A road has been traced out by society; we find it open before us 
and we follow it, for it would take greater effort to trek across the country.”188 Because the 
violation of norms requires greater intellectual and motor effort than conformity, the force of habit 
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causes our actions to become determined by social custom and makes independent action outside 
of those customs increasingly difficult. 
The differing evaluations Bergson provides of habit are explained when viewed through 
the lens of his dynamic understanding of consciousness. While the lowering of consciousness’ 
tension habit acquisition causes is necessary and useful for practical and social life, the danger of 
it being lowered to a pathological degree is ever-present. And because this dynamic is permanent 
in our psychic life, I suggest that the loss of individual agency should be understood as an illness, 
or perhaps more precisely put a general condition, that is found in human life, and the attendant 
problems of inflexibility and conformism its symptoms. Hadot’s interpretation of Bergson 
helpfully highlights the ways practical concerns through habit come to dominate our everyday 
experience of the world. By situating this interpretation within Bergson’s theory of habit, we have 
been able to see how this mode of perception results in a particular way of behaving in the world 
as well. Acting in an automatic, inflexible, and conformist fashion are behavioral patterns into 
which humans are permanently at risk of falling, and Bergson ultimately claims that they 
characterize the majority of people. Bergson at one point states even goes so far as to say that 
rigidity and conformism are “essentially human” and that human thought in general “accepts, such 
as it is, its insertion into social thought, and that uses preexisting ideas like any other tool formed 
by one’s community.”189 While the extent to which these conditions cause suffering varies, for 
Bergson they merit a practical response in that they entail a loss of autonomy. Loss of agency, 
inflexibility, and conformism are the negative states philosophical practice will have the task of 
alleviating, and in this regard Bergson’s form of philosophical practice should be understood as 
“therapeutic” as described in the introduction. The task of philosophy is to “cure” us of rigidity 
                                                          





and conformism, and in the final section I will argue that Bergson’s concept of “intuition” is 
designed to do precisely that. 
3. Intuition, Self-Creation, and the Art of Life 
 
It was Deleuze who first rescued Bergson from the oblivion into which his work had fallen 
by demonstrating – against critics such as Russell who were as eloquent as they were uncharitable 
– that intuition constitutes a rigorous philosophical method.190 It is also, however, a therapeutic 
philosophical practice that allows us to regain individual agency over our actions and to combat 
the problems of inflexibility and conformism. Intuition entails the trained application of conscious 
attention that practices experiencing duration, such that it provides access to the world as it truly 
is. In doing so, however, intuition allows us to grasp ourselves as individuals capable of 
determining our own ways of life. Intuition experiences the indeterminacy in the world of objects 
and thus makes it possible for us to see ourselves as free to choose our own ways of being and 
thus restores to us the conscious agency habit causes to withdraw from us. The practice of 
intuition resolves the issues of inflexibility and conformism by going directly to their source, 
namely the decreased tension of consciousness exacerbated by habit that makes choice difficult. 
Instead of helplessly repeating past ways of thinking and acting, intuition opens consciousness to 
possibilities of self-creation in which we articulate and follow a path of life that we ourselves 
discover within the movement of reality. In doing so, intuition makes it possible for us to create 
an individual course of life, from which we garner feelings of joy and strength that allow us to 
resist the temptation to conformism. 
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 The primary goal of the practice of intuition is to achieve precision in thinking, and 
Bergson argues that it accomplishes this by refusing the reductions of the reflective 
consciousness. Intuition is related to conscious attention, but for Bergson it differs in that it can 
be consciously cultivated and practiced as a method of actively resisting the pressure of habit to 
reduce conscious experience to generalities. Instead of taking the generalizations of reflective 
consciousness as the basis of thought, intuition is founded on the postulate that follows from the 
theory of duration that change and motion are more primitive than stasis and hence actively 
attempts to grasp them in one’s conscious experience, in this regard functioning as a 
“supplementary attention.”191 By focusing on change and motion in things, intuition actively 
attempts to free itself of the general concepts that everyday ways of thinking applies thus reaches 
a greater level of precision in thought. Specifically, by focusing on change and becoming one 
becomes capable of grasping qualitative differences between things. Whereas ordinarily thought 
attempts to grasp different and new things as an “arrangement of pre-existing elements” in which 
nothing is either lost or created, intuition grasps the uniqueness of individual things, their 
sensuous richness that habit erases.192 By refusing to simply identify a quality with the term 
“orange,” for instance, one can experience the particular hues of which orange is composed as it 
appears in different levels of light or shade and comes to more precise knowledge of it.193 Through 
the application of conscious effort, intuition allows one to escape the limitations of one’s 
perceptual scheme and grasp uniqueness and ongoing change in the world. 
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 Although Deleuze is correct that intuition constitutes a method that provides increased 
precision in thought and that Bergson himself applies it to dispel classical philosophical problems 
such as that of free will, the relationship between mind and body, Zeno’s paradoxes of motion 
among others, Bergson also views it as a way to alter our everyday experience of the world. The 
world as it is in itself to which philosophy gives us access is, as we saw in the previous section, 
given in the most immediate mode of conscious experience. Engaging in intuition allows us to 
regain contact with this mode of experience whenever we put in the effort to do so. Intuition is a 
method that can be applied at any time and in any context, and as a result Bergson argues that 
through it philosophy can be taken “out of the school and…into closer contact with life.”194 As 
something that can change our manner of perceiving the world in our everyday lives, Bergson 
thus treats the concept of intuition not just as a philosophical method to achieve precise 
metaphysical knowledge but also as a philosophical practice that trains philosophers to base their 
way of living on their enriched everyday experience of the world. Bergson’s hope that philosophy 
can exit the school and enter into life indicates that he regards his method of intuition as something 
that can directly affect our ways of perceiving, and I suggest, of acting as well. Intuition as a 
practice does so by reversing the effects of habit on consciousness, and therefore makes regaining 
agency possible. 
 Intuition resolves the conditions that afflict human life by attacking them at their root, 
namely the dynamic limitation habit effects on conscious experience. Though the application of 
intellectual effort, intuition plunges consciousness directly into the flux of duration and grasps 
entities in their unique and unpredictable processes of change. In doing so, intuition opens 
consciousness to experiences of the unfolding of radical novelty from which habit separates us 
                                                          





and thus actively breaks down the concepts we use to interpret them. By mediating our 
experiences of entities through general concepts, we ordinarily perceive them as simply a bundle 
of externally related properties. Intuition resists this static mode of perceiving entities by entering 
into a kind of attunement with them that Bergson calls “sympathy,” a patient and attentive 
experience of them in their specific processes of motion and development, the way they retain 
their past state and integrate them into their present and thereby anticipate the future.195 In viewing 
clouds, for instance, one can remain satisfied with noting their color, direction of motion, and 
type, but sympathetic perception avoids these attributions altogether and instead attempts to 
directly experience its directionality and tendency that articulates the course of its motion, the 
ways different parts of the clouds appear differently in particular qualities of light, and so on. 
Abstract qualities are impotent at describing clouds at this level, such that sympathetic experience 
also entails an immediate demonstration of the insufficiency of general ideas in describing the 
world. Stated more positively, intuition grasps the way even inanimate objects participate in 
“spirituality,” or are in other words unbound by the concepts and rational knowledge we apply to 
them and are hence free from external determination.196 Intuition puts the philosopher in contact 
with the specific processes of unpredictable change and motion that define the concrete existence 
of entities, such that it allows for a direct experience of the world as it is in itself. Bergson in fact 
refers to intuition in this respect as “metaphysics,” and it provides us access to the truth by 
distancing us from perception as formed by habit: “to philosophize”, Bergson concludes, “means 
to reverse the habitual (habituelle) direction of the workings of thought.”197 
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 When applied to everyday life, intuition allows for the continual transformation of our 
ways of perceiving and thinking in a way that responds to duration rather than erasing it. In this 
regard, intuition brings philosophy out of the school by allowing not just our philosophical but 
moreover our everyday thinking, what Bergson labels “common sense,” to gain in precision.198 
Intuition adds to our perception by focusing specifically on the qualitative and changing aspects 
of our experiences that are generally filtered out of consciousness. In doing so, the philosopher 
learns to perceive like artists, who for Bergson “reveal” unique experiences of the world in their 
sensuous and affective richness. Artists work with our quotidian perceptual faculties but extend 
them by concentrating on the way perception, affect, and memory interpenetrate in order to form 
a truly individual experience. The atmospheric effects produced by the vivacity and 
indeterminacy of the colors of one of the landscapes of Turner, an artist Bergson admires, presents 
a vision that transcends the “pale and colorless vision of things that is habitually ours” and 
captures it in a particular work through the medium of paint, just as a poet does with words.199 
Turner presents an experience that lies outside our everyday perception of the world, limited as it 
is by the effects of habit. Rather than simply copying a memory or a photograph of a sunset on 
the water onto canvas, a work like “The Scarlet Sunset” fuses vision and emotion to create an 
image that testifies to the uniqueness of Turner’s perception of the sunset and presents it enriched 
with the motion of clouds and water and the influence of that motion on the rest of the scene. For 
Bergson, philosophical intuition attempts to achieve qualitatively unique experiences like these 
but goes beyond artistic practice by altering old concepts and possibly even constructing new 
ones that are added to one’s common sense. By attending to processes of change and motion, 
                                                          
198 Ibid., p. 113/105. 
 





intuition can become the basis of what Bergson calls a “progressive philosophy” that continually 
recasts and transforms existing categories in light of new experiences.200 In doing so, philosophers 
accustom themselves to attending to the qualitative aspects of their everyday experiences and 
using them to alter their commonsense ways of thinking. 
 These changes intuition effects in our thinking are the basis of its therapeutic efficacy. In 
changing our commonsense ways of thinking, intuition introduces freedom into our everyday 
experience of the world, and allows us to recover agency over our actions in two ways. First, at 
the level of conscious experience, intuition allows us to recognize ourselves as individuals capable 
of creative self-determination. Intuition reverses the process of filtering through which the 
superficial self is created: whereas reflective thought grasps ourselves through general concepts 
that alienate us from our inner life, intuition grasps the individuality of entities and the 
undetermined nature of the processes they undergo and allow us to see ourselves as equally 
individual and free. In doing so, intuition allows us to resist the alienation habit brings about and 
to identify ourselves with our individual experience of the world and our ability to bring about 
novelty by ourselves. Intuition practices seeing freedom and the creation of the absolutely new in 
the universe and hence in ourselves as well: through intuition we “feel we are participating, 
creators of ourselves, in the great work of creation which is the origin of all things and which 
goes on before our eyes.”201 In becoming cognizant of our own inherent self-creativity we can 
gain a greater appreciation for our own capacity of self-determination and begin to work to act 
less as a result of habit and more as a result of conscious choice. Rather than seeing ourselves as 
limited to the possibilities that have been given to us by our past or by our socialization, we see 
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ourselves as capable of creating new possibilities, of finding new ways of life. Intuition thus 
changes our conscious sense of self and allows us to recognize ourselves as undetermined along 
with the rest of the universe and hence as able to determine our own ways of life. 
 This conscious self-recognition is in turn made possible by a second change produced at 
the dynamic level of conscious tension that ultimately provides the physical basis for the recovery 
of individual agency. The exertion of effort required to engage in intuition that holds in a single 
experience the various aspects and flux of perception and memory present in it greatly raises one’s 
level of conscious tension. As a result, consciousness becomes increasingly able to resist the 
pressures of habit and practical need and attend to the perpetual creation of novelty that is sensible 
within one’s perceptual field. In fact, it is precisely resistance to habit through effort that gives 
rise to the consciousness of oneself as a free being described in the previous paragraph. In a 
manner influenced by Maine de Biran’s analysis of tactile resistance, Bergson argues that the 
exertion of effort against the limits of habitual perception gives rise to conscious awareness of 
oneself as an individual who exists independently from the external world.202 The resistance habit 
offers the attempt to engage intuition stimulates consciousness to continue to exert itself, to refuse 
the partial and general notions we have become accustomed to applying and to instead reach a 
truly unique experience of the world. The sense of oneself as independent being capable of 
exerting such effort follows from this experience, and in achieving this self-consciousness we 
gain a sense of ourselves as “masters” of our own exertions and hence our possibilities for 
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acting.203 What is essential about Bergson’s analysis of the dynamic effects of the practice of 
intuition is that by raising the tension at which consciousness resides, it cultivates a counter-force 
to the force of habit that makes the hesitation required for choice and invention possible in actual 
fact. Effort that resists habit maintains consciousness in its state of concentration, thus allowing 
it to not only weigh options but to actively seek out opportunities for new types of action in one’s 
surrounding world. In doing so, the practice of intuition actively lessens our determination by the 
mechanical causality of habit, and thus opens us to uncovering new ways of thinking and acting, 
rather than simply repeating old ones. 
 By opening human consciousness to novelty and becoming, intuition also provides 
resources to combat inflexibility and conformism in human character. Intuition resolves the 
problem of impulsiveness and rigidity by creating the dynamic conditions for creative judgments 
and choices tailored to individual situations. Having raised conscious tension to the level of making 
hesitation prior to action possible, intuition allows a focused examination on the conditions in 
which one makes a decision regarding how to act. Rather than simply applying past solutions to a 
particular scenario, the practitioner can explore the immediate perceptual details of her experience 
of it as well as her memories of past experiences. In doing so, she gains a “presentiment” 
(presentiment) of possible consequences of her actions and uncovers ways of calibrating her 
actions according to her desired ends.204 By strengthening conscious tension against the impulse 
that leads to unthinking and rigid conduct, intuition allows consciousness to examine and even 
create possibilities for action. Bergson argues that one must continually reapply such effort in order 
to maintain it, but when applied in the case of action it becomes “good sense” that entails “constant 
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wakefulness” to the specificities of particular situations and individual judgment in each case.205 
Bergson is clear that good sense cannot be hypostatized into a single state of character that can 
become passive and habitual: it is rather “work itself,” the continually renewed vigor of attention 
that refuses to accept past solutions but instead invents new ones in each specific occasion and 
thus aspires to perfect adaptability and flexibility.  
 As the outgrowth of intuition, good sense is a form of practical knowledge that is able to 
respond to the constant and unpredictable change of duration. As such, it functions creatively by 
forming a new action in each case it encounters. Bergson in fact argues that the good sense that 
arises from intuition is the most effective way to respond to the novelty of duration and hence to 
combat inflexibility in one’s conduct. Bergson makes this argument by contrasting good sense 
from experience and deliberation, two other forms of practical knowledge that he claims fail to 
confront novelty.206 Experience, accumulated observations that have been condensed into a general 
understanding of how to act in particular cases, cannot respond to the new situations we encounter 
in life. For example, Aristotle’s doctor who acts according to experience (empeiria) reasons based 
on accumulated memories of past patients, their symptoms, underlying diseases, and modes of 
treatment.207 From these past situations, the doctor chooses which course will be most likely to 
cure the disease with which she is presently confronted, yet when presented with an unfamiliar 
patient who presents symptoms with which she has not encountered before here reasoning from 
prior examples fails to provide guidance. Deliberative reasoning that begins with general principles 
that it applies to particular cases fails for the same reason that the application of general ideas as a 
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whole cannot escape inflexibility for Bergson, namely their qualitative poverty when placed next 
to the flow of duration. Deliberation, Bergson argues, is a blunt instrument that only approximates 
the contours and flow of particular situations and as a result produces rigid forms of action. By 
attending to the qualitative uniqueness and the processes of change that are present within 
situations, good sense can construct an action that is calibrated to its requirements, producing 
novelty in response to novelty. A truly courteous person, in Bergson’s example, does not simply 
past acts thought of or even defined as polite to present circumstances, and nor does he apply 
general principles of politeness, but senses the preferences of a particular individual, recognizes 
through both memory and perceptual observation what their interests are and projects how they 
might respond to particular forms of action, and thus crafts an act that displays courtesy as it applies 
to that person in particular.208 Good sense produces genuinely new forms of action that are 
irreducible to the rearrangement of elements of previous actions but that solve the problem of 
inflexibility by perceptively and intelligently adapting preserved actions to respond to the new 
situations one encounters in a dynamically unfolding universe. 
 The changes to consciousness intuition causes also cultivate the emotional resources to 
confront and resist the experiences of painful tension that incline us towards conformism. 
Specifically, Bergson argues that the emotion of joy (joie) instills a sense of ourselves as 
individuals that forms the basis of a countervailing force to the impact of social opinion and 
custom. Joy is the consciously-felt emotion that arises solely with creativity.209 Joy for Bergson is 
a special emotion that, following the Stoics, he differentiates from pleasure (plaisir), the 
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satisfaction of need, and instead views as a feeling of euphoria that arises from achievement.210 At 
the dynamic level, joy arises when psychic resistance is overcome, when effort triumphs over the 
pressures exerted against it and it comes to a unique experience or action. Qualitatively, Bergson 
compares this experience to the joy the artist experiences at seeing her creation, the completed 
work of art that testifies to the effort that went into it. What Bergson adds to the Stoic conception 
of joy, however, is that it is attached to one’s experience of oneself as an individual. Bergson 
rejects what he takes to be the common explanation of joy, namely that it arises from the glory or 
admiration we receive from others. Such concern for the opinions of others, Bergson claims, is the 
result of insecurity in one’s achievement, and when one is sure that one has created something joy 
arises one does not seek out validation for it. In this regard, Bergson argues that in the experience 
of joy we briefly transcend the human condition and feel ourselves to be as gods whose creation 
is self-validating.211 Joy, in other words, is an individualizing emotion, a pride that one feels in 
regards to oneself and one’s own efforts. In experiences of joy one briefly forgets one’s standing 
in the eyes of others and instead is able to concentrate on the value of oneself as creator of 
something absolutely new and that is hence owed the “absolute value of a great work of art.”212 
 Making intuitive thought a component of common sense makes this experience of joy an 
increasingly regular occurrence in one’s emotional life and ultimately provides the space to 
articulate a way of life that is more or less independent of social expectation. Treating intuition as 
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a practice attempts to make novelty as much of a regular component of one’s common sense and 
everyday perceptual experience as possible. As a result, one’s experience of the world, as well as 
one’s actions in it, will become increasingly creative. By cultivating the ability to have sympathetic 
experiences of entities, one will find more qualitative nuances in one’s everyday experiences that 
had previously been excluded, as well as more opportunities for new forms of action. Bergson thus 
argues that intuition slowly builds upon itself to the point where it becomes a general ability to 
engage in the “creation of self by self, the growing of the personality” that entails the cultivation 
of individual tendencies that differentiate oneself from others and articulate a unique set of actions 
and goals for oneself.213 Bergson ultimately claims that in doing so, philosophical practice makes 
aesthetic satisfaction into a more frequent, continuous, and ultimately accessible occurrence than 
art does.214 Whereas the production of art requires talent and specialized training, the practice of 
intuition simply entails an extension of one’s natural perceptual abilities, such that anyone can 
experience the joy of creativity. Furthermore, as one engages in intuition as a more regular 
occurrence joy becomes a seduction to further creativity. Intuition and joy become a virtuous cycle 
that inspires increased creativity in our actions and increased independence. Bergson even 
speculates that moral systems originally came into being in this way, through an individual 
emotion that arose through actions and eventually crystallized in the form of doctrines.215 The 
continual practice of intuition allows one to develop an individual pattern of life that both responds 
to and incites one to one’s creative acts and experiences. 
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 The practice of intuition culminates in a Socratic attitude towards society, which Bergson 
understands as one of non-identification with the internalized labels of the social self. Against 
interpretations of Socrates as positing an intellectualist ethics, Bergson argues that what is essential 
to Socratic ethics is his daimōn, the quasi-divine voice that prevents him from doing what he knows 
to be wrong.216 Socrates’ ethics is in fact a “mission” that “transcends” reason and instead entails 
a felt commitment to the truth that governs his ways of comporting himself among others.217 
Grounded in a voice of refusal, this commitment is to a large degree negative. Socrates refuses to 
engage with others in ways that would compromise the ethical foundations of his way of life. 
Stated more positively, however, it is possible to interpret the daimonic voice of refusal as a voice 
of hesitation that allows for independent choice even in the face of social pressure. Bergson seems 
to have something like this in mind when he says that whenever a philosopher “detaches himself 
from the common rule of humanity…living Socrates is there” in the form of the “attitude of the 
sage” he exemplified in his own life and taught to subsequent Greek schools, including that of the 
Stoics.218 While the individual who adopts the attitude of the sage remains within society, he 
separates his own self-conception and goals from those of the groups in which he participates and 
maintains his commitment to his individual way of life. This detachment entails retention of the 
dynamic openness to new possibilities and options that allows one’s behavior to remain supple 
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even in the face of the tension of social non-conformity. The attitude of the sage is thus an attitude 
of non-attachment, of distance from social pressure and commitment to one’s own choices and to 
one’s personality as one creates it that Bergson concludes is the result of intuition.219 Although 
insertion in social life is inevitable and the need to communicate with others is permanent, the 
attitude of the sage entails the cognitive and emotional resources to resist the inevitable temptation 
towards conformism that ultimately derives from the increase in conscious tension and change in 
self-recognition brought about by intuition. 
 By focusing on both the dynamic and the conscious aspects of the problems of agency, 
inflexibility, and conformism, Bergson’s practice of intuition serves as a genuine treatment to the 
negative conditions of human life he diagnoses according to the terms in which he defines them. 
If intuition were merely to change our ways of thinking about and recognizing ourselves without 
engaging with the effects of habit at the dynamic level, that change in self-conception would be 
empty and lacking in the resources to combat the continual pressure habit exerts on consciousness. 
Such an individual could even be open to charges of hypocrisy, or at least of an even more comic 
lack of self-awareness, thinking herself to be master of herself while in fact conforming to the 
necessity of habit in its mechanical and social form. Bergson’s practice of intuition avoids this 
problem by functioning at both the dynamic level and the level of self-awareness simultaneously: 
experience of duration through the application of effort both raises the level of consciousness’ 
tension while also providing one with an experience of the world and hence of oneself as creative 
and free. Intuition thus gives consciousness the strength to resist the pressure habit exerts, without 
which one’s recognition of oneself as a self-creating being would be empty and in vain. 
Furthermore, Bergson’s analysis of the emotion of joy that results from creativity suggests that 
                                                          





self-determination and creation draws strength from itself and becomes an incitement to further 
activity in its own right. The ongoing adaptation of oneself to one’s circumstances in good sense, 
and the Socratic attitude of non-identity with social norms, thus are grounded in physical changes 
to consciousness that actively resist the effects of habit. Intuition succeeds in its therapeutic 
function by combining the opening of consciousness to novelty with changes at the dynamic level 
that support continuous creative activity. 
 In arguing that intuition should be understood as a form of philosophical therapy, however, 
it should be noted that there is an important difference with therapeutic practice as Nussbaum 
understands it. Bergson’s extolling of good sense and the Socratic attitude of the sage suggests that 
like Nussbaum’s forms of therapy, intuition is attached to an account of normative human life. 
Intuition, Bergson claims, is not only able to revivify our experience of the world and our own 
conducts but also constitutes a “preparation for living well (bien vivre).”220 Unlike Nussbaum’s 
therapeutic arguments, however, for Bergson the therapeutic practice of intuition is not merely 
applied contextually or medicinally according to the specific needs of a patient at a particular time, 
but more precisely as a permanent regimen that institutes a state of “health” at the same time as it 
cures “sickness.” Intuition is not a practice that is used solely to treat a particular condition and 
then be left aside: since habit is a permanent and necessary feature of human life, even though the 
joy of self-creation feeds on itself it is always liable to be limited, or in Bergson’s words to undergo 
a process of “cooling,” that makes one’s newly learned ways of acting habitual.221 Intuition must 
be continuously practiced and made into the basis of one’s everyday ways of perceiving and acting 
in the world. To the extent that intuition is practiced as a concrete way of life, it allows the 
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philosopher to achieve good sense and the attitude of the sage, but the effort that is its foundation 
cannot be avoided. 
4. Conclusion: Homo Faber 
 
 In interpreting philosophy in Bergson as a “transformation of perception,” Hadot links the 
metaphysical and existential interests animating his philosophical practice. What is problematic 
about our everyday ways of perception is that they are not only cut off from experience of the 
world as it truly is but also prevent us from grasping ourselves as free beings in contact with the 
metaphysically real world. Philosophy is a choice in that one must actively refuse to accept one’s 
everyday experience of the world and instead strive to come into contact with the continual 
unfolding of duration, the creation of the radically new as it occurs in nature. And indeed, we have 
seen that Bergson’s concerns are quite close to those Hadot attributes to him and that he claims 
Bergson shares with the ancients. In its capacity as a therapeutic practice, intuition functions by 
making us conscious of ourselves as free and responsible beings capable of controlling our own 
activities. Although dependent upon a neurological theory of habit that differs strongly from 
ancient conceptions, Bergson’s argument that recognition of our free and creative nature causes us 
to abandon a passive and mechanistic mode of behavior for an active and vital one coincides nicely 
with Hadot’s understanding of the existential concerns that animate philosophical practice.222  
 Both the motivations and the efficacy of Bergson’s philosophical practice can only be 
understood, however, as responses to the effects of habit on human consciousness and human 
action. Training oneself to see the world “naively” or in terms of duration is a component, if 
admittedly the key component, of what can be appropriately called a permanent philosophical 
therapy. The effortful attention to one’s immediate perceptual world of intuition transforms 
                                                          





perception to the extent that it trains us to notice the qualitative details and shifts we normally 
ignore, but for Bergson the reason to do so is not only to see the world as it is in itself in a way 
that can resolve philosophical problems but also because it resists the ongoing and inevitable 
effects of habit on human action and human consciousness. While we have seen that as a 
component of bodily intelligence habit is an ineradicable and necessary component of human life, 
its dynamic relationship with consciousness means that it constitutes a permanent threat to 
individual agency and self-determination. For Bergson, human life is always at risk of becoming 
routinized, such that we automatically re-enact ways of acting rather than developing new ones 
that respond to our world. The very automaticity and passivity that makes habit useful to the body 
also incline us towards inflexibility and conformism, and by indicating that they are part of the 
human condition Bergson suggests that they in fact characterize the majority of us. Agency is won 
only through the continual struggle to apply the effort of intuition that must become for Bergson a 
permanent feature of our lives.  
Focusing on Bergson’s concept of habit shows that even though his philosophical practice 
is primarily therapeutic, his concepts of good sense and the attitude of the sage indicate that therapy 
is in fact a component of a highly optimistic picture of our capacity to achieve self-determination. 
Indeed, the practice of intuition opens up the possibility of what can be called radical self-creation 
that goes farther than Ravaisson’s concept of invention in allowing for change and unpredictability 
in one’s way of being. Whereas for Ravaisson, invention remains tied to a particular virtue that it 
instantiates in an improvisational fashion, for Bergson the cultivation of good sense is a creative 
practice in that it uncovers absolutely new possibilities for being within one’s perceptual 
experience. As his critiques of experiential and deliberative knowledge demonstrate, the attempt 





adapt. Action must instead begin from the discovery of the exigencies of a specific situation to 
which one then adapts oneself. Unlike the expert or the deliberator who act from pre-established 
principles, whether tacit or explicit, the person of good sense ceaselessly reapplies the free effort 
of intuition to explore their immediate perceptual world as it is infused with memory and 
qualitative richness and discover new possibilities and needs. Bergson holds as an ideal perfect 
responsiveness to change in circumstances, and this results in the need not to alter existing actions 
in light of new circumstances but to create new ones that the body then learns.  Bergson jettisons 
the idea of a pre-given virtue for philosophical practice to instantiate and instead seeks to uncover 
new ways of acting that culminate in an individual personality and manner of living. 
 As a result, Bergson’s conception of philosophical practice entails a radical openness to 
change and unpredictability in one’s way of life that is not limited to variation on a theme but runs 
to the point of making oneself mirror the ceaseless productivity of reality. Reality, as Bergson 
argues, possesses the structure of duration that entails the continual production of absolute novelty, 
in order to respond to it one’s actions must also be absolutely new. Bergson’s philosophical therapy 
thus results in a program of radical self-creation, of continuous change in one’s ways of acting that 
bring about absolute novelty and give rise to a truly individual manner of being in the world. 
Bergson expresses this conception of self-creation in his definition of humanity as Homo Faber, 
“Man the Maker,” who is differentiated by his capacity “to create materially and morally, to 
fabricate things and to fabricate himself.”223 Self-determination for Bergson ultimately takes the 
form of self-creativity, of being able to invent for oneself a flexible and individual way of being 
through one’s own efforts. Like Ravaisson’s conception of practice, radical self-creation entails 
the invention of actions that cannot be predicted or articulated in advance. Bergson radicalizes the 
                                                          





notion of “invention,” however, by suggesting that intuition allows humanity to invent their entire 
way of being from their actions to their perception through the practice of intuition. Philosophy’s 
focus on freedom and indeterminacy gives rise to mastery over ourselves to the point where we 
become self-creators, even breaking through the human condition at points and seeing ourselves 
function alongside universal creation. 
 Since habit is a permanent fixture of our embodied lives, however, it seems to me that the 
possibilities for self-creation will be tempered in actual practice by the fossilization of free actions 
into motor mechanisms. Good sense and the attitude of the sage require continuous application of 
intellectual effort, and it seems doubtful that such effort can be sustained in everyday life. Indeed, 
Bergson’s own arguments concerning the practical and social utility of routines could be brought 
to bear in analyzing the plausibility of treating practice as an intuition. It is absurd for 
consciousness to attempt to invent each new action it undertakes: automaticity remains a necessary 
feature of our behavior to prevent consciousness from being overwhelmed with necessities. One 
could even argue that by allowing so many of our everyday activities to be undertaken 
automatically, habit fulfills a positive role in allowing consciousness to focus on situations that are 
particularly relevant to one’s interests and aspirations. Bergson’s argument that the new ways of 
acting and thinking that are created through the practice of intuition inevitably undergo a process 
of “cooling” appears to recognize this fact. What the person of good sense invents through 
philosophical practice will eventually become fossilized, closed, and automatic, in short, a habit, 
requiring a new application of effort to retain agency. One could make a similar argument at the 
social level as well. Striving to retain the attitude of the sage allows the philosopher to retain 
distance from social custom and opinion, but she remains in the world and must communicate with 





degree of tension with his quotidian examples of good sense, which he claims is found in 
phenomena like courtesy and in professional life.224 The likely outcome of the practice of intuition, 
in short, seems to be one of an oscillation between expansion of oneself through creative action 
and contraction into habits. Although the practice of intuition remains radically creative, that 
creation will not be continuous but part of a movement between extremes of flexibility and 
inflexibility, individuality and conformism. Bergson’s therapy attempts to treat the most extreme 
forms of habitual stasis, and given the necessary and even positive role habit plays in everyday life 
that therapy appears at its most attractive when it attempts to achieve a middle ground between 
radical creativity and stasis. 
 This discussion ultimately returns us to the issue of assessing Bergson and Ravaisson’s 
differing theories of habit left over from the first section. At this point, however, we are in a better 
position to appreciate what is at stake in their contrasts. Both regard habit as the way repeated 
actions and affections are retained within individuals, and both claim that habit plays a crucial role 
in embodied intelligence. Bergson’s notion of good sense, and his analysis of bodily adaptation 
contained in the image of the cone, suggests however that the kind of “skilled” behavior Ravaisson 
claims is essential to habit only comes about through a certain degree of effort. Bodily intelligence 
in the absence of consciousness for Bergson is limited to a means-ends logic: the production of 
novelty arises only with consciousness. These observations ultimately stem from his basic account 
of habit as a mechanism that plays only a passive role in learning. Bergson’s account of a loop that 
runs between perception, the nervous system, and the body is clearly much more advanced than 
Ravaisson’s uncritical reliance on Leibnizian dynamism, and relates these aspects of our being 
much more effectively than Ravaisson. The question that arises in the contrast between the two 
                                                          





thinkers, however, concerns whether a certain degree of conscious effort is required for bodily 
learning and adaptation, and on this front I side with Ravaisson over Bergson that it does not. In 
the next chapter, we will see that Merleau-Ponty argues, in my opinion convincingly, that 
Bergson’s dualism between habit and consciousness fails to properly account for the phenomenon 
of learning. For now, however, it is also worth noting that while Bergson’s theory takes the 
neurosciences into account far more than Ravaisson, it falls afoul of the dynamism of the 
contemporary discussions of plasticity described in the previous chapter. Variability in synaptic 
connections that occur through repetition at no point require conscious mediation, such that 
changes in one’s manner of acting do not require Bergson’s dualistic explanation. And although 
contemporary neuroscience differentiates between adaptable and static forms of unconscious or 
“automatic” action, often referred to as “goal-oriented” and “habitual” respectively, the difference 
between the two is not explained by conscious effort but by differences in training patterns.225 In 
particular, “overtraining,” or the unnecessary repetition of particular actions, is often cited as a 
cause of the degeneration of adaptable into static forms of action.  
 These observations are more consistent with Ravaisson’s overall account of habit as an 
ability rather than an action in two respects. First, they attribute to the body a greater range of 
adaptability and freedom in the absence of conscious intervention than Bergson. And second, they 
regard adaptation as primary over stasis, or in other words they view habit as the primary 
phenomenon in terms of which the concept of “routines” must be understood. Bodily learning is 
primarily a dynamic process that allows for change and adaptation and does not require the explicit 
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agency of consciousness. Bergson’s conceptions of closed, automatic, and unchanging habits, and 
of the process of their acquisition as fossilization are best understood, in other words, as deviations 
from the general account of habit Ravaisson provides. In this regard, we can see the process of 
fossilization that results from overtraining in a similar vein as Ravaisson’s account of addiction, 
both of which result from the overuse of particular forms of action. Whereas addiction for 
Ravaisson entails a heightening of the preference for and automaticity of to an unstoppable level, 
fossilization results in preference’s weakening, leaving only its automaticity. In a book heavily 
influenced by Bergson, Paul Ricoeur provides a way to account for how both of these results can 
come about. Ricoeur argues that “automatism,” what in this chapter I have called routines, results 
when one adopts a “repetitive attitude,” or in other words engages in actions regularly but without 
thinking or concern for them.226 This often occurs, Ricoeur argues, in common life with “daily 
cycles of action” that do not need to change or adapt. Whereas the skilled actions that are 
Ravaisson’s focus are pertinent to our conscious goals, a repetitive attitude can be adopted when 
undertaking actions that are necessary yet undertaken in conditions that rarely if ever change. 
While driving to school is an important activity, it rarely changes in its character. There is thus no 
need for the body to adapt itself to new circumstances, such that it can get by merely by reapplying 
old forms of action. Likewise, my routine of turning on a pot of water each morning to make coffee 
is unchanging, such that the focus of perceptual and bodily attention can be placed elsewhere. In 
both of these cases, adaptation through the application of bodily intelligence is unnecessary in 
order to achieve a particular goal, such that the body can engage with the world in a more passive 
manner. These special cases seem to be the most likely ones in which fossilization in the manner 
Bergson understands it occurs, and should be understood as a different form of habit’s 
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“degeneration” from that which Ravaisson describes. The problem of the limitation of everyday 
perception Hadot identifies, along with the loss of agency and the attendant problems of rigidity 
and conformism we have discussed in this chapter, are thus best understood as results of this form 
of degeneration rather than permanent features of the human condition that are perennial problems 
for philosophical practice to solve. 
 Yet thinking of habit in its sense as “motor mechanism” or “routine” as a separate form of 
its degeneration allows us to see the value of his philosophical practice in a new light. Whether or 
not we agree with Bergson’s identification of duration with metaphysical reality (another subject 
to be discussed in the next chapter), the focused application of conscious attention on one’s 
surroundings can be seen as efficacious in combating habits that have degenerated in either form 
of addiction or fossilization. Since both of these forms of degeneration entail automaticity, 
applying effort in order to regain the capacity to hesitate prior to acting would serve as a 
mechanism with which to raise habits that have become fossilized and have come to hinder our 
practical and social lives back to consciousness, such that a new habit can be formed. Ravaisson 
himself suggests such a possibility in passing in De l’habitude, claiming that habits that have exited 
the domain of consciousness can be brought up to it again through effort, though he does not go 
into detail regarding how this can be accomplished in practice (H 57). Bergson’s concept of 
intuition thus provides a potential answer to the question Ravaisson’s own theory of practice left 
open, namely how to prevent cultivated ways of being from degenerating and turning into 
addictions. The analysis in this chapter allows us to add the problem of fossilization, and intuition 
treated as a form of therapy provides a potential solution. As a result, we can recast the role of 
effort and attention in order to accommodate its role in a less mechanistic theory of habit. Viewing 





threat to human action. As a result, constant effort will not be required to ensure the kind of 
adaptability Bergson associates with good sense, such that its role in living well as a whole will be 
diminished. Its role as a form of therapy, however, will become a crucial counterpoint to the 
purposive cultivation of habits. Intuition will remain a valuable practice both for ensuring that 
one’s cultivated habits do not degenerate, and for helping one to overcome old habits that are 







Chapter 3: Knowledge in the Hands: Maurice Merleau-Ponty on Habit, Freedom, and Self-
Experimentation 
 
 Contemporary philosophy, Merleau-Ponty declares in his inaugural lecture as chair of 
philosophy at the Collège de France, has lost its uneasiness (malaise) with everyday life.227 In an 
academic world that values erudition over originality, and in which life has become bureaucratized 
and routinized, philosophical work strives for ease in communication only. Philosophers have 
become reduced to mere functionaries, passing opinions on theoretical subjects back and forth 
between each other like memoranda and all but forgetting that their practice originated with a man 
who neither wrote nor taught but who questioned the way people in the streets and the marketplace 
lived their lives. Socrates exemplifies what Merleau-Ponty calls the “total function of philosophy,” 
which stems from the sense that “the world is unacceptable as it is: knowledge we wish to be 
written down for the honor of humanity but which we forget when we return to our affairs.”228 
Socratic philosophy gains its value from its continual relevance to everyday life, which lies 
precisely in its refusal to give in to the temptation to rebel from it and to live alone as one of 
Hegel’s beautiful souls, wrapped up in the hypocritical sense of one’s superiority. Socratic 
philosophy for Merleau-Ponty recognizes our inherent embeddedness in the world, that we are 
ourselves “inescapably,” and yet that it is precisely on the basis that we are who we are by our 
participation in a social world that we can recognize our aspirations and struggles in the lives of 
others and relate to them authentically.229 Socratic philosophy does not advise us to rebel against 
our social world but what is far more dangerous, to understand our world on the basis of rational 
                                                          
227 Maurice Merleau-Ponty Éloge de la philosophie et autres essais, (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), p. 38, in English as 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. John Wild, James Edie, and John O’Neill, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 33. 
 
228 Ibid., p. 39/34. 
 





thought. Critical examination of opinions and acceptance of only those which survive scrutiny puts 
us at odds with a social world that demands absolute adherence to custom. While Socrates refuses 
to challenge his execution, he does so on different grounds from any that would be acceptable to 
the Athenians, just as he accepts the gods on a different basis from traditional religion. And yet, in 
taking this distance from the world by searching for its truth through reason the philosopher gains 
a kind of freedom he did not previously possess. The philosopher only clarifies the social world, 
only puts into words what everyone already knows but cannot yet articulate, yet in doing so takes 
experiences that were previously felt to be private and shows them to be common and therefore 
available to change by common action. Philosophy, in short, “opens each of us up to freedom.”230 
 Although he does not take on Socrates’ philosophical method, I will argue in this chapter 
that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical project is Socratic in that it too attempts to achieve and 
maintain freedom. Merleau-Ponty sees his philosophical work as an aid to living well in the social 
world in which his readers live, recognizing as Socrates did the impossibility and undesirability of 
flight from the world and attempting to demonstrate the commonality of seemingly private 
experiences to gain a better practical grasp of our world. Merleau-Ponty’s clearest expression of 
this goal is found in the preface to The Phenomenology of Perception, where he claims that: 
True philosophy entails learning to see the world again, and in this sense a historical account can 
give meaning to the world with as much “depth” as a philosophical treatise. We take our fate in our 
hands, we become responsible for our history by means of reflection, but equally by means of a 
decision on which we stake our life, and in both cases what is involved is a violent act which is 
validates itself in its exercise.231 
 
Engaging in philosophy entails taking a decision that implicates one’s way of experiencing and 
living in the world. It involves choosing what Pierre Hadot calls the “existential option” (option 
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existentielle)232 to relearn how to perceive (voir) the world and to base one’s identity and projects 
on this new discipline. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is a form or style of thinking that 
precedes its crystallization as a distinct movement within philosophy and that is continuous with 
the “effort of modern thought” found not merely in philosophy but also in art to creatively 
articulate meaning in the world.233 By attending to and describing the patterns of our first-person 
experience of the world we can establish its structure not merely as it is reflectively thought but as 
it is lived through our active engagements. In doing so we can come to see how our activity creates 
an environment of lived and social space that is familiar to us and available to our concrete goals. 
Philosophy, both his earlier phenomenology and to a certain extent his later ontology, attends to 
what Merleau-Ponty following Husserl calls our “operative intentionality,” intentionality not 
found in our objective knowledge of the world but in our practical commerce with it, “our desires, 
our evaluations, and in the landscape…the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise 
language.”234 Philosophical analysis uncovers our pre-reflective practical comprehension of the 
world and reveals to us how the values we presuppose in our everyday lives are not private but 
common to a social formation. Philosophy uncovers not just the immanent structure of our world 
but its participation in a shared history and thus opens us up to the possibility of changing that 
world for the better. 
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 Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habit is crucial to his understanding of how to live freely, and 
that it makes key advances over both Bergson and Ravaisson while preserving many of their 
insights. In this chapter’s first section I focus on Merleau-Ponty’s presentation of habit in The 
Phenomenology of Perception, which develops Ravaisson and Bergson’s notion of embodied 
intelligence by demonstrating that habit is the basis of our meaningful experience of the world. By 
preserving some of Bergson’s analysis of the “lived body” while sweeping away the traces of 
mind-body dualism left in his work, Merleau-Ponty is able to capture much – though not all – of 
Ravaisson’s account of the spontaneous and goal-oriented body without relying on his 
metaphysics. Merleau-Ponty’s contribution, however, is to combine this analysis with the 
phenomenological concept of meaning to argue that habit functions as the mediator of a “world,” 
a horizon of familiar possibilities of which repeated interactions gives us a practical grasp that 
allows us to accomplish our everyday tasks. Through habituation our capacities of motion and 
perception are not only coordinated but synthesized, such that habit is to thank for the seamlessness 
of our sense of reality. What results from this analysis is an appreciation of both the independence 
and ultimately primacy of embodied intelligence over reflective consciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty’s most sophisticated advance over Ravaisson and Bergson, however, is to 
ground skillfulness in an inherently social process of habit acquisition. Relating his early 
phenomenological and his late ontological work, section two will explore the role habit plays in 
embedding us in an intersubjective world. Developing the theme of interaction hinted at in 
Merleau-Ponty’s early work, I will argue that habit for Merleau-Ponty is a process of appropriating 
meanings through communication, mimesis, and through our participation in shared social 
activities. As a result, Merleau-Ponty develops a conception of the self that is produced historically 





of formation. Merleau-Ponty comes closest to Bergson in his appropriation of Husserl’s concept 
of sedimentation (Sedimentierung), the retention of repeated experiences, to explain the habitual 
subject’s openness in terms of its historicality. Repetition produces the aptitudes through which 
we live unconsciously, such that we can never even in principle come to know their origin. 
Habituation entails continuous interaction with our spatial, social, and institutional environment, 
our internalization of practices through creative repetition that changes practices in the process. 
The habitual subject is thus a fluid subject always in process of becoming, such that attempts to 
reflect upon it will only serve as approximations that highlight some of its tendencies and 
relationships.  
With this analysis of the ways habit produces meaning and embeds us in a social world we 
will be prepared in the final section to see how Merleau-Ponty integrates his thought on habit into 
a theory of philosophical practice designed to help us live freely within our social world. Habit 
complicates attempts to gain conscious control of one’s circumstances, such that philosophy’s task 
of clarifying the contours of our world and the nature of the precise relationships of which we are 
constituted will be an endless one. While we are free insofar as our world is open to our action 
such that institutions and practices can be changed through our work, actively assuming our 
freedom will require knowledge of just the concrete conditions which have formed us habitual 
subjects of which we can only gain partial understanding. Philosophical practice for Merleau-
Ponty thus does not take the form of introspection but of self-experimentation that attempts to 
uncover our habitual ways of grasping the world and comparing them to our conscious knowledge. 
Through observation of our affective reactions to diverse situations we do not discover radically 
new possibilities for life as in Bergson but instead uncover possibilities that are latent within our 





possibilities, a better – though necessarily incomplete – sense of what they are and how we share 
them with others, such that we learn what our concrete interests are and how best to achieve them. 
Philosophical practice thus culminates in political practice as philosophy, theoretical consideration 
of our existential constitution, turns into non-philosophy, interrogation of the concrete histories 
that have made us who we are and what possibilities we have to improve our situation. 
Philosophical practice provides a situated self-consciousness, not full recognition of ourselves as 
rational beings in Hadot’s sense as such complete knowledge is impossible, but rather greater 
awareness of particular possibilities and our ability to pursue them. 
1. The World of Habit: Ravaisson, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to uncover our pre-reflective lived experience of the world stems 
from the desire he shares with Ravaisson and Bergson to avoid both empiricist and intellectualist 
accounts of human subjectivity and knowledge. All three reject the dualistic picture of the mind 
and body inherited from Descartes and attempt to articulate a concept of subjectivity that inheres 
in the body and challenge the ontological opposition between cognitive and corporeal substances, 
and all three identify habit as a phenomenon that highlights weaknesses in mind-body dualism and 
points toward an alternative. Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of habit is much closer to Ravaisson’s 
than to Bergson’s, however, in that Merleau-Ponty understands habit in terms of an aptitude rather 
than in terms of a mechanism. We do not respond automatically to specific stimuli in our 
environment by means of specific motor mechanisms as Bergson holds: rather, habit entails the 
“power” (pouvoir) to recognize particular types of situations taken as a whole and to respond to 
them by means of a certain type of action.235 Merleau-Ponty develops his own theory of habit in 
explicit opposition to Bergson and to contemporary theories of habit drawn from behavioral 
                                                          





psychology that interpret habit mechanistically and which fail to explain the process of learning 
skills. This engagement allows Merleau-Ponty to extend Ravaisson’s understanding of embodied 
intelligence to include a pre-reflective source of meaning in the phenomenological sense of 
encountering entities as relevant to our projects and concerns. Habit is the basis of our horizon of 
possibility, our pre-reflective experience of the world in terms of its availability to certain types of 
action. By demonstrating the inseparability of bodily and perceptual intentionality, Merleau-Ponty 
places Ravaisson’s affirmation of a body whose actions are not simply goal-oriented but 
improvisational on a firmer ontological footing and ultimately goes beyond him by understanding 
the relationship between body and world as one of unceasing co-production. 
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of habit decisively rejects mechanistic explanations and thus 
restores to it adaptiveness and freedom. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty’s definition of habit as an 
intelligent aptitude bears strong similarity to Ravaisson’s habit-based theory of embodied 
subjectivity. Becoming habituated to playing the organ, for instance, entails learning how to use 
the organ to create a particular musical effect, to perceive the organ not merely as a set of keys and 
pedals but as a tool to be deployed in the course of realizing the goal of making music. Habit 
correlates new objects with bodily potentialities, developing those potentialities in the process. 
One learns to play the organ through variation on existing motions of one’s fingers, hands, and 
feet, and as one becomes familiar with the organ one learns new types of motion. And the 
understanding of a particular object the body garners through habituation is transferable to other 
situations as well. Once one has learned how to play the organ one can play new pieces on new 
organs, such that habituation culminates in an intelligent and flexible aptitude rather than a 
mechanism. For both Merleau-Ponty and Ravaisson, habit entails a principle of practical 





motor significance,”236 indicating that habit allows the body to use objects in the course of 
accomplishing its goals without having to consciously analyze them. Habituation organizes objects 
into types and our actions respond to types of objects rather than to the particular object at hand. 
Even when an organist sees a new organ for the first time she immediately knows how to play it 
and requires little practice to master it. In this way habit gives insight into a form of bodily 
understanding that belongs to the body as a “mediator of a world.”237 This form of practical 
understanding Merleau-Ponty calls “knowledge in the hands,” and it not only makes us familiar 
with our surroundings but also makes them meaningful to us.238 Habit organizes the body’s 
motions into aptitudes that it projects into the world through perception, such that our actions 
express our understanding of the world and can be further expressed in language. Rather than being 
merely an immobile fossil, habit is a fluid process of producing meaningful and intelligent 
behavior in such a way as to suggest continuity between mind and body. 
Commentators have often noted convergences between Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty on 
these points.239 However, Merleau-Ponty seems never to have cited Ravaisson in his articulation 
of the concept of habit. According to Janicaud, Merleau-Ponty only mentioned Ravaisson once 
during his Agrégation and only then as a precursor to Bergson, apparently failing to recognize the 
infidelity of Bergson’s reading of Ravaisson described in the previous chapter.240 Rather than 
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working with Ravaisson, Merleau-Ponty develops his concept of the body-schema as a rejection 
of the conception of embodied subjectivity we saw Bergson develop in the previous chapter in a 
way that ends up with a position similar to Ravaisson’s, though with crucial additions. Merleau-
Ponty critically engages with Bergson in regards to his theory of perception and of habituation, 
arguing that in both cases Bergson retreats to the very same kind of intellectualism that Ravaisson 
in Chapter One called “rationalist,” and as a result fails to comprehend the nature of bodily learning 
that can be found in the work of habit. These failures point towards the need for understanding the 
habituated body as productive of meaning in the phenomenological sense, an addition that 
ultimately expands Merleau-Ponty’s conception of embodied intelligence beyond Ravaisson’s by 
viewing the body as productive of practical knowledge in its own right rather than only extending 
and clarifying consciously-posited goals. 
While Merleau-Ponty’s conception of bodily learning takes on the Bergsonian relationship 
between perception and action, he argues that Bergson himself fails to provide a role for the body 
and thus falls back into intellectualism. Bergson sees perceptions as sensori-motor responses to 
the aspects of objects relevant to practical interests or as “a system of nascent acts,”241 and hence 
appears to challenge a picture of perception grounded in mind-body dualism. Merleau-Ponty 
argues, however, that Bergson fails to follow through on the thrust of his theory of perception in 
claiming that consciousness alone is capable of interpreting entities. Rejecting a mentalist 
understanding of perception requires recognizing that, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “I perceive from 
here and from nowhere else.”242 In other words, were perception a truly holistic process involving 
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both mind and body, the situatedness of one’s perspective would have to be taken into account. 
Ambiguity and perceptual limitation would follow as positive phenomena from a holistic account 
of perception, but Bergson avoids reaching this conclusion and instead regards perception as 
simply highlighting one aspect of preexisting objects. Perception is a form of subtraction for 
Bergson: when I perceive an object, I notice merely those aspects of it relevant to my situation 
rather than the object as a whole. Perception does not act as a constituting (constituante) activity 
that posits entities in their being, then, but merely grasps some of an antecedent object. Bergson 
ultimately remains a realist in regards to perception, and his attempts at articulating a form of 
bodily subjectivity flounder on his inability to provide a genuine role for the body in perception. 
Perception entails an anticipation of action only because of the role consciousness plays in editing 
our experiences of the world and making a certain portion of it available to bodily activity. The 
body merely responds to sensory cues and thus possesses no principle of freedom or consciousness 
of its own. “It would have been necessary,” Merleau-Ponty concludes, “to show that the body is 
unthinkable without consciousness, because there is an intentionality of the body, and to show that 
consciousness is unthinkable without the body, for the present is corporeal.”243As we shall see, 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body-schema takes on the Bergsonian insight that perception 
entails an anticipation of bodily activity while grounding that anticipation in the practical structures 
of embodied perception and thus escapes the dualistic trap into which Bergson falls.  
The oversized role of consciousness in perception also weakens Bergson’s attempt to make 
habit a component of bodily intelligence. Habit entails a kind of synthesis of perceptions and bodily 
motions, but Bergson provides an intellectualist account of this synthesis that cannot account for 
improvisation in behavior. In Bergson’s example of learning a poem by heart consciousness plays 
                                                          





the crucial role of separating the poem into passages short enough to be remembered. Repetition 
of verbal recitation of passages follows and is determined by conscious activity, such that the body 
remains passive in the process of memorization. It is conscious thought that delineates simple 
motions and their order in performance; bodily repetition merely solidifies the pathway from the 
instigation of an action to its completion. Bergson thus also provides a causal picture of the nature 
of behavior, where the body’s acts are determined according to the dictates of rational 
understanding and where habit originates in “an act of understanding that organizes elements only 
to subsequently withdraw.”244 Merleau-Ponty argues that understanding habit as a motor 
mechanism, an ability to perform a specific action resulting of this process of decomposition and 
repetition, fails to accurately describe the process of learning.245 A dancer, for instance, does not 
learn particular moves through memorization of a consciously analyzed formula but through 
perception of another person performing those moves and imitation of their motions. Conscious 
analysis does not mediate between perception and repetition, but is rather preceded by perception 
that grasps them in terms of bodily potentialities. A dancer first recognizes motions and imitates 
them before comprehending them in terms of a formula. The addition of conscious analysis to the 
process of learning is false and fails to account not only for the possibility of direct imitation but 
also of improvisation. When a skilled dancer learns a new set of steps she can immediately 
incorporate them into her stock of known moves and can embellish through projection of her 
body’s capacities into new emotive situations, just as when an organist learns new melodies or 
chords he can treat them as phrases that can be treated as “emotional or musical values” that can 
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be altered based on the occasion.246 Bergson’s concept of motor mechanism is too rigid to account 
for the fluidity of the process of learning and hence distorts the nature of habituation. 
The failure of Bergson’s theory of habit to adequately describe the process of learning 
results from the passivity it attributes to the body, which for Merleau-Ponty causes it to lapse into 
mind-body dualism. Although Bergson describes the body as a “center of action”247 that can bring 
about genuinely novel events in the world and hence avoids Descartes’ deterministic view of the 
body, its freedom still depends upon prior acts of consciousness. Once those acts of consciousness 
cease the subject is left with a mechanical principle of action that is unable to calibrate itself to 
changes in the individual’s environment and therefore cannot develop further.248 Merleau-Ponty 
thus sees Bergson as a precursor of behaviorist psychology, which also holds a mechanistic view 
of the nature of habit as simple conditioning. Through repetition of a scenario where a dog is fed 
after seeing food and hearing a bell ring, for instance, these latter events gain the power to instigate 
the motion of salivation as response, or in other words become stimuli. The association of 
environmental and behavioral events is purely external: Pavlov’s dogs do not salivate upon hearing 
a bell ring because of any intrinsic connection between the sound of a bell and the act of eating but 
because through numerous experiences of being fed following the sight of food and the ringing of 
a bell the dogs have become accustomed or conditioned to associate these events.249 The “stimulus-
response” theory of behavior is thus nothing other than a mechanistic theory of habit acquisition 
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where a purely passive body becomes determined to act in a certain way through repetition of 
events. Habit entails the production of a causal vector, or a “reflex arc”, that causes the body to act 
automatically when stimulated. Individuals respond to discrete excitations in their environment 
with the motions they have learned through repetition, and these motions accumulate into a stock 
of possible actions an individual can deploy when engaging with the world.250 Under this view the 
body is rendered a passive object, a mechanism that is determined by external forces and for which 
consciousness has no role. 
If Bergson provides an intellectualist account of the process of habituation, behaviorism 
provides an empiricist account, and their shared failure to grasp the process of learning signals for 
Merleau-Ponty the need to integrate the concept of meaning into an account of habituation. 
Behaviorist theories of conditioning cannot account for why any and all excitations associated with 
an unconditioned stimulus do not become over time conditioned stimuli, and why even when an 
irradiative effect does arise from a conditioned stimulus it does not last.251 While one of Pavlov’s 
dogs may associate specific stimuli that are manipulated in an experimental setting such as the 
ringing of a bell with the presentation of food, nothing in the theory of conditioning prevents the 
dog from also associating other elements of the situation that are held constant such as the lighting 
or temperature with the food. Pavlov himself is eventually forced to hypothesize the existence of 
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forces such as inhibition that counter the effects of conditioning to account for these anomalies, 
forces which themselves require additional hypothetical forces to explain their functioning and 
which ultimately cause the theory of conditioned reflexes to collapse. Ultimately, it is 
behaviorism’s refusal to see the body as anything other than a mechanical object that prevents it 
from grasping the role meaning plays in the acquisition of behavior. Behaviorism’s mechanistic 
view of the body attributes to it the ability to respond only to specific excitations from its 
environment as inputs that instigate causally determined outputs from the body. The body is in 
itself merely a conduit for specific nerve excitations without an ability to filter and choose between 
excitations. The question of why particular excitations become stimuli and others do not therefore 
becomes unanswerable, necessitating the hypothesis of illusory forces Merleau-Ponty compares to 
the proliferation under Medieval Scholasticism of fictional faculties to explain holes in classical 
Aristotelian metaphysics.252 
The only way to adequately account for the process of learning without introducing illusory 
forces for Merleau-Ponty is to abandon mind-body dualism altogether. His manner of doing so 
attributes to the body a capacity for meaning-making that goes beyond Ravaisson’s in constructing 
an environment that is structured by possibilities for action. This expansion is made possible by 
Merleau-Ponty’s avoidance of the ontological foundations for Ravaisson’s theory of habit: 
Merleau-Ponty at no point mentions Aristotle’s substance metaphysics or Leibnizian dynamism in 
the course of articulating his position on habit, but instead partakes of the language of worldhood 
drawn from German phenomenology.253 Habit makes possible our possession of a world, 
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understood in a Heideggerian sense as an environment structured by possibilities for action. 
Merleau-Ponty follows Heidegger in rejecting the conception of humans as consisting of an ego 
or consciousness that exists apart from its surroundings and instead views the human subject as 
existing in and through its engagements with the world.254 For Merleau-Ponty perception 
constitutes our engagement with a meaningful world, an environment structured in reference to 
our goals and projects in a manner similar to the conception of “virtual space” found in Gestalt 
psychology.255 Geographical space is superseded by a figure-background structure of space 
consisting of objects with use-values in positions that are correlated with the body’s possibilities 
for action and organized according to one’s present goals and concerns. Elements of a structured 
situation have meaning insofar as they are encountered in terms of their functional relations, as a 
shirt that is for wearing or a doorknob that is for being turned, and it is the body itself that grasps 
these relations rather than their being grasped through conscious synthesis. Merleau-Ponty prefers 
the Heideggerian understanding of meaningful involvement in the world as “ontologically 
definitive” of us, however, rather than the Gestaltist theory that meaning arises through the 
application of structured neurological frames to it.256 Humans exist insofar as they relate to their 
environment, such that the problems associated with causal explanations of behavior turn out to 
be pseudo-problems. Our ontological constitution as self-projecting beings is reflected in our 
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experience of our environment not just as an opportunity to achieve a particular goal but rather as 
a set of open possibilities available to action. 
 In grounding his conception of the intelligent body in the phenomenological tradition rather 
than in Leibnizian metaphysics, Merleau-Ponty is able to adapt Bergson’s treatment of the body 
and perception as a unified system for his own purposes while restoring to the body its capacity 
for spontaneous action. Our involvement in the world does not take the form of hermeneutic 
structures as it does for Heidegger, but instead finds its “anchor” in the body. Perception, our 
engagement with the world, is an embodied process and cannot be understood otherwise. Merleau-
Ponty’s concept of the body schema explains how this is the case. By locating the origin of virtual 
space in bodily potentialities and postures rather than immediately in neural structures as the 
Gestaltists do, Merleau-Ponty argues that habitual learning entails the coordination and 
development of bodily and perceptual capacities. Not only do I see a doorknob as a potential 
manipulandum amidst an indifferent background but moreover as manipulable by my own hand, 
such that when I perceive the doorknob my arm readies itself to reach for it. It is thus not merely 
my eyes that perceive the doorknob but also my arm and with it the system of muscles from my 
neck to my toes that allows me to raise my arm and reach for the knob. Merleau-Ponty thus adds 
one’s own body (corps propre) to the Gestaltist’s figure-background structure of perception as a 
“third term” that is presupposed in our concrete experience of the world.257 Perception entails 
anticipation of bodily actions as it does for Bergson, but this anticipation is not the effect of the 
movement of stimuli from the central to the peripheral nervous system but is rather one half of a 
holistic system of perception in which bodily and virtual space are coordinated, and Merleau-Ponty 
refers to the system as a whole as the body schema. Our being-in-the-world is thus irreducibly 
                                                          





embodied as our projection of meaning into the environment is mediated by our body’s sense of 
its potentialities that it can enact without external instigation. Bodily capacities and postures form 
the “intentional threads” (fils intentionelles) that link us with our environment, such that bodily 
awareness posits our environment as available to our free activity and hence as a world in the 
Heideggerian sense.258 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the body schema is designed to avoid providing an 
intellectualist or an empiricist account of habituation like those of Bergson and the behaviorists 
and instead affirms a notion of bodily intentionality irreducible to either conscious or causal 
determination in a manner strikingly similar to Ravaisson. Both Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty 
regard habit as grounding a form of human subjectivity that consists of neither an unreflective, 
bodily in-itself nor of its counterpart of a transparent for-itself of consciousness. While Bergson 
offers a picture of a body-subject that can relate to its world through habits, those habits are static 
and only develop through the application of conscious attention and analysis. By contrast, 
Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty both allow room for an unconscious form of habitual synthesis that 
coordinates bodily and perceptual capacities and in Merleau-Ponty’s words “synthesizes” them. 
While one can doubtless learn to memorize poetry in the manner Bergson describes it is not the 
primordial form habituation takes. Rather, habit is the manner our being-in-the-world is “dilated” 
to the particular situation at hand. When I enter a space my repeated interactions with similar 
spaces allows me to recognize the kind of posture and comportment appropriate to that physical 
and social environment and I adjust myself spontaneously. Two further implications follow from 
this: first, habit constitutes a form of subjective temporality where my past makes possible a certain 
present for myself and inclines me towards a certain future. My occurrent sense of available actions 
                                                          





is produced through repetition that structures my perceptions and bodily responses, such that the 
possibilities I project into the world are always limited by habit. Second, a corollary of the first 
point, when I reflect upon my actions I do so from a vantage point already structured by 
habituation. In other words, consciousness for Merleau-Ponty is produced through habituation. My 
understanding of my own actions and affections is not objective: it too is limited by my capacities 
for attention and differentiation which are themselves the effects of habituation. Humans are 
therefore not immediately ethical subjects, able to critically examine their ways of life. Rather, 
they must be opened up for freedom. 
It should not be taken from these similarities, however, that Merleau-Ponty is best 
conceived as an implicit disciple of Ravaisson’s. The differences in the ontological foundations of 
their theories of habit also carry weight at the experiential level. Merleau-Ponty does not regard 
habit as the actualization grounded in a metaphysical principle of persistence as Ravaisson does 
but as the production and synthesis of bodily and sensory structures that makes the body-schema 
possible. As Mark Sinclair has argued, Ravaisson’s appropriation of Leibnizian dynamism 
explains phenomena pertaining to habit that Merleau-Ponty’s cannot. While the understanding of 
habit as a practical form of bodily knowledge can account for everyday practices of coping in 
Hubert Dreyfus’ words, Ravaisson seems to have a clearer sense of the way repetition makes 
actions easier and more assured.259 Habit not only produces determinate abilities that orient our 
behaviors and perceptions but makes abilities active tendencies that we apply more and more often. 
Coping does not capture the sense of momentum Ravaisson attributes to the process of habituation, 
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which explains not only why habits become so strongly rooted in us but also why they are so 
difficult to break.  
At the same time, however, Merleau-Ponty’s clearer articulation of the relationship 
between the enhancement of bodily and perceptual potentialities in the process of habituation than 
Ravaisson’s, and his addition of the phenomenological concept of meaning, allows us to see the 
body as engaged in a continual process of learning and development that affirms the primacy of 
embodied intelligence as over reflective thought in our practical commerce with the world. Taking 
on Bergson’s notion of perception as incipient action allows Merleau-Ponty to describe how we 
constitute our environment in terms of its practical relevance and how the environment 
incorporates itself into our behavior. Merleau-Ponty’s contribution over and above Ravaisson is to 
take Bergsonian notion of perception past its own limitations and demonstrate how habituation 
entails the production of meaning that is not merely independent of but in fact precedes reflective 
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty articulates a theory of embodied intelligence that goes beyond 
viewing the body as an enhancement of the goal-positing activity of consciousness to also include 
the body’s own capacity to understand the world and to form itself in light of that understanding. 
The body’s production of “skilled” actions that spontaneously coordinate means and ends must be 
viewed therefore as part of a larger process of mediation between self and world in which the body 
continually extends its grasp of the world while simultaneously being changed by it. The result of 
habituation is a body that is truly a human body and not simply an object, a body that consists of 
“lived meanings” (significations vécues) that correlate its potentialities with its environment in 
such a way that we can come to understand our world.260 Habit, in other words, is best understood 
as an ongoing process of habituation in which the body ceaselessly appropriates new aptitudes and 
                                                          





objects and in so doing continually modifies its world. Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty’s grounding in 
phenomenology allows him to account for how habituation entails the co-constitution of not 
merely a practical but also a social and ultimately historical world, as we shall see presently. 
2. Beyond Second Nature: The Open Self and the Social World 
 
In the previous section, it was noted that the aptitudes of which the habituated body consists 
are acquired through repetitive interaction with our environment and are produced in tandem with 
it. The body and its environment constitute for Merleau-Ponty a system in which the self exists as 
its set of possibilities. For Merleau-Ponty, however, we will see that the self’s possibilities are both 
social and historical. The self is produced through a fluid and multidimensional process of 
exchange between individuals and the institutions and systems with which they interact. Merleau-
Ponty’s analysis of intersubjectivity, an interest that unites his early and late work, views habit as 
an always already social process of internalizing historically produced ways of understanding the 
world through encounters with cultural objects and institutions and imitation of other people that 
produces a familiar environment of shared meanings and possibilities.  In Merleau-Ponty’s later 
work he divides his discussion of habit into two related concepts, sedimentation and style, to 
describe how subjects are formed as they appropriate particular aptitudes from their social 
environment and express those aptitudes by adapting them to their own settings and thereby change 
the worlds they inhabit. What will emerge from this discussion is an understanding of the self as 
open to being altered by engagement with other subjects and particular practices and ultimately as 
fluid, continually in the process of acquiring and adapting the aptitudes by which it understands 
the world and itself. This account of openness yields a more nuanced and flexible account of how 
social subjects are formed than Ravaisson and Bergson provide, and that pays greater attention to 





Conceptualizing habit as a process of habituation grounded in the body’s capacity to 
construct meaning results in an understanding of the self as open to its environment, to whose 
influence it responds by continually reconfiguring its aptitudes. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty 
challenges the distinction between first and second nature. The process of coping with new 
environments necessitates learning new skills that are transposable to other contexts. It is therefore 
insufficient to say that humans create practices and institutions that structure their behavior, as it 
is “the capacity of going beyond created structures in order to create others” that characterizes 
human beings.261 Humans do not simply shape their environment through their actions as other 
animals do but continuously interpret it, and this capacity to interpret and reinterpret the world 
separates human intelligence from that of animals.262 Objects transformed into tools by non-human 
animals possess only one use and according to Merleau-Ponty are never reimagined. Humans by 
contrast perceive objects under a “plurality of aspects”, allowing them to provide objects with new 
uses under different necessities. Regarding institutional and social life as “second nature” 
objectifies them and regards them as a one-time result of creation rather than as fluid constituents 
of the process of constructing a human world. Like Ravaisson, Merleau-Ponty regards second 
nature as the outgrowth of a continuous process, though not of an ontological principle of 
persistence. Instead, for Merleau-Ponty the continual transformation of the human world is the 
result of the inherent dynamism of the body schema. The human body constantly calibrates its 
sense of possibility based on the nature of the particular situation at hand. Humans perceive objects 
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under new aspects and appropriate them as tools in different ways, and in so doing alter and 
recalibrate their own bodily aptitudes. 
Merleau-Ponty’s argument for the habituated self’s openness to the influence of its 
environment is an extension of his analysis of bodily learning that allows him to demonstrate that 
the world in which the habituated subject lives is inherently intersubjective. As we approach 
objects in the world we find that some are in Merleau-Ponty’s words “engraved” with particular 
human actions they serve.263 That is to say, we encounter certain objects in terms of a human use 
we have not given to them but that indicates the existence of others like ourselves who have 
intentions, projects, and perspectives analogous to our own. The construction of meaning through 
habit produces a world of cultural objects, and we find ourselves immersed in a world of such 
objects and hence with a pre-conscious sense of other humans. One learns what a book, a building, 
or an implement is, for instance, when one comes to understand its culturally-prescribed purpose. 
The transposition of aptitudes allows one to use human objects for purposes other than those given 
to them (e.g., using a shoe as a hammer), but one’s existence in the midst of artifacts creates what 
Merleau-Ponty calls an “atmosphere of humanity” that gives us a sense of the appropriate uses and 
meanings of things. Our sense of an intersubjective world is thus mediated by habit, and 
habituation allows perception to encounter a world of objects and actions with a shared 
significance. We perceive intentions in the actions of other people just as we perceive the intentions 
built into the cultural objects that surround us. As a result, we are not closed, self-evident subjects 
but ones are forced to recognize the limits of their potentialities. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, humans 
are “beings which are outrun by their world, and which consequently may well be outrun by each 
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other.”264 Constantly presented with intentions that are not our own, our habitual selves are placed 
in a social world filled with otherness and possibilities for learning. 
It follows from Merleau-Ponty’s conception of intersubjectivity that the possibilities that 
define the self are acquired in and through social life, such that bodily intelligence is oriented 
towards learning the possibilities that define a particular social identity. Socialization takes the 
form of learning the use of objects and adapting our aptitudes to those uses, a process that begins 
in and lasts throughout childhood through the imitation of others as examples of roles the 
individual can play.265 Through play children learn to appropriate objects in the way their family 
and friends have and thus come to resemble them in their habits. A crucial step in the process of 
socialization is the appropriation of language, through which the individual learns to express in 
symbolic form the generalized aptitudes learned through habituation. The result of this process is 
that an individual’s habits, his ways of understanding and coping with the world, become 
consonant with those of the social groups with which he interacts. Social identity as Merleau-Ponty 
understands it does not entail conscious self-recognition in terms of social labels; it is a tacit 
phenomenon, implicit in the possibilities with which one tends to reckon. In Merleau-Ponty’s 
example, being a proletarian is not in the first instance an issue of conscious class identification 
but a manner of projecting possibilities into the world based on one’s experiences with social and 
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economic institutions.266 This self-formation through socialization is crucial to our having a world 
according to Merleau-Ponty. Concomitant with our sense of individual self-identity is the “zone 
of generalized existence” we find around ourselves, the already-constituted meanings of objects 
and possibilities we imitate and internalize or learn to separate ourselves from that constitutes the 
social world with which we compare and contrast ourselves and through which we gain a sense of 
our own selfhood.267 Human subjects are not formed unidirectionally by some abstracted society; 
rather, they appropriate certain possibilities and reject others and thereby come to a tacit 
understanding of what they can and cannot do and ultimately who they are. Social subjects exist 
in Merleau-Ponty’s words between the two poles of anonymity and individuality, constantly 
working out the extent to which they can reckon with socially given possibilities. 
As a form of socialization, habituation provides the subject with limits to its openness to 
new possibilities. While humans are constantly capable of reinterpreting their world, that capacity 
is usually limited to working through the possibilities inherent to social groups to which one 
belongs and adapting them to one’s specific setting. The habituated self thus exists not merely as 
a process of working through a social dialectic of anonymity and individuality but also as 
possessing its own form of historicity, which for Merleau-Ponty entails a dialectic of inheritance 
and adaptation. When we engage with the world we participate in what Merleau-Ponty calls a 
“perceptual tradition” that is constructed not only by our own repeated behaviors but those that 
our cultural and social environment has made available to us.268 The present of our conscious 
experience is suffused with a past that has never been the theme of a present, consisting of 
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repetition through which the aptitudes by means of which we experience the world are acquired. 
The process of habituation that structures the body is in turn structured by the socially-defined 
objects and practices it engages with, such that in every moment of the conscious present is hidden 
traces of not only our personal history but that of the society into which we are born.  It is in this 
sense that Merleau-Ponty speaks of a habitual body that underlies the occurrent body, the body 
consciousness experiences as an object like others in the world but which is already structured by 
the intentionality it gains through habituation.269 Our participation in a shared social world 
provides us with possibilities inherited from previous generations based upon our cultural, 
economic, and political situation. Habit thus serves as the mediating term between ourselves and 
a world that is both social and historical that forms the horizon of our possibilities. In his later 
work, Merleau-Ponty will refer to his philosophy as a “transcendental geology” that attempts to 
grasp the human subject in terms of the nexus where history and behavioral structures intersect 
and inscribe themselves on the human body.270 Historical institutions and practices have become 
layered into our bodies through repetition, on which our everyday experience of the world is built 
and structured without our being conscious of the fact. Philosophical interrogation of habit and the 
habituated body forces us to see ourselves as inhabiting a set of social histories of necessity and 
allows us to begin the process of bringing those histories to light. 
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This understanding of the relationship between the body and socially-produced 
possibilities is what Pierre Bourdieu will appropriate for his own sociological theory. It is not 
incidental that Bourdieu credits Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for “[opening] the way for a non-
intellectualist, non-mechanistic analysis of the relations between agent and world.”271 Merleau-
Ponty in particular strongly influences Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, bodily dispositions produced 
by participation in social practices that regulate everyday conduct and form a stock of abilities that 
are spontaneously brought to bear in different practical situations.272 For Bourdieu as well as for 
Merleau-Ponty bodily comportment gives insight into the social practices into which one has been 
socialized and hence is inscribed with individual and social history. Indeed, Bourdieu’s 
understanding of the historicality of the subject as a “present past that tends to perpetuate itself 
into the future by reactivation in similarly structured practices” owes much to the language of 
sedimentation, or the transformation of repeated experiences into stable dispositions Merleau-
Ponty borrows from Husserl. 273 While both seek to provide an account of a socially-informed body 
that is capable of understanding and responding to a world, Merleau-Ponty provides a richer 
description not only of the process of habituation as it pertains to individuals, but also regarding 
how individuals concretely exist within their social context, or to use Bourdieu’s terminology, 
regarding the relationship between individual habitus and class habitus. Bourdieu understands this 
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relationship as one of homology between members of a particular class, where their common 
participation in social practices is balanced by the sequence in which individuals participate in 
those practices, what Bourdieu calls their unique “social trajectory.”274 Early experiences dominate 
one’s subsequent engagement with society and hence modify the way one is formed by social 
practices. One’s experience of work, for instance, is affected by the knowledge and values one 
received while in school, which in turn is affected by one’s family life.275 Personal history inflects 
the dispositions one acquires in one’s social life for Bourdieu that allows for individual variation 
among members of a particular group. 
Merleau-Ponty is acutely aware of the importance of an understanding of the ways 
appropriation of social dispositions is grounded in an individual’s personal history. However, his 
twin concepts of sedimentation and style also give insight into the ways subjects enact and 
transform the dispositions they acquire through social practices and provide greater depth to the 
form of historicity proper to the habituated self. Merleau-Ponty interprets the concept of 
sedimentation as an attempt to engage in what he calls a “vertical history,” a history where events 
are pushed beneath the level of conscious reflection through repetition and become foundational 
for future events.276 Merleau-Ponty notes that Husserl even uses the term Stiftung, foundation or 
institution, to describe the events whose significance outstrips our attempts to grasp them 
consciously.277 A book, for instance, is a matrix of meanings that emerge through repeated readings 
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and interpretations of the book and becomes foundational for later authors’ works. A particular 
manner of speaking of writing becomes available to readers of a certain work, and through 
repetition of these mannerisms the reader gains the ability to deploy them in various contexts. In 
this way, an author’s work is incorporated into a cultural tradition. Stylistic elements of language 
become potentialities to express a particular emotional or factual value like the keys of an organ 
described earlier and hence become foundational for future expressions of language by the reading 
audience.278 In Merleau-Ponty’s later work the language of sedimentation increasingly replaces 
that of habit to reflect his shift in emphasis towards understanding the subject in historical terms. 
Social institutions are as much products and matrices of sedimented activity as cultural works, and 
embodied subjects are formed through their participation in them and make available aptitudes 
that become the foundation of future activity. In both cases engagement with entities in the world 
gives depth to the embodied subject in the form of aptitudes whose origins are unknown and that 
lie below the surface of consciousness ready to be reactivated. Over time and through new 
experiences some habits lose their relevance to the subject’s life and sink into oblivion while others 
rise to become elements of the subject’s self-understanding. The embodied subject thus not only 
lacks self-transparency, it is also by nature fluid. The capacities that form the world the subject 
inhabits are always in the process of generation or corruption, and in this way the traditions and 
institutions in which the subject participates are also changed as the possibilities they embody get 
adapted to new settings and remain vital or fall into disuse. 
The result of subject formation through sedimentation is what Merleau-Ponty terms style, 
which along with sedimentation also replaces the language of habit in his later work. In The 
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Phenomenology of Perception style is described in Heideggerian terms as the unity of a particular 
world, the manner of comportment that identifies an individual or a group and differentiates it 
from others.279 Style, in other words, denotes the specific aptitudes that form an individual’s body 
schema and articulate the ways she encounters and responds to her environment. As Merleau-
Ponty elaborates on the concept of style in his later work the connection with Heidegger becomes 
more explicit. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty equates style with Wesen, 
Heidegger’s term denoting the verbal form of being. The embodied subject exists as its 
potentialities, sedimented through repetition of specific experiences the unconscious retention of 
which forms its ways of understanding and interacting with its environment.280 Whereas 
sedimentation refers to the retention of past experiences, style draws attention to how sedimented 
aptitudes are actively expressed in everyday life. The way we perceive things in the world and the 
way we use them to achieve certain ends bestows meaning upon them, such that even our most 
mundane activities are creative acts. Our bodies and our environment stand in a relationship of 
mutual co-production: through their interaction they both become works (oeuvres), entities 
endowed with significance drawn from traditions and altered by personal history.281 Dispositions, 
in other words, are not merely acquired through sedimentation: rather, they are transformed in their 
very enactment in specific cases as they are adapted to particular needs and desires, and in this 
adaptation one gains the possibility of acting in a new and unique fashion. Our actions are matrices 
of meaning just like the cultural products we appropriate, and our intentions are not exhausted in 
the bodily or technological means we have to express them. An individual’s style is their futurity 
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just as sedimentation is their past, as one’s manner of expression points towards the repetition in 
which one’s intentions will be fulfilled, and it is this repetition that gives the world its sense: in 
Merleau-Ponty’s words, “the continued attempt at expression founds one single history – just as 
the hold our body has upon every possible object founds one single space.”282 The dialectic 
between individuality and anonymity can be restated as that between intention and existing 
linguistic possibilities, and subject-formation is an ongoing mediation between the two terms. 
Habituation and the related concepts of sedimentation and style thereby allow us to view 
social worlds without objectifying them. Rather than viewing habituation as assimilating us to a 
preexisting community, or as constraining us to live according to customs as with Bergson, 
Merleau-Ponty presents a fluid picture of how possibilities embodied in objects and practices form 
the human body, which in turn produces new possibilities through adaptation that enter into the 
subject’s environment. The differences between the individual and society are merely stylistic, 
pertaining to the particular aptitudes that characterize different individuals and which form 
institutions and practices, an ontological reversibility Merleau-Ponty expresses by referring not to 
discrete social entities but to “flesh” (chair), a continuous tissue whose enfolding through time 
produces distinct yet open constellations of possibilities.283 Merleau-Ponty thus regards both 
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subjects and social institutions as open to change through creative repetition that alters possibilities 
to the point of transformation. 
The concepts of sedimentation and style, however, give insight into a self that is irreducibly 
historical, provisionally stable yet dynamically changing in a manner that is not dependent upon 
conscious activity. Habit is a mediating term between anonymity and individuality that pays 
greater attention to individual variation and trajectories among members of a group than 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus allows for. While habitus explains how individual subjects are 
formed by participation in social practices without explicit exercises of power over them, 
sedimentation and style provide a more nuanced account of how this process of formation takes 
place and what individual subjects do to alter the dispositions they acquire through social activities 
as well as the social worlds in which they live. Repeated attempts at expressing intentions alter 
linguistic and behavioral patterns develop some and cause others to be forgotten, such that 
traditions are changed in the very process of their transmission. The process of appropriating 
dispositions is never one of simple acquisition but entails negotiation between new and existing 
aptitudes, experimentation and sometimes invention that unites them in creative ways. Using a 
shoe as a hammer is a quotidian example that gives insight into the ways aptitudes interact with 
each other, a phenomenon that Merleau-Ponty points out in a clearer way than Ravaisson does. 
This process in an ongoing exchange between self and world through which both are transformed 
articulates the course of our relations with the social world and our ability to discover and interpret 
ourselves as individual subjects in its context. 
 
3. Merleau-Ponty, Philosopher of Freedom  
 
The results of the proceeding sections can be stated in the following terms: consciousness 





unify them into a self. Conscious reflection always comes après-coup, after the work of 
sedimentation has already produced the aptitudes by which we inhabit and engage with the world 
and while we creatively express those aptitudes and change ourselves in the process. The habitual 
subject exists as a temporal ecstasis where the past is retained in the present even as it is directed 
towards a future that it itself enacts. There is no complete conscious self-knowledge, then, but only 
an approximation of one’s states based on momentary observations and retrospective judgments. 
Yet our ways of thinking and knowing are not independent either, but themselves the product of 
historically contingent processes of appropriating traditional material and expressing them in the 
unique circumstances of our lives. Against Bergson’s notion of a deep-seated self, Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the self can only gain a sense of itself when it is in activity, when it has a sense of what 
it is doing and synthesizes its acts, feelings, and thoughts into a more or less coherent idea of 
itself.284 How I understand myself is limited by the terms available to me within my cultural and 
historical location and I only come to learn what to make of myself gradually and incompletely. 
The same is true of the social world in which I live. Although I have been and continue to be 
formed through my interactions with other people, texts, and institutions, I am not directly 
conscious of the ways those interactions shape me and them but only experience moments of 
illumination where I can see the effects of something I say or do on someone else or vice versa 
and retrospective judgments regarding how my time working or being at school has changed me. 
Conscious understanding attempts to stabilize and concretize the continuous flow of habituation 
and hence leaves a remainder that is merely felt yet still active in the way one exists. 
In this final section, I will examine how Merleau-Ponty applies his concepts of embodied 
intelligence, sedimentation, and style to develop a conception of philosophical practice that 
                                                          





conforms to his Socratic project of achieving freedom. Freedom for Merleau-Ponty is situated 
within social worlds and entails actively taking up possibilities for social and institutional change 
that exist but only tacitly as part of our set of habits. We shall see, however, that Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the relationship between philosophical practice and freedom changes throughout 
his career. In his early work, he argues that by investigating the ways we experience social 
institutions we can see how they have formed us and ultimately how they themselves can be re-
formed. Separating from the habitual world through philosophical investigation allows us to see it 
as a site of potential change, rather than as simply existing. As he grows more sensitive to the 
nature of sedimentation as a form of historicity, Merleau-Ponty focuses more on the work 
philosophy does to clarify our personal situation within our socially and historically constituted 
world. Instead of directly trying to grasp the social and institutional structures that have formed 
us, Merleau-Ponty advocates a kind of experimentalism, modeled on the work of the artist, which 
attempts to articulate the inchoate feelings that remain after conscious reflection. By attending to 
our affective reactions to situations and putting them into language in a manner similar to a novelist 
we can gain a better, yet still incomplete, sense of our habitual ways of experiencing the world, 
and by comparing them to our conscious knowledge we can test that knowledge’s relevance to our 
way of life. Merleau-Ponty never abandons his dictum that philosophy only puts into words what 
we already know, but it becomes a Socratic self-examination that questions whether our habitual 
experiences our truly our own or whether they are shared and in so doing creates the unease with 
the world that is a prerequisite for changing it. In investigating Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of 
freedom and philosophical practice, I will argue that his form of philosophical practice can be read 





Merleau-Ponty’s early thought concerning freedom remains close to the Marxist project of 
changing the world through critique, but he interprets Marxism through his phenomenological 
method. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty’s theory of “effective freedom” that is situated within an 
existing yet open set of social possibilities subtends a political project of becoming conscious of 
one’s possibilities and actively committing to them. The intersubjective world as we have seen is 
one that we have not created and of which we lack transparent knowledge. We come slowly 
through repeated experiences to understand our possibilities and gain a sense of who we are. The 
embodied subject is its way of inhabiting its world, its manner of reckoning with certain 
possibilities rather than others. Our identities are ultimately nothing other than the projects that 
orient our actions and constitute our intentions. We are thrown, to use the Heideggerian term, into 
a world whose significance we discover only gradually and incompletely, based on the specific 
history that becomes our habitual way of understanding the world. Actively taking up a class 
identity is not a matter of accepting Marxist theory but rather of reflection on one’s own 
experiences and comparison of one’s experiences with those of others. The worker gains a sense 
of “the appointed order with which he is at grips” by learning about his wages, those of his co-
workers, and those of other industries, about the strikes that have increased wages in various 
industries and the tactics bosses, police, and governments have used to stifle resistance, etc.285 
When the worker comes to see the conditions of his livelihood as similar to those of people who 
live under different circumstances, and furthermore if he comes to regard their fates as linked, only 
then does he gain class consciousness. Identification with a social label occurs only at the end of 
                                                          





a process of clarifying a certain set of possibilities or in Merleau-Ponty’s words a “field” in which 
projects and intentions are embodied in our behavior. 286 
His (admittedly controversial) critique of Sartre illuminates how freedom for Merleau-
Ponty is inherently situated within existing social world.287 Sartre regards our being a field of 
possibilities as an effect of our choices regarding who we are to be, while Merleau-Ponty sees it 
as nothing other than our nature as embodied subjects existing in an intersubjective 
environment.288 Claiming as Sartre does that our choices structure the world we inhabit ignores 
the role of social self-formation in constituting and limiting our sense of possibilities. It is not we 
as isolated individuals who confer meaning upon cultural objects and practices but we as formed 
by those practices and who are always in conversation with them.289 This is not to say that we 
cannot make choices regarding our projects and commitments, and indeed Merleau-Ponty regards 
coming to an explicit understanding of one’s possibilities as the very process of opening up to 
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freedom. But freedom is gained slowly as individuals come to understand who they are and where 
they stand in their social world and what their location allows them to do and not to do. Sartre’s 
understanding of the individual as a nihilating force that possesses absolute freedom to explicitly 
choose its way of life over and against the world ignores the fact that it is only in relation to the 
world that we gain a concrete existence, that rejection of the world is itself a mode of existing in 
the context of the intersubjective environment that has formed us.  
Instead, Merleau-Ponty’s interactional understanding of the relationship between self and 
world results in a recognition of the world’s incompleteness and an understanding of freedom as 
situated agency. Even as we are formed by institutions and practices we did not create, aspects of 
the social world remain open to our action: “The world is already constituted, but also never 
completely constituted; in the first case we are acted upon, in the second we are open to an infinite 
number of possibilities.”290 Part of coming to reckon with our identity as a proletarian is to 
recognize that wage structures are not in fact fixed but can be altered through collective action. 
The combination of knowledge of how to change conditions and social organization oriented 
towards those changes makes possible the achievement of one’s aims. Freedom thus entails the 
recognition that one’s field of possibilities is not indifferently arrayed, but some possibilities are 
closer to us while others are more remote, and learning to act based on an understanding of the 
possibilities that are in fact open to one. As a member of the proletariat I can try to work for a raise 
or a promotion or to start my own business but through experience and observation I learn that in 
the unlikely cases where these events do come about the same structures of exploitation and 
alienation from work remain, such that my best option is to work to take more control of the labor 
process. Freedom in Merleau-Ponty’s words is “a meeting of the inner and the outer,” the 
                                                          





intersection between our projects and the conditions that can bring them about, where the options 
by which to bring about this meeting are greater or lesser based on the “tolerance” our sense of 
possibility and institutional givens have for it.291 Freedom in other words is where the ethical and 
the social meet harmoniously, the location where individual commitment and social and 
institutional conditions are made to cohere through our own activity. 
 Freedom is in this sense therefore an inherent feature of our socially and historically 
constituted world, but actualizing that freedom in practice requires knowledge of the institutions, 
practices, ideas, and individuals one is involved with that is garnered by means of a form of 
philosophical self-examination that explicitly expresses one’s habitual, pre-reflective knowledge. 
By highlighting the experienced yet unthematized projects that constitute one’s existence and the 
ways certain aspects of one’s environment help or hinder the achievement of those projects one 
can produce an understanding of how one can change one’s world for the better. In other words, 
to become free one must first bring what is habitual up to the surface of consciousness so that it is 
available to examination and judgment. The exercise of freedom requires a suspension of one’s 
habitual way of life so that it can be presented to oneself objectively. Our habitual world to 
Merleau-Ponty is as the water in which fish live but of which they are never conscious. Habits 
articulate the contours of our world, relating bodily and technological means to particular ends and 
bestowing objects relevant to our projects significance, but they are expressed in the style of our 
conduct rather than cognized in thought. Merleau-Ponty ultimately agrees with Sartre that when 
one comes to understand that the institutional and social conditions of one’s existence are 
themselves impediments to that existence one’s habitual way of life becomes precarious and the 
actions one takes can force those habits to change. For Merleau-Ponty, being opened up to freedom 
                                                          





requires a denaturalization of our habitual world, and it is in this respect that his philosophy is 
Socratic as described at the outset of this chapter. Philosophy retains its uneasiness with the world 
by taking its task to be the uncovering our habits and the nature of the world we take for granted 
they give insight into and which we share with others.  
While this picture of the way freedom is achieved through philosophical reflection is 
appropriate to Merleau-Ponty’s early analyses of intersubjectivity, it fails when put in the context 
of the historicity defined by sedimentation. That the social possibilities one acquires through 
habituation are inflected not only with inherited forms of behavior and understanding but also with 
their adaptation to new circumstances signifies that the structures of our social world are 
necessarily opaque, meaning that philosophical reflection cannot even in principle fully articulate 
them. The attempt to conceptually articulate our social world ignores that social subjects exist as 
a process of continual becoming, whose interpersonal and institutional influences remain unclear. 
Sedimentation, as Merleau-Ponty will say, does not merely constitute a “deposit or a residue” of 
ossified behaviors but a process of change in the matrix of possibilities with which individuals 
reckon that is inherent to its production.292 The very interactions and improvisations that create 
institutions and practices alter and transform them, such that social worlds must be understood not 
only as open in the sense discussed above but furthermore as fluid. The possibilities I act upon 
have been produced through unpredictable and contingent processes of change and will produce 
new possibilities equally unpredictable and contingent. The unity of my social world lies only in 
the interconnection between events and possibilities that admit of multiple avenues of 
interpretation. A theory of history that searches for dialectical totality thus flounders in the 
ambiguity necessary to the process of sedimentation. Social history is not revealed as sequential 
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and logically interconnected states but as “asymmetries, vestiges, diversions, and regressions.”293 
While sedimentation and style reveal regularity in the social subject’s mode of existence, they also 
point to an essential instability in social and individual practices, calling into question the 
enterprise of understanding either conceptually. 
The late understanding of the fluidity and historicity of the habitual subject results in a 
recognition of profound limitations on the possibilities of practices of ethical self-cultivation. The 
limits the temporal structure of sedimentation and style set on self-knowledge put projects that 
attempt to fundamentally transform one’s way of being at risk of either giving rise to a form of 
subjectivity they did not intend, or worse, to become ossified in the form of institutions that impose 
violent forms of discipline and impose an artificial stability on one’s way of being. While one can 
see this concern in Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of contemporary philosophy with which this chapter 
began, in an essay called “Faith and Good Faith” Merleau-Ponty draws a parallel between the ways 
contemporary Soviet Marxist and French Catholic institutions engage in the social world that 
reveals his understanding both of the structure of projects that change one’s way of life and their 
dangers. Structurally, Merleau-Ponty claims that ethical projects begin with a diagnosis of a 
condition of human existence to be resolved, in the former case of class struggle and in the latter, 
sin. The conceptual and institutional systems of Marxism and Christianity as he understands them 
respond to these issues in our habitual world, and the figures of the proletarian and Christ are 
parallel in that they exemplify how to live life in response to the diagnoses that animates these 
systems.294 To be a Marxist or a Christian requires that one comes to share in the recognition of 
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the influence of class or sin on one’s manner of existing, to see past experiences, present states of 
character, and future projects not as individual but as shared, and then to work to eliminate those 
influences both through ethical and political action. Yet Merleau-Ponty argues that such projects 
can become a “dead or sectarian faith” if they resolve themselves into sets of doctrines or 
disciplines that attempt to fix the possibilities for ways of living in response to their diagnoses. 
Merleau-Ponty finds such an attempt at fixation in the Catholic critics of Sartre, who reflexively 
reject the latter’s analysis of inauthenticity out of a dogmatic insistence on the perfection of 
humanity in history. For Merleau-Ponty, the application of the Syllabus of Errors to analyses of 
human existence runs the risk of freezing the development of the Christian life and closing off 
possibilities for its expression.295 Likewise, Merleau-Ponty worries that Soviet communism in 
particular has failed to maintain fidelity to its humanistic origins in Marxist philosophy. Having 
failed to transform human nature through revolution the communist party in Russia has become a 
dictatorship of bureaucrats who through forced labor and show trials have attempted to impose a 
way of life upon the Russian people. Communism is in Merleau-Ponty’s words “going back on its 
principles” in that it abandons just the relation of idea to lived experience and which animated the 
thought of Marx as well.296 In this way communism has become what Merleau-Ponty following 
Arthur Koestler calls a “philosophy of the commissar” that reduces all ethical and political 
questions to mathematical applications of bureaucratic principles and that therefore loses the 
ability to relate to the habitual world.297 
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Merleau-Ponty does not argue that ethical and political projects of personal transformation 
inevitably devolve into bureaucratized forms of self-discipline. Such a result is only the worst 
outcome for such projects, but Merleau-Ponty’s slow disillusionment with the French Communist 
Party in particular makes it a primary concern of his. As a result, Merleau-Ponty’s own 
understanding of philosophical practice in his late work emphasizes opposing the tendency of 
ethical and political commitments to ossify and become new sources of oppression. Merleau-Ponty 
clarifies how philosophy accomplishes this task by analogizing it to art, which he regards following 
both Ravaisson and Bergson as a “figurative philosophy” (une philosophie figurée) that 
accomplishes the task of self-examination not through direct observation but by providing a 
medium for the subject to creatively express her pre-reflective, habitual knowledge.298 A style of 
engaging with the world is expressed in our behavior and Merleau-Ponty uses the aesthetic 
language of a “work” (oeuvre) to describe what is produced through our comportment towards the 
world, including both cultural objects and our own bodies. The work is a specific product of style, 
a response that crystallizes our way of being in the world into something that can clarify it upon 
observation. Corporeal style is thus an incipient form of art: bodily motion is in Merleau-Ponty’s 
words “primordial expression” that aims at explicitly articulating our habitual being in the world. 
The artist merely amplifies everyday forms of expression by creating an aesthetic style that serves 
as an appendage to corporeal style.299 Aesthetic style, the style of the artist, takes the artist’s way 
of inhabiting the world and uses the material means at the artist’s disposal such as paint, a musical 
instrument, or words, to create a language of expression that makes his habitual life legible. Rather 
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than creating ex nihilo a method of representing the world, the artist learns to express in a particular 
medium his sedimented experiences and his style is his method for doing so.  
Also like Ravaisson and Bergson, Merleau-Ponty’s analogy between philosophy and art 
extends to drawing a parallel between artistic and philosophical practice. Gaining the ability to 
translate one’s habitual being in the world into the language made possible by an artistic medium 
does not occur naturally. Against any notion of artistic genius, Merleau-Ponty argues that artistic 
style is developed only through experimentation and exercise, repeated attempts to capture the 
ways the artist’s environment is made manifest. The eye, for instance, can be trained through 
techniques that “outline [sic] and amplify [sic] the metaphysical structure of our flesh.”300 
Repeated attempts at expression in traditional forms trains the artist’s vision to grasp how her 
world is made manifest in everyday life, the particular effects of color, light, and shade that make 
her environment appear as it does. In doing so, the artist distances herself from her habitual way 
of seeing and thus her habitual way of being in order to represent it, and in viewing the work of 
art the spectator suspends his own habitual way of life in experiencing the work of art. Cézanne’s 
still life paintings for instance highlight the brute physicality of nature and the independence of 
color from human vision and perspective by rejecting shading effects in favor of a gradient of 
different tones, unsettling viewers of his paintings by forcing them outside of their habitual ways 
of seeing the world even in presenting to them a world intimately familiar to them.301 Through 
producing such a style Cézanne takes up his freedom through what Merleau-Ponty calls a “creative 
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repetition” (reprise créatrice) of himself, a practice that gradually uncovers his sedimented ways 
of perceiving the world and allows him to express them in such a way that he maintains fidelity to 
himself.302 Art such as Cézanne’s presents the world in the very strangeness in which it is 
experienced but which is forgotten because of its sedimentation into established habits, and opens 
its viewers to reflection upon their own ways of seeing the world and its commonality to 
Cézanne’s. In this regard art helps to perform the political function Merleau-Ponty believes is 
necessary to the full appropriation of freedom by allowing artist and spectator to go beneath their 
everyday experience of the world and to see how it is not private but shared. 
Merleau-Ponty’s artist does not attempt to remove himself from habitual life to take up a 
position of pure reflective consciousness by which his actions can be judged in a Bergsonian 
manner, as this is not merely impossible but undesirable. If habit is our manner of existence in the 
world as a sedimented past that forms our present experiences, then it is impossible for 
consciousness to gain full independence over our practical and ethical lives. Bergson’s subject 
who resists the force of habit through a heroic exertion of effortful attention is as unrealistic a 
model of ideal selfhood as Aristotle’s phronimos who reflectively deliberates concerning optimal 
choices as both ignore the situated and constructed nature of consciousness. Humans cannot 
achieve perception of their environment that lacks mediation by sedimented experiences, such that 
the artist’s distance from her habits provides her only a marginal degree of reflective freedom. 
However, this outcome is not to be lamented. It is ultimately the very attempt to radically recreate 
ourselves based on an abstract ideal that risks the freedom that comes from existing in a world, as 
such a project can alienate us from the people, objects, and institutions, that serve as the anchoring 
                                                          





points of our habitual ties to the world.303 Freedom is meaningless outside of the very structures 
that orient the projects through which we live our lives, and attempting to transcend those 
structures risks alienating us from our situated freedom. The artist does not practice self-
transcendence, then, but rather creative repetition, continual experimentation to articulate and 
work through the possibilities inherent to his location in the world. The artist’s exercise of freedom 
works both with and against habit, training vision to grasp the ways the world comes to presence 
and thus separating the artist from habitual perception only to return to the habitual world and 
consciously enact his possibilities in the work of art to discover what they permit and forbid him 
to do. Merleau-Ponty sums up the paradox of freedom by stating that “If there is a true liberty, it 
can only come about in the course of our life by our going beyond our original situation and yet 
not ceasing to be the same: this is the problem.”304 
Philosophical practice is likewise not so much introspective as it is experimental, consisting 
not of solitary reflections concerning our own patterns of thought but of interrogations of our 
responses to situations and events in the world. By attending to the concrete ways individuals 
interact with their environment philosophy makes visible their presupposed concepts and practices 
of perception and comportment that constitute their engagement with the world. In this way to 
quote Merleau-Ponty a “philosophical life always bases itself on these three cardinal points:” our 
everyday thought as it grounds itself in what we take to be true, in personal history, and in 
relationships with others.305 Simply reflecting upon individual thought processes misses what is 
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essential about human existence, that it is only in the interaction with other individuals, built 
spaces, and institutions that our being in the world is made manifest and worked through gradually 
and over time. In this light, the full meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s hope for philosophy to transform 
perception can be seen. Philosophy uncovers the interconnected aspects of our Wesen and allows 
us to initiate what he calls a “dialogue with self” where we step outside of ourselves and view our 
emotional and behavioral reactions to events in his life from a distanced standpoint.306 This critical 
distance entails seeing our comportment in general terms, as potentially shareable by others and 
therefore as a theoretical interpretation of our world. Our perception of the world, and perforce our 
behavior as well as our self-understanding, no longer seem natural but rather as a determinate 
stance, one that has been produced by certain conditions and which allows for certain possibilities 
while closing off others. Philosophy according to Merleau-Ponty thus exercises a more powerful 
denaturalizing function than art does by uncovering the structures of existence and personal and 
social histories that underlie our everyday experience of the world. 
In dredging up our sedimented personal and social histories, philosophy allows us to 
engage in self-experimentation that most fully takes up our inherent freedom. In an essay devoted 
to the work of Michel de Montaigne Merleau-Ponty argues that this self-experimentation begins 
by focusing attention on our occurrent moods and reactions to test how well our conscious view 
of the world coheres with them:  
Self-understanding for Montaigne is dialogue with self. It is a questioning addressed to the opaque 
being he is and awaits a response from. It is like “essaying” or “experimenting on” himself. He has 
in view a questioning without which reason’s purity would be illusory and in the end impure. Some 
are amazed that he should want to speak about even the details of his mood and temperament. It is 
because for him every doctrine, when it is separated from what we do, threatens to be mendacious; 
and he imagined a book in which for once there would be expressed not only ideas but also the very 
life which they appear in and which modifies their meaning.307 
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Self-experimentation for Montaigne is a practice of skepticism regarding our habitual notions. It 
involves asking whether in accepting doctrines derived either from one’s own life experience or 
from one’s social and intellectual world (and this includes even philosophies such as Pyrrhonian 
skepticism) we have not lost contact with our passions and desires, such that these notions have 
become imaginaries that mask our experience of the world rather than express it. Practicing 
philosophy requires examination of the relationships between ideas and the affections that indicate 
sedimented experiences that have not yet coalesced into language, as it is only through such testing, 
such experimenting on oneself with ideas, that one discovers their relevance and value and protects 
against the mendacity of purely abstract notions. Such a practice not only clarifies one’s own 
engagements and commitments through comparison with doctrines but also adds to the meanings 
of those doctrines by seeing how they apply to the events of one’s life. From Merleau-Ponty’s 
perspective, philosophy entails not only the uncovering of existential structures and personal and 
social histories but also their comparison with our conscious ways of knowing. Concrete 
philosophy is unhappy because the elaboration of concepts must always come up against its own 
limitation of the “ontological cipher” that limits their applicability.308 As we discover the implicit 
ways we know the world through attention to our momentary passions and affects, we at the same 
time discover the contradictions and between our ideas and our behaviors, moods, and social 
possibilities. And just as Montaigne complained of the continual effort required to assess the 
validity of his ideas in light of his passions, we too must submit ourselves to a regime of 
“unremitting virtù” to discover how our conscious ways of thinking falsify our ways of being and 
to learn to calibrate our ideas to our authentic possibilities.309 
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 Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of philosophical practice thus preserves a measure of 
critical scrutiny towards one’s behaviors while focusing attention on the concrete ways our social 
existence affects our possibilities. Philosophy “limps” as an intellectual discipline in Merleau-
Ponty’s words because it forsakes pretensions to absolute knowledge in favor the relative and 
limited perspective offered by investigation of one’s own life and thus becomes what he will in 
another context call non-philosophy.310 Ontological inquiry finds that our existence lies entirely in 
our relations with others, with our spatial and built environment as well as with other humans and 
institutions. Philosophy fails to reach final conclusions about our existence that transcend historical 
mediation but instead develops ways of understanding the meaning we make of things, including 
ourselves. Philosophy’s failure to transcend the world it attempts to study is in fact the source of 
its liberatory potential. Philosophical practice does not seek full rational control of one’s behaviors 
and thought processes. Such an attempt fails to grasp the irreducible historicality of the habitual 
subject and thus risks becoming nothing more than a new form of bad conscience that futilely 
attempts to negate our ability to creatively express our sedimented ways of being. Instead, 
philosophical practice highlights our occurrent impulses and feelings that resist conceptual 
formation but indicate our contact with “brute being,” the moments of encounter in which we 
orient ourselves in the world and from which we construct meaning.311 In this way philosophy 
states descriptively nothing more than what we know but lack the language to articulate, having 
been turned towards mute experiences through investigation of the nature of habit. 
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Philosophy for Merleau-Ponty is thus a Socratic activity in that it works both with and 
against habit to achieve the exercise of freedom. Merleau-Ponty questions but does not abandon 
the project of making what was believed to be private public, but adds another crucial layer that 
makes this project possible. Any attempt to study the ways interaction with institutions affects our 
sense of possibility and to test whether institutional or social formations are compatible with our 
aspirations must begin with to our momentary responses and comparison with the affects of others. 
Such testing reveals whether experiences of frustration or disappointment are personal or whether 
they are shared with others and grounded not in accidental events but in the structure of our world. 
In so doing philosophical investigation both highlights in a manner similar to art how our world 
appears to us and explains why it appears in the way it does, thus providing the material by which 
to ask whether and how it can be changed. In doing so, philosophical practice does not attempt to 
assimilate us to a preexisting model of perfection but entails uncovering possibilities for action 
that are not radically new as in Bergson but latent within our social worlds yet still inchoate. 
Philosophical practice gives us a sense of our social location amidst the inescapable ambiguities 
of our experience of the world and indicates how our interactions with social institutions have 
formed our particular identities and possibilities. With this knowledge, we can begin to interrogate 
our existing social world based on an analysis of the effects institutional formations have on 
people’s aptitudes and self-conceptions. Critique becomes possible as we test whether social 
formations make possible the achievement of our interests, and if not whether new institutions and 
social practices can be developed that maintain greater fidelity to our being in the world.  
If Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical practice is directed towards the goal of achieving 
concrete freedom, however, it is equally wary of the ways that freedom can be lost in the very 





either criticizing, or at least as qualifying, ways of enacting ethical and political commitments in 
practice in a way that arises from his theory of habit. Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of notions of 
freedom as self-creation exemplified in the work of Sartre relies on his understanding of habit as 
mediator of a world that is inescapable save through an act of self-deception. It is incorrect to say 
that sedimentation opposes freedom: freedom for Merleau-Ponty is nothing other than the range 
of projects we have open to us as beings situated in time and place and who have been brought up 
to see ourselves under a certain light, and any ethical or political project must reckon with our 
grounding in historical and social practices. Yet the effects of habituation are ongoing, such that 
one’s commitments must remain sufficiently open to unpredictable change in one’s way of being 
and in the possibilities for expressing a particular ethical or political ideal. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
fluidity of the habitual subject precludes the achievement of full conscious self-mastery, as the 
aptitudes that form the basis of one’s style and manner of engaging with the world are in a state of 
constant yet imperceptible flux. Just like the historical manners of acting described in the previous 
section, dispositions one consciously cultivates through practice will transform themselves in the 
very acts by which they become integrated into one’s habitual being in the world. As a result, the 
“ideal self” one attempts to cultivate through practice will also be transformed over time. Engaging 
in self-experimentation as Merleau-Ponty understands it can therefore be understood not only as a 
potential basis of political practice but also as a complement to forms of ethical and political 
commitment that guards against the possibility of their devolving into forms of self-repression. 
4. Conclusion: Merleau-Ponty and the Examined Life 
 
The attitude Socratic philosophy cultivates towards social institutions, says Merleau-Ponty, 





resistance to them.312 Socrates participates in the practices of the Assembly and of the law courts 
but reminds his jurymen that they fail to understand, let alone live up to, what the city of Athens 
is and what it means. And yet if those jurymen and those institutions that have failed to embody 
the idea of Athens are not the city, then what is? Where is the meaning of the city of Athens to be 
found outside of the people who make it up? Are their values and goals not the only content we 
can give to the idea of Athens? Finally, what could a man who claims to take no part in public 
matters, who converses with people privately and avoids advising the assembly on matters of 
policy, and who claims that anyone who cares for justice must shun the intrigue of political life, 
possibly know?313 Socrates would be guilty of hypocrisy and arrogance in claiming to have a 
unique understanding of the values and goals of the city of Athens while refusing to participate in 
its institutions if it were not for his ironic approach to his relations with other people and to the 
truth as a whole. Socratic irony in Merleau-Ponty’s view is grounded in our ambiguous 
relationships with ourselves and other people. We cannot avoid making choices and taking 
responsibility for them even though our decisions are taken in circumstances we do not fully 
understand and have effects we cannot predict, and where whatever we do is seen and judged by 
others from whose perspectives our acts can take on an entirely new meaning. Socrates’ criticism 
of the Athenians avoids hypocrisy only because he refuses the standpoint of absolute knowledge, 
the closure of the Hegelian dialectic of spirit into a self-contained Sittlichkeit in which moral 
certainty is rejoined with historical and ultimately metaphysical validation, from which he could 
make pronouncements concerning the inherent value of the Athenians’ actions. Socrates’ method 
is instead to point out the divergences between the self-understanding of his fellow citizens and 
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their habitual way of life. The irony behind Socrates’ famous disavowals of knowledge is not that 
he does not possess true knowledge of Athenian virtue, but that there is no such knowledge, no 
state where the individual and the city coexist in perfect harmony. Athenians’ behavior has a 
different meaning in the light of Socratic questioning from the way they had understood it, and in 
being shown this divergence lies the possibility of examining and changing oneself. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that it is precisely this irony that modern philosophy needs in order 
to recapture its uneasiness with the world and its relevance to it. As we have seen in this chapter, 
however, regaining this sense of irony is only possible on the basis of an understanding of the 
nature of habit. Merleau-Ponty goes beyond both Ravaisson and Bergson’s accounts of habit while 
preserving many of their key insights in conceiving of habit not just as the production of a 
potentiality, nor as a mechanism attached to perceptions, but as a fluid process of organizing and 
synthesizing motions and perceptions through repetition into gestures in which our understanding 
of the world is embodied and expressed. Our preconscious and prereflective ways of knowing are 
grounded in our habitual manner of existing in the world, our style that reflects the forms of speech 
and behavior that we have internalized from our environment and which become the aptitudes by 
means of which we experience and cope with new situations. Our conscious ways of knowing the 
world are built on yet diverge from the fluid meaning we experience in the world that is implicit 
within our comportment. Our comportment also gives insight into our interactions with a social 
world that outstrips our ability to understand it, as what we inherit goes beyond our personal history 
and involves us in the struggles of our fellow beings. To be human for Merleau-Ponty is thus to 
exist in a world that one did not create and whose meaning one cannot assimilate and yet to which 
one remains responsible. In an essay on the Nazi occupation of France Merleau-Ponty reflects that 





world, established “according to a man’s mode of work, the nature of his loves, and the shape of 
his hopes; in brief, according to the way he lives with others.”314 Human life is always ironic in 
the sense that he attributes to Socratic philosophy, unable to escape its situatedness in a social 
world, mediated by habit, and yet having a task, a project, that defines us and which we cannot but 
strive to achieve. The attempt to ignore our inclusion in the world of institutions and practices, and 
to try to achieve individual self-perfection isolates us in the way philosophers have isolated 
themselves in the bureaucratic academy or were forced into silence during the occupation. As our 
analysis of habit has shown, we only exist insofar as we interact with our environment, such that 
any self-transformation must be combined with institutional or social transformation or it will only 
serve to alienate us from the world and makes us guilty of the hypocrisy Socratic irony strives to 
avoid.  
This irony is exacerbated by the work of sedimentation, the retention of experiences 
through repetition that produces our forms of comportment and which remains at the heart of all 
our interactions with the world. Against Bergson, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates that habit entails 
the creative expression of forms of action and language we inherit from our social world, such that 
habit is best understood as habituation, a continuous process of developing, working through, and 
transforming aptitudes. At the same time, the openness of sedimentation as Merleau-Ponty 
understands it is far greater than what Ravaisson allows for. While Merleau-Ponty lacks the sense 
of dynamism in Ravaisson’s conception of habit as desire, Ravaisson’s “continuist” theory of 
mind-body unity views the habituated body as simply an extension of conscious agency as a form 
of skill. For Ravaisson, the invention of new forms of activity habit brings about remains within 
the confines of the goals consciousness posits, even if its tendency towards automatism disrupts 
                                                          





conscious self-mastery. Sedimentation as Merleau-Ponty understands it by contrast reveals the 
continuity of spirit and nature, mind and body, rather than just their rapprochement, as it shows 
that our embodied existence is nothing other than gradual and mimetic appropriation of existing 
forms of comportment and application to our specific circumstances that produces new manners 
of existing that are thrown back into the social world. Merleau-Ponty thus brings the linkage of 
nature and second nature, of inheritance and acquisition, Ravaisson inaugurates to its conclusion 
in recognizing that all action is expression that takes place in interactions with a shared world. 
Human existence is nothing other than its cultivation through participation in social and 
institutional life, such that the opposition between self and world is dissolved. This cultivation 
takes place over time and is fluid, such that our inability to grasp the totality of culture is mirrored 
by an inability to grasp ourselves as a totality either. Our sense of self-identity is always an 
approximation that papers over the constant change of which our existence consists, such that 
Merleau-Ponty adds to Socrates’ ironic relationship with others an ironic relationship with 
ourselves that investigation of habit reveals. 
The task for philosophy as Merleau-Ponty sees it following Montaigne is to cultivate both 
the sense of our inability to conceptually grasp ourselves and our world and at the same time our 
responsibility to it, to be “simultaneously ironic and solemn, faithful and free.”315 Because we live 
in a world of shifting traditions, institutions, and practices, our world is never fully constituted but 
always open to being changed through our activity in it. Our freedom lies in this openness, yet our 
freedom is neither absolute nor indifferent to circumstances. We are not free to create ourselves in 
Sartrean fashion as this ignores our embeddedness in a social world, but at the same time because 
we exist among specific configurations of institutional and social possibilities we are free to the 
                                                          





extent that we understand and can change those formations. We are free both to work for a raise 
and to go on strike for better wages and in so doing improve our conditions, but these avenues for 
action operate under different assumptions of the nature of our situation and of the institutional 
and collective means at our disposal and are likely to lead to drastically different outcomes. Our 
ironic distance from our conscious understanding of our world must be balanced by the recognition 
that we are our projects and that value consists of “actively being what we are by chance, of 
establishing that communication with others and with ourselves for which our temporal structure 
gives us the opportunity and of which our liberty is only the rough outline.”316 This communication 
is established by attending to one’s momentary feelings as they emerge through one’s reactions to 
situations rather than through self-analysis as the latter ignores the nature of sedimentation and 
thereby falsifies our self-knowledge once again. Attention to and description of one’s experiences 
allows comparisons with other people that sketch the lines of institutional power dynamics and 
possibilities for collective actions through which freedom is exercised. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical practice does not begin from a pre-defined “ideal self” or 
objective conception of the good life, but instead uncovers the possibilities that lie latent within 
one’s habitual being in the world. In this regard, his theory of philosophical practice is open to 
change to a greater degree than Ravaisson’s but less than Bergson’s. In contrast to how the person 
of good sense acts, expressing ethical or political commitments in one’s style does not entail 
creation of new forms of action in response to individual situations. Whereas for Bergson, good 
sense is defined by its radical novelty, that is its irreducibility to the rearrangement of prior 
elements, for Merleau-Ponty intelligent action entails the calibration and adaptation of existing 
sedimented possibilities to present needs. Because he does not see the body as passive, Merleau-
                                                          





Ponty is able to demonstrate how responsiveness and flexibility can occur without having to 
attribute to consciousness the ability to grasp absolute novelty, and his criticisms of Bergson’s 
theories of perception and the body are powerful reasons to prefer his view. 
 At the same time, while his understanding of the habituated body’s adaptability is much 
closer to Ravaisson’s, commitment as Merleau-Ponty understands it, whether ethical or political, 
resists definition in two ways that are not true of Ravaisson’s form of virtue ethics. First, the forms 
of commitment of interest to Merleau-Ponty are not antecedently given but uncovered in the course 
of self-experimentation and hence partially resist conceptual articulation. Knowledge of the way 
of life to which one is “condemned” to live is only uncovered through the process of entering into 
dialogue with oneself and with others, and can only exist as an incomplete task. Attempting to gain 
complete knowledge of all of the sedimented possibilities from one’s personal history along with 
the histories one shares with others that have come together to form one’s current orientations is a 
futile endeavor, such that one can only have a partial understanding of the tasks one must achieve 
and of the specific habits one must cultivate in the process of doing so. Second, the ways we form 
ourselves in light of our commitments will be subject to gradual yet unpredictable change. 
Possibilities that we enact will be affected by the expressive structure of sedimentation, in which 
aptitudes are imperceptibly altered in their very enactment and are slowly transformed. As a result, 
our ability to understand how our conduct instantiates a particular commitment, or whether it 
exceeds it in various ways, will only be determinable through the practice of interpretive self-
experimentation. Indeed, the fluidity of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of sedimentation all but 
guarantees that the ways of being one cultivates in light of one’s commitments will eventually 
become transformed into something new. Just as Cézanne’s creative repetitions of himself 





existing aptitudes and ultimately transform them into new ones in an ongoing process of 
adaptation. Patterns of action and states of character are altered in their very enactment, such that 
making ethical or political commitments into habits will ultimately result in those commitments 
being exceeded in ways that cannot be anticipated.  
Merleau-Ponty’s practice of self-experimentation offers a limited and contextualized self-
consciousness and mastery over one’s ways of being in a way that qualifies Hadot’s association of 
his work with that of Bergson and the ancients. Hadot’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology as “perception of the world as a world” is correct so far as it goes, but he goes on 
to assimilate Merleau-Ponty’s phenomeology to the transformation of perception as Bergson 
practices, ignoring the essentially socially and historically situated nature of the habitual subject.317 
While intuition in Bergson effects a global, or to use Hadot’s terms, existential transformation of 
our mode of engaging with the world that entails self-recognition as a radically free being, for 
Merleau-Ponty freedom exists only in particular contexts and is only actualized through projects 
that respond to specific circumstances. The achievement of self-awareness is thus limited for 
Merleau-Ponty to recognition of oneself has inhabiting a particular social and historical location 
within one’s world, and with a greater sense of one’s existing possibilities. Engaging in self-
experimentation teaches one to see the world anew insofar as it denaturalizes one’s world and 
reveals it as the product of histories of social and institutional interaction. This shift in our way of 
viewing the world, however, is not a “radical rupture” in Hadot’s words that rouses us from 
lostness in the everyday, but rather entails a clarification of our everyday being in the world.318 By 
gaining distance from our habitual, pre-reflective knowledge through its conscious expression, we 
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gain a provisional mastery over ourselves in sharpening the understanding we have of our existing 
possibilities for action, but only in specific contexts of our everyday activity. Such self-
consciousness and self-mastery is also provisional in another sense, namely that the work of 
sedimentation will ultimately cause whatever actions we consciously undertake to exercise gradual 
and unpredictable impacts upon our character. Even as one becomes conscious of oneself as in 
possession of particular possibilities and actively pursues them as projects, the changes to one’s 
aptitudes brought about by that pursuit will accumulate to the point that one’s overall character is 
transformed, such that one’s understanding of oneself will gradually become obsolete. 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussions of contemporary Catholic and Marxist projects allow us to 
read these qualifications as offering challenges to the goals of achieving complete self-
consciousness and self-mastery through philosophical practice. First, any attempt to articulate a 
program of self-transformation must cultivate self-awareness through attention to our affects, 
rather than attempt to rationally reconstruct our psychology. As we have seen, the attempt to 
conceptually map our pre-reflective ways of knowing always leave a remainder of sedimented 
content found in our emotional reactions to situations that give insight into our occurrent yet 
inchoate understanding of the world. Self-work must therefore base itself on constant attention to 
one’s occurrent emotional states and interpretation of those states in communication with others. 
To use Pierre Hadot’s terms, the aspect of attention (prosoche) to the present moment and one’s 
responses to events must therefore be emphasized319 but also supplemented with an understanding 
of the nature of sedimentation, that one’s reactions not only give insight into the way one 
understands the world but are also indexed to specific interactions with other people and 
institutions that have inclined us to see the world in particular ways. Ethics must merge with 
                                                          





history, including social history, and describe not just how one lives in the world but explain why, 
and this explanation cannot be merely psychological but at the same time social and even political. 
Second and more importantly, the achievement of rational self-mastery must be balanced 
with accommodation of the unpredictable work of sedimentation. In our habitual conduct is found 
the meaning we make of the world, our experience of it as relevant to our concerns, desires, and 
aspirations. If practice attempts to take control of our habitual way of being, our bodily aptitudes 
as well as our momentary thoughts and feelings, it will be burdened by the fact that our dispositions 
result from the fluid process of the production, expression, and transformation of aptitudes in the 
light of new events. The collapse of the distinction between first and second nature means that our 
very existence lies in our contingent interactions with the world, such that self-transcendence to 
the position of the sage who sees all from the vantage point of objective truth is only possible at 
the price of alienating us from the very environment in which we make meaning of ourselves and 
of others. The project of leaving behind the occurrent self that is ridden with uncontrollable 
passions is ultimately an attempt to transcend the human condition entirely. Our aptitudes, and the 
active behaviors that arise from that, contain a moment of passivity within them, material we 
garner from our relations with others and which we cannot control. The attempt to gain control of 
our thoughts and feelings through practice shares the same limitations as the attempt to transform 
human nature through the application of Marxist theory in Soviet Russia, and may result in a new 
“philosophy of the commissar,” an oppressive discipline that sees our entanglement with the world 






Chapter 4: The Feeling for Ambiguity: Indefinite Self-Cultivation and Philosophical 
Practice as Self-Unfolding 
 
 The merging of first and second nature that Ravaisson initiates and Merleau-Ponty 
completes with his concepts of sedimentation and style introduces historicity to the embodied 
subject of habit. While all three thinkers agree that the body must be understood as an intelligent 
agent capable of instigating purposive action, their ways of grounding embodied subjectivity in 
analyses of the effects of repetition on subjects force us to go beyond seeing bodily intelligence 
and agency as, to paraphrase Andy Clark, a “leaky” consciousness that is extended in the body.320 
For at the same time as the body as oriented towards practical rationality, it is also a product of 
processes such as desire, fossilization, and sedimentation that cause it to develop in ways that 
cannot be articulated in advance. The intelligence and historicity of the habituated body are not 
opposing forces in tension with each other: the processes whereby repeated actions and affections 
produce ongoing effects in subjects are the ontological foundations of embodied subjectivity, its 
very condition of existence. Yet what Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty have shown is that 
embodied intelligent agency develops in the course of its very actualization. The body’s 
adaptations and motions that allow it to engage purposively and responsively with its environment 
subtly change it through repetition, such that the body exists in a perpetual state of becoming. The 
concepts of desire, fossilization, and sedimentation all outline aspects of this process, and are each 
involved in the production and adaptation of bodily intelligence to varying degrees. When taken 
together, however, they culminate in an understanding of the embodied subject as fluid and whose 
development inevitably outstrips conscious self-knowledge. 
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 The result of our investigation of the habituated body in Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty is the recognition that projects of self-cultivation do not simply form the subject according 
to a rational ideal but are simultaneously impacted by these features of bodily intelligence and 
historicity. What unites the programs of philosophical practice Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty articulate is that they respond to the intelligence and historicity of habituated subjects, 
whether they take advantage of the dynamic nature of habituation to cultivate virtue as with 
Ravaisson, combat the mechanization of human behavior resulting from fossilization as Bergson 
does, or uncover new possibilities for projects to which one can consciously commit oneself in the 
case of Merleau-Ponty. In doing so, the forms of philosophical practice investigated in this 
dissertation (including Bergson’s in its adapted form) produce the conditions for the 
unencumbered expression of embodied intelligence even as it is produced and affected by its own 
historical formation. Allowing both principles to function simultaneously, however, introduces the 
principles and practices of self-cultivation to the structure that underlies the body’s becoming. The 
dispositions and aptitudes practice gives rise to do not stay static but continue to develop as they 
are enacted in everyday life and the effects of repetition gradually alter them. The self cultivated 
through conscious practice, in other words, continues to cultivate itself, and this causes projects of 
self-cultivation to result in something in excess of the form or principle that animated it. Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty all affirm this process of development in their conceptions of 
philosophical practice, and to conceptualize the open-ended and continuous nature of the changes 
they seek to institute in human life I have coined the term indefinite self-cultivation. 
 In this concluding chapter, I would like to examine the philosophical stakes of Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work for theories of self-cultivation and philosophical practice 





habit and embodied subjectivity that stem from them investigated in this dissertation, and I intend 
to now demonstrate that their work, including their conceptions of philosophical practice, provide 
resources that can benefit current discussions of ethical and philosophical practice. In doing so, I 
hope also to clarify the ways Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work can be understood 
as complementary and as articulating a unitary position on the nature of habit and its role in ethical 
and philosophical practice. I will first clarify the notion of indefiniteness that emerges through 
reading Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of habit together. By putting their work 
in conversation with theorists of virtue acquisition in philosophy and the study of religious ethics, 
I will argue that projects that understand self-formation as the acquisition and cultivation of 
habitual dispositions and aptitudes will ultimately give rise to results beyond or other than their 
pre-defined goals. I will then turn to the work of Pierre Hadot, whose conception of philosophy as 
a way of life originally inspired many of the questions I set out to investigate in this dissertation, 
in order to articulate the theoretical territory indefinite self-cultivation covers. I will argue that 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the embodied subject provide a 
perspective from which we can critique theories of philosophical practice like Hadot’s that seek to 
cultivate rational self-mastery and form the basis of an alternative set of goals for philosophical 
practice to achieve. Against dualistic theories of philosophical practice that pit reason against the 
passions that we will see ultimately result in a violent dominance of reason over the body and the 
emotions, indefinite philosophical practice exercises intelligent bodily agency in a way that 
opposes circumstances that give rise to a repetitive and passive mode of existence and actualizes 
bodily and social freedom while giving rise to stable and increasing pleasure. 






In this dissertation’s Introduction, the notion of indefiniteness was provisionally defined 
negatively by contrast with theories of self-cultivation that interpreted the concept of definition in 
terms of the concept of form. We have seen throughout this dissertation, however, that the 
indefiniteness of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of philosophical practice 
reflects the nature of the subjects they pretend to form. Articulating a more comprehensive concept 
of indefinite self-cultivation therefore requires reading their theories of embodied subjectivity 
together to pinpoint precisely where and how they exceed the criteria that define the formed 
subject. In this section, I will define the concept of indefinite self-cultivation by putting the work 
of Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty in conversation with contemporary theories of 
embodied practice in the study of religious ethics. In doing so, I will argue that attempts at 
consciously forming the embodied subject as it is conceptualized in their work through practice 
will give rise to changes in the subject that exceed the criteria for the formed subject and can thus 
only be understood as indefinite. Whether explicitly recognized or not, practices of intentional 
habituation cultivate a state of character that functions as an embodied form of practical reason by 
activating the autonomic processes of desire, fossilization, and sedimentation that underlie 
embodied intelligence. Projects of self-formation build character by orienting the process of 
habituation, but having done so those processes continue to function in ways that give rise to 
unpredictable changes that ultimately overflow any particular form of character. The dynamic and 
mutable nature of habit as Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty theorize it cause projects of 
self-cultivation to bring about results other than or beyond what they intended, such that projects 
of intentional habituation are inherently liable to bring about indefinite change. 
The present focus on the relationship between Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty and 





current conceptions of philosophical practice. The relationship between habit – named by the terms 
hexis or habitus – as the foundation of practical reason, and its origin in practices of individual 
formation, is examined in much greater detail in the study of religious ethics, in which the notion 
that “reason has a material, embodied life” has become a common theoretical principle.321 In 
particular, the turn towards the application of virtue theory in the conceptualization of ethical 
practice and the ethical subject makes scholarship on religious ethics an attractive conversation 
partner for Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work. Scholarship on religious ethics has 
tended to view becoming an ethical subject as participation in a pedagogical process of acquiring 
dispositions that conform to a particular model. This approach relies upon a “dispositional 
model”322 of the self in which the ethical subject is conceived as a harmony between conscious 
self-conception and the body viewed as an “assemblage of embodied aptitudes” or dispositions 
that is achievable through practice.323 The model can take various forms, including a set of virtues 
or excellences, a sage or saint whose example is to be followed, or even a broader conception of 
                                                          
321 Richard Miller, “On Making a Cultural Turn in Religious Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 33 (3), 2005: 409-
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human flourishing.324 In each case, however, the model of ethical subjectivity is given in advance, 
and the possibility of conforming to this model through some pedagogical program is assumed. In 
this regard, practice or ritual are to be seen not primarily as symbolic or communicative but as 
pedagogical and efficacious in producing a certain form of ethical subject, such that they serve as 
pedagogical techniques through which habituation according to a particular model is achieved. 
In constructing a dispositional model of the self, scholars of religious ethics view acquired 
habits as durable, in the sense that they become the more or less permanent basis of the ethical 
subject’s everyday way of life once they are acquired. Scholars of religious ethics have thus 
heightened Aristotle’s connection between states of character and deliberation to argue that it is 
the body itself that “learns” how to instantiate virtue in particular situations.325 By understanding 
the body as a set of acquired aptitudes, scholars of religious ethics have broken down the 
distinction between “body sense and body learning,” thereby giving practice the role of actively 
producing the forms of experience previously understood to be natural such as physical movement, 
emotional being, and even states of belief.326 It thus becomes possible to speak of a learned and 
embodied practical reason, a bodily competence at acting and feeling in accord with moral norms. 
The body’s capacities serve as the self-moving means that spontaneously achieve ethical and 
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practical ends.327 Ethical, political, and religious commitments are therefore not simply or even 
primarily cognitively believed but are rather enacted in everyday contexts through the medium of 
the body. Grounding the concept of character in embodied practice demonstrates in particular that 
once dispositions have been acquired they become increasingly difficult to change. By lodging 
commitments within the body, practice has the effect of making actions and feelings that had been 
consciously repeated unconscious, a spontaneous component of the subject’s aptitudes.328 As a 
result, those commitments become natural and difficult to dislodge either through conscious 
argumentation or through conscious change in one’s actions. Having acquired a set of aptitudes, 
the mode being in the world they articulate tends to maintain itself against change. 
Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work both complements and ultimately goes 
beyond this picture of the ethical life by grounding the dispositional model of the self in an 
ontology of the body. In particular, I would suggest that their work gives content to the linkage of 
body sense and body learning by allowing bodily learning to be conceptualized in terms of the 
processes underlying embodied practical reason. Merleau-Ponty’s correlation between non-
propositional knowledge and embodied aptitudes in his concept of the body schema indicates how 
consciously cultivated habits become unconscious and appear natural. Actions that instantiate 
virtues are incorporated into the process of bodily learning and change our immediate experience 
of the world. The body “learns” to play the organ for instance when perception is trained to 
interpret the organ’s keys as possibilities for producing a particular set of musical “values” while 
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the body is trained to move itself in ways that produce those values. The organ only becomes an 
object for the subject insofar as it has been incorporated into its perceptual field in this manner, 
such that acquiring the skill of playing the organ necessarily entails an immediate understanding 
of how it can be utilized. Merleau-Ponty’s adaptation of Bergson’s understanding of perception as 
a nascent action indicates that the body furthermore acts in a way that follows from the perceptual 
knowledge one acquires. Merleau-Ponty often goes so far as to describe pre-reflective perception 
as a kind of “faith” that objects in the world are what they are that in what Husserl would call the 
“natural attitude” goes unquestioned, such that the appearance of naturalness and the unconscious 
reenactment of a certain manner of engaging with it result from the fact that they have been 
incorporated into our stock of non-propositional knowledge.329 Likewise, the acquisition of virtue 
entails learning to immediately recognize the ethical “value” of a particular action, to see in one’s 
perceptual field opportunities for acting well and to calibrate one’s bodily motions to achieve that 
end. Ways of being acquired through practice are durable insofar as the ways of interpreting the 
world they instantiate become a component of our pre-reflective knowledge and cease to be 
questioned, an aspect of the world simply as we believe it to be.  
The dynamism of Ravaisson’s concept of inclination strengthens the sense of durability of 
habitual aptitudes even further by focusing on their qualitative dimensions. Ravaisson’s 
interpretation of habit as a form of desire focuses on the progressive and affective aspects of our 
relationship with habitual dispositions in a way Bergson and Merleau-Ponty do not, and it allows 
us to see how habits become a more central component of our behavior over time. While the latter 
two provide cogent arguments for how the body is able to act intelligently through habit, only 
Ravaisson’s grounding of habit in a theory of desire accounts for the increased ease of and 
                                                          





preference for habitual actions. We gain, as we saw in Chapter One, a “taste” for the actions we 
repeatedly undertake, a preference for them that can even become conscious comfort at acting 
according to habits and discomfort at acting in a different manner. I have argued that these 
qualitative features take us beyond thinking of habit as intelligence or “competence” to see how 
habitual dispositions become stronger over time, in the sense that they become more of an (1) 
immediate and (2) preferred source of our actions. The durability of habitual dispositions can thus 
be understood as continually increasing as a form of tendency. The more a subject repeats a 
particular manner of acting the more likely it is to continue doing so, and the more it will prefer it, 
and conversely the more of a felt discomfort and effort it will be to act in an unfamiliar fashion. 
Most importantly, however, Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty highlight the ways 
embodied practical reason, the habituated body’s purposive nature, is a historical phenomenon. 
By conceptualizing habit as a continuous process of habituation that entails constant change to 
subjects, these thinkers allow us to see embodied intelligence as continually changing throughout 
the subject’s biography as habits are expressed in new contexts and give rise to goal-oriented 
actions that are then incorporated into its abilities. In this context, I would argue that Ravaisson’s 
concept of invention and Merleau-Ponty’s concept of sedimentation can be understood to 
respectively focus on the production and retention of intelligent forms of action. Invention as 
Ravaisson understands it is a productive process that gives rise to both a new interpretation of a 
situation and a new form of action. Invention thus expands one’s aesthetic understanding of virtue 
by calibrating it to the particular case, thus opening a new possibility for its expression. At the 
same time, imagination constructs a form of action that adapts existing aptitudes to the particular 
case, expanding them as well. New forms of action are produced as the subject interprets new 





accomplish it.  Although I have argued that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of perception differs 
from and is ultimately richer than Ravaisson’s, I nevertheless believe the concept of invention can 
be interpreted within Merleau-Ponty’s terms as what he calls the “dilation” of our habitual being 
in the world to new situations. What both are describing is a process of the skillful adaptation of 
existing dispositions to the requirements of a new situation that is grounded in prior experiences 
of similar situations.330 Merleau-Ponty merely adds that this process does not entail the 
coordination of separate faculties of the body and perception but rather the simultaneous 
constitution of the situation as a unique possibility for action and of one’s body as a means to 
achieve it through application of one’s pre-reflective knowledge. I prefer the term “invention” to 
that of “dilation” because it more directly expresses that the process of producing purposive actions 
entails the expansion of one’s possibilities, that in each instantiation one adds to one’s bodily 
abilities as well as to one’s understanding of a particular commitment. Merleau-Ponty’s concept 
of sedimentation picks up where Ravaisson’s notion of invention leaves off by demonstrating that 
all actions the subject undertakes are retained in some form. As a result, practical reason must be 
understood as a historical phenomenon, one that is produced in and through the subject’s repeated 
interactions with the world and that is changed as new ways of acting are invented. Merleau-
Ponty’s language of temporal depth in particular describes a process of synthesis in which new 
actions transform existing aptitudes and become foundational for future ways of acting.331 Any 
                                                          
330 I would suggest that the inherent intelligence of habit as articulated throughout this dissertation could also serve 
as an ontological grounding for the linkage of the concepts of virtue as character and virtue as skill that Aaron 
Stalnaker attempts to find in Confucian thought, see Aaron Stalnaker, “Virtue as Mastery in Early Confucianism,” 
Journal of Religious Ethics, 38 (3), 2010: 404-428.  
 
331 Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the historicality of habit thus goes beyond that of Hollywood and Asad, for 
whom practical reason is “historical” only in that it is produced in time and through practice rather than constantly 
shifting in response to new circumstances (Hollywood, “Practice, Belief, and the Feminist Philosophy of Religion,”, 
p. 59). Cf. Pamela Sue Anderson, “Divinity, Incarnation, and Intersubjectivity: On Ethical Formation and Spiritual 





trained musician understands how to use a piano to produce musical values, for instance, but 
Thelonious Monk’s unique manner of shaping his hands when playing produces a different sound 
that changes the manner in which the piano can henceforth be used. As a historical phenomenon, 
practical reason thus takes on an individual character as the bodily “means” applied to achieve 
particular ends are changed in the very adaptations that constitute their iterations and conform to 
the subject’s history.  
Although I have argued this his conception of bodily intelligence as a form of static “logic” 
is best understood as a degeneration of habit rather than its ordinary manner of existence, it should 
be noted that Bergson can also add to this conception of ethics by describing what could be called 
a “routinized” form of practical reason. The value of Bergson’s work is to illuminate how the body 
changes when one adopts a “repetitive attitude” towards one’s commitments, either as the result 
of fatigue or conscious choice, or due to a lack of change in one’s circumstances, or because those 
commitments are no longer central to one’s real conditions of life. In such exceptional cases, 
Bergson demonstrates that the body ceases to function in an inventive manner and adapt its 
capacities to new circumstances and instead merely re-enacts existing actions. While this form of 
embodied engagement remains purposive in that existing actions are applied strategically to 
accomplish the individual’s ends, it is a reduced form of intelligence that solely entails the 
continuation of existing forms of behavior rather than the constitution of new ones.332 In this 
situation, the expression of ethical commitments becomes, to paraphrase Bergson, rigidified, as 
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we only reiterate previously undertaken actions and fail to adapt ourselves to changing 
circumstances. 
Yet this historical understanding of bodily intelligence also begins to point towards the 
ways Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s conceptions of habit go beyond and even 
challenge this picture of the ethical life. In investigating this issue, we are returned to the discussion 
in this dissertation’s Introduction regarding the nature of the “formed” or “defined” self as it is 
cultivated through practice. The preceding discussions, however, have put us in a position to 
investigate this issue with greater precision by advancing the following question: to what extent is 
it possible to achieve harmony between one’s conscious self-conception as an ethical subject and 
one’s habitual aptitudes as they are expressed in everyday life, insofar as the latter as a “layer” of 
the self are understood to be dynamic in the sense just articulated?333 The question of whether self-
cultivation can be definite or not can thus be understood as whether “harmony” between self-
conception and aptitudes is maintained throughout the production of actions that follow from 
habitual aptitudes, and the retention of changes to aptitudes these actions cause. In discussing 
Sabina Lovibond’s conception of ethical formation, we identified two criteria for assessing 
whether one’s character can be understood as “formed” or not. First, we saw that actions should 
be in theory rationally derivable from an ethical ideal. This entails both consistency between one’s 
actions, such that one can be understood to have a “unified” character, and that one’s actions can 
theoretically be articulated in advance given knowledge of a particular virtue and of a particular 
situation one encounters, or in other words that one’s behavior is predictable. And second, we saw 
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that the subject should theoretically be able to provide a rational account of their actions, that they 
possess knowledge of how and why they act in the way they do.  
Our discussion of the study of religious ethics allows us to now add a third criterion, namely 
that one’s knowledge of oneself as a particular type of ethical subject should correspond over time 
to the actual state of one’s dispositions. That is to say, the dispositions produced through practice 
should endure throughout the process of their enactment in everyday contexts and should remain 
recognizable as exemplifying a particular virtue. This last criterion is broader than the other two, 
which focus on specific actions. This criterion instead entails the ability to recognize oneself as a 
virtuous person throughout one’s everyday engagements over the longer term, or in other words 
that the harmony between self-conception and bodily state that is the basis to current theories of 
religious ethics is maintained. In this regard, the criterion of correspondence over time corresponds 
to the question of whether one possesses an ēthos in the sense Michel Foucault gives the word, a 
“mode of being for the subject, along with a certain way of acting, a way visible to others…in his 
clothing, appearance, gain, in the calm with which he responded to every event, and so on.”334 In 
order to have a “formed” or “defined” self, one’s mannerisms spread over various facets of one’s 
conduct should, over a long period of time, correspond to one particular ideal or principle that 
defines them. 
Instead of regarding virtuous actions as derivable from a pre-existing principle, it follows 
from the concept of invention that ethical ideals change in the course of their enactment. The 
language of derivation implies that the principle from which a conclusion is derived remains 
constant. When Aristotle compares the act of deliberation to engaging in a “geometrical 
construction,” for instance, the end – the practical goal or the virtue to be instantiated – remains 
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constant in the manner of a first principle, and specific actions are chosen insofar as they follow 
as logical necessities to achieving that end.335 Derivation in this context entails only the 
specification through analysis of what is required to achieve a pre-given end, such that the task of 
deliberation is to clarify the principle in question.336 Because the invention of habitual actions 
entails an expansion of one’s aesthetic sense of one’s commitments, however, it follows that the 
ethical ideal given expression in habitual actions will expand with it. In seeing new situations as 
opportunities to express ethical or political commitments, the application of bodily and perceptual 
aptitudes does not hold one’s commitments constant but actively gives them new content. An 
Christian life, for instance, would in Merleau-Ponty’s view engage with the Sartrean concepts of 
bad faith and inauthenticity as opportunities to see sin and redemption in human life under a new 
light. In doing so, the Christian would preserve their commitment to enacting a redeemed way of 
life by changing the content of the notion of redemption in response to reality of bad faith and 
inauthenticity in life. Likewise, the content of Ravaisson’s virtue of generosity changes in the 
different contexts of individual and social life to which it is applied, but it is precisely in this 
adaptation that it is preserved as a principle. In both cases, commitments are redefined in the course 
of their enactment. Whereas derivation describes a unidirectional process of specification from a 
fixed first principle, invention implies the bidirectional reinterpretation of one’s commitments in 
light of the contexts in which they are applied. While the virtuous person may begin with a rational 
or aesthetic sense of their commitments, those commitments do not remain constant but rather 
change and reintegrate themselves into one’s bodily and perceptual skills through new encounters. 
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Since the habitual subject enacts its commitments through a dynamic process of 
reinterpretation and adaptation, its comportment will be less consistent and predictable as it will 
be creative. Viewing invention as a holistic process of coordinating ethical principles with the 
practical interests at play in a particular situation as well as with one’s bodily aptitudes relies on 
an understanding of perception as constituting rather than reducing its field. Perception thus posits 
new opportunities for expressing one’s commitments, which entails the spontaneous adaptation of 
one’s aptitudes in the form of a specific action. Actions do not follow rationally from one’s 
commitments but emerge throughout the course of this coordination, such that they cannot be 
anticipated in advance of their enactment.337 The bodily calibration that occurs in the process of 
expressing habitual aptitudes results from a non-reflective perceptual grasp of a situation, such that 
the connection between commitments and their expression in actions is aesthetic rather than 
rational. Attempting to predict how the habituated individual will act is thus an inherently 
problematic task as actions come about only through the application of perceptual and bodily 
capacities that have already been formed through their past experiences and thus interpret new 
situations in unique ways. That actions only emerge through contact with particular contexts also 
indicates that consistency will take a secondary role to flexibility in the habituated subject’s 
comportment. Although I have criticized the conception of habit on which it relies, Bergson’s 
concept of “good sense” is thus not so far from the understanding of emergent action I am 
describing here in that both are an adaptive process that emphasizes change over stability. It does 
not follow that the virtuous person’s actions will be inconsistent; it is more accurate to say that 
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they are contextual in the sense that a particular manner of action applied in one set of 
circumstances would not be in another. Consistency in fact seems most appropriate when applied 
to the degenerated forms of habit as addiction and routine as Ravaisson and Bergson articulate 
them, as in those cases one simply reapplies existing actions rather than creates new ones. In its 
ordinary existence, the habitual subject’s state of character is in a constant state of motion and 
change as a result of its engagements such that it expands beyond the derivability criterion. 
The constant changes one’s ways of acting undergo limit the amount of knowledge one can 
have of one’s actions and of ones’ state of character as a whole. The rejection of deliberative 
models of virtue carried out by the thinkers examined in this dissertation is predicated on a view 
of the body as the primary agent of action and intelligence. As we saw particularly our discussion 
of Merleau-Ponty, the non-propositional practical knowledge embodied in habitual aptitudes 
forms the basis of our immediate reactions to situations. It is therefore necessary to regard practical 
reason as primarily embodied rather than conscious. Conscious reflection generally occurs only 
after the emergence of new forms of action, such that its accounts of virtuous actions will be 
retrospective and hence merely approximate one’s pre-reflective grasp of the contexts in which 
actions have come to be. Through his application of the theological concept of grace, Ravaisson 
strengthens this sense of primacy attributed to embodied over conscious intelligence by arguing 
that desire is the source of the motivational force behind habitual actions. The desire to persist in 
present ways of being, strengthened by the pleasure garnered through expressing habitual 
inclinations, impels us to act, such that the holistic process of interpretation and adaptation occurs 
increasingly automatically and hence further from conscious control and knowledge to the point 
where it appears as though we are not the agents of our own actions. It follows that as habitual 





actions, the less subjects will be able to provide a rational account of how and why they act. 
Rational deliberation will be replaced by the holistic process of inventing actions, such that 
conscious agency and self-knowledge diminish as bodily intelligence and spontaneity increases.  
The retrospective nature of conscious self-knowledge also gives insight into why self-
cultivation will go beyond the final criterion of self-recognition as well. The preceding analysis of 
the retention of repeated actions in the process of sedimentation suggests that changes to habitual 
aptitudes accumulate over time. Actions produced in encounters with new situations and contexts 
gradually gather and synthesize themselves into one’s habits and alter them. In Chapter Three, we 
saw that Merleau-Ponty argues that this process ultimately results in a unique formation that he 
calls “style,” a way of being that is inflected with one’s personal history. Given the ongoing nature 
of the process of sedimentation, however, Merleau-Ponty’s concept might be better rendered as 
stylization, as what he is describing is continual yet imperceptible change in one’s aptitudes in 
which they are made to conform to the situations one encounters. In their calibration to new 
situations, aptitudes undergo what Merleau-Ponty at one point calls a “coherent deformation” in 
which they are altered to fit a new set of interests.338 Over time, however, as the subject continues 
to express its aptitudes in everyday life these deformations ultimately accumulate into a 
transformation of oneself. Merleau-Ponty’s preferred example of this process is the cultivation of 
aesthetic style. Although he began as an Impressionist studying under Camille Pissarro, through 
the repeated attempt at expressing his vision of the world Cézanne gradually developed a style that 
was irreducible to the gestures of his previous influences. Through the very process of expressing 
one’s habitual aptitudes in everyday life those aptitudes are gradually though inexorably 
transformed into something new that only becomes crystallized for the subject through a kind of 
                                                          





retrospective judgment when they recognize the differences between their present mannerisms and 
those of their past. Marcel Proust also captures some of the sense of gradual transformation 
Merleau-Ponty attempts to conceptualize in an observation concerning habit: “Habit! That skillful 
but very slow arranger who begins by letting our mind suffer for weeks in a temporary 
arrangement; but whom we are nevertheless truly happy to discover, for without habit our mind, 
reduced to no more than its own resources, would be powerless to make a lodging habitable.”339 
Habit “arranges” our lives in such a way that we become accustomed to any particular context in 
which we find ourselves. The work of habit takes place outside of our conscious lives, but through 
it we are gradually adapted to new and changing circumstances and only recognize it after habit 
develops new ways of living. 
 The implication of this active and ongoing understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
style as stylization is that over time, any ēthos the subject develops will eventually be transformed 
into something different and new. The specific mannerisms one develops through practice and 
enacts in one’s everyday life conform to the same dynamic structure as all habitual aptitudes. 
Unless one’s circumstances stay more or less the same, or one’s ethical commitments cease to be 
relevant to one’s life, in which case they would likely become routinized in Bergson’s sense, 
through their adaptation in light of new circumstances those mannerisms will therefore slowly 
change as they incorporate the actions that are invented in new contexts. As a result, what Foucault 
would call one’s “way of being,” or the forms of action that characterize one’s comportment, 
gradually and imperceptibly change through their expression in everyday contexts to the point 
where one ultimately constructs a way of being that is irreducible to the old and whose relationship 
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with it becomes looser over time.340 To return to an example from Chapter One, if for instance one 
learns to become a teacher by reading a book about proper pedagogy, by taking classes, or by 
following the example of a mentor, one will at first teach according to the mannerisms of one’s 
influences. As one gains experience in teaching, however, one will eventually develop one’s own 
“style” of teaching that is an adaptation of yet remains irreducible to one’s influences, and this 
might even result in the production of a new “method” of teaching that might be unrecognizable 
to one’s influences as proper teaching. How novel one’s style of teaching will become will depend 
on contingent factors such as the variety of contexts in which one teaches (i.e., in different schools, 
different grade levels, students of different backgrounds, etc.), but this is merely a matter of degree. 
Some amount of transformation will inevitably occur as one applies ways of particular mannerisms 
to the circumstances of one’s life. Harmony between one’s self-conception as an ethical subject 
and the actual state of one’s aptitudes is therefore achievable only in the short term: the reiteration 
of aptitudes in new and divergent circumstances will ultimately change them in ways that cannot 
be predicted and may either outstrip or transform one’s understanding of oneself.  
In going beyond each of these three criteria of “defined” or “formed” self-cultivation, 
philosophical practice as Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty can be understood to be 
indefinite. To state the concept of “indefinite self-cultivation” more positively, however, we can 
say that it entails (1) the acquired ability to engage in unpredictable yet intelligent and creative 
action that expresses a particular commitment in everyday life. Through the acquisition of a set of 
habits that follow from one’s commitments one divests oneself of direct conscious control of one’s 
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actions, but in doing so one allows actions to be governed by the dynamic process of invention 
and sedimentation that constructs actions that mediate between practical and ethical needs and 
bodily potentialities and adapts the latter to act in a way that spontaneously achieves one’s ends; 
(2) the active tendency to act in this committed yet creative manner, not from conscious 
deliberation or even with rational knowledge of one’s manner of acting but instead from the 
preference for habitual ways of acting and the pleasure one takes in doing so; and finally (3) the 
gradual expansion and change of one’s commitments to the point that they become an individual 
form of conduct. Through the very process of invention and sedimentation that allows spontaneous 
and intelligent expression of one’s commitments, one will gradually alter those commitments as 
they encounter new contexts that imperceptibly yet inexorably change them. While the degree to 
which one’s ways of expressing those commitments will change is variable (depending primarily 
on the extent to which they become routinized or addictive), these changes come about through 
the accumulation of an emergent process of creating new forms of action, such that they are open-
ended and cannot be articulated in advance. Self-cultivation goes beyond each criterion for the 
definition or form of a subject and gives rise to a way of being that is constantly in the process of 
changing in ways that will produce something beyond or other than what could be articulated in 
advance, such that its results will be indefinite. 
As is by now clear, it is not because of any aesthetic preferences for change or 
indeterminacy for their own sake that self-cultivation as Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty 
understand it is indefinite in the sense described above. It is rather the nature of the habitual layer 
of our subjectivity itself that is the cause of the constant and open-ended changes in the process of 
self-formation. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty together conceptualize an embodied 





habitual aptitudes. Embodied intelligence and freedom are inherently creative in that through them 
actions emerge that adapt existing aptitudes in ways that cannot be predicted in advance yet allow 
the subject to achieve its goals, and through their sedimentation they continually alter the habits 
through which the subject engages with the world. Stasis is exceptional rather than the rule, the 
result of the degeneration of habits into routines or addictions that fixate the subject on a closed, 
unchanging manner of acting. As a result, as a general rule the self is never fully identical to itself, 
but exists as a process of enacting itself in the form of actions that gradually deform and transform 
it. Insofar as they attempt to make a certain set of mannerisms that conform to an ideal habitual, 
consciously-undertaken practices of self-cultivation will therefore be deformed and possibly 
transformed in like manner. While the nature of habit as a form of embodied subjectivity allows 
such projects to achieve a degree of success in introducing a particular way of being into one’s 
habitual aptitudes, the process of their enactment in everyday life will ultimately become 
something in excess of the model or principle on which projects of self-cultivation are based. 
2. Indefinite Philosophical Practice: The Problem of the Passions341 
 
While programs of bodily practice will inevitably be affected by the dynamics of the 
process of habituation and give rise to indefinite results, Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty 
affirm these dynamics and make them the basis of their theories of philosophical practice. This 
final section will attempt to articulate what is at stake in this affirmation for theories of 
philosophical practice more broadly by drawing their work together and putting it into direct 
conversation with Pierre Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of life. We have seen 
throughout our investigation that when read in the context of their theories of habit, the goals and 
methods of their philosophical practice differ from those Hadot attributes to them and at least 
                                                          





qualify the concern for conscious self-mastery Hadot claims is essential to philosophy as a way of 
life. When read together, the conceptions of philosophical practice articulated by Ravaisson and 
Merleau-Ponty, along with Bergson as I have reinterpreted it through their work, provide a more 
sustainable basis for the philosophical life than Hadot’s. Attempting to achieve rational self-
mastery in the way Hadot does attempts to arrest the historical processes of habituation in a manner 
that is both futile and ultimately harmful not only to the subject but also to the form of commitment 
that practice attempts to actualize by causing it to degenerate into a repressive discipline. Allowing 
these processes to function in an unimpeded fashion, by contrast, gains the benefits of the freedom 
and joy that arises from habitual action without the drawbacks of Hadot’s form of philosophical 
practice. In addition, we will see that it also solves the problem of the passions that is the ultimate 
motivation for philosophical practice not only for Hadot but a number of theorists who have 
recently attempted to resuscitate ancient theories of philosophical practice.342 Because it affirms 
and operates on the basis of the conception of the habitual body-subject articulated in the previous 
section, indefinite self-cultivation treated as an independent philosophical practice in its own right 
avoids Hadot’s existential opposition between reason and the passions and instead views the 
passions as part of a larger problem of ossification in individual ways of life. Rethinking the 
passions in this manner allows indefinite philosophical practice to respond to them without 
solutions that cause a self-alienating dominance of reason and instead give rise to bodily and social 
freedom and pleasure. 
A. Pierre Hadot on the Passions 
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Pierre Hadot is best known as a historian of ancient philosophy, but as I noted in the 
introduction, he takes his conception of philosophy as a way of life to have universal applications. 
As such, he can be read as having a theory of the passions, albeit one that arises primarily through 
readings of other philosophers. Even a cursory reading of his work reveals that he understands the 
passions to be the central problem that philosophy as a way of life – ancient or modern – must 
solve. Indeed, one need look no further than his opening definition of philosophy found in his 
essay on spiritual exercises to put the importance of the concept of passions in Hadot’s work in 
relief: 
In the view of all philosophical schools, the principal cause of humanity’s suffering, disorder, and 
unconsciousness were the passions: disordered desires, exaggerated fears. The domination of 
worries prevents people from truly living. Philosophy appears therefore, in the first place, as a 
therapeutic of the passions (“Try to rid yourself of your passions,” writes G. Friedmann). Each 
school had its own therapeutic method, but all of them were related to a profound transformation of 
the individual’s mode of being and of seeing. Spiritual exercises had precisely for their object the 
realization of this transformation.343 
 
Insofar as philosophy is not merely a theoretical discourse but a way of life, its primary aim is to 
rid humanity of desires and fears that have become too strong and are directed towards the wrong 
objects. While Hadot takes the concept of the passions primarily from Hellenistic thought, his 
invocation of the modern sociologist Georges Friedmann (1902-1977) and his existentialist 
language indicate the universality of the phenomenon as he understands it. For Hadot, not just 
ancient philosophy but all philosophical practice is premised on the dominance of human life by 
the passions. Pre-philosophical existence is defined by its being governed by the passions, such 
that the primary aim of philosophy is to serve as a form of therapy that transforms our mode of 
existence. 
 The link Hadot draws between being and seeing provides the clue to his explanation of 
how the passions arise in human existence. In Chapter Two, we saw that Hadot’s original insight 
                                                          





that philosophy can function as a way of life arose from his early engagement with Bergson’s 
theory of perception. The influence of Bergson on Hadot, I now suggest, goes deeper than this 
basic inspiration but also extends to helping him construct a substantive theory of the passions and 
how they develop that justifies his claim that the passions are the central feature of pre-
philosophical life. In applying Bergson’s work, Hadot does not take on his metaphysics of duration 
or his account of the loss of agency as a whole, but instead argues that the limitation of perception 
caused by habit is the central cause of the passions. The invocation of Bergson allows Hadot to 
argue that this problem of the passions does not depend upon ancient psychological theories but in 
fact identifies a universal feature of human existence. In this regard, Hadot’s argument connecting 
habit and the passions does not rely on Bergson’s neurological account either. Instead, Hadot 
claims that Bergson clarifies and puts into a rigorous form the observations of both ancient and 
modern thinkers (including Merleau-Ponty) that repetition breeds familiarity with objects that 
causes us to experience them thoughtlessly and to without conscious attention.344 When we first 
see the night sky it fills us with amazement, but over time we become accustomed to seeing it to 
the point where we forget even to look up.345 Repetition dulls our perception and causes us to 
interact with the world unthinkingly. These observations culminate in an understanding of habit as 
what Hadot calls alternatively a “mode” of experience or a “domain” of everyday existence, a 
lower level of selfhood in which objects are encountered and interacted with solely in terms of 
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their capacity to resolve immediate need.346 Hadot appeals to Bergson’s overall distinction 
between action-oriented perception and philosophical or aesthetic modes of perception that arise 
from intuition to argue for an opposition between practical and philosophical modes of existence, 
where the demands of practical life result in the limitation of ways of thinking about and perceiving 
the world to ones that facilitate action and achieve practical goals.347 Our automatic, pre-
philosophical ways of perceiving and thinking about the world are in his words “governed by 
habits” and therefore tend to conform to immediate interest and desire.348  
Hadot appropriates Bergson’s theory of habit to the extent that it illuminates the cause of 
the ailments that plague human life. Hadot thus shares Bergson’s therapeutic interests, but 
diagnoses a different condition, that of the passions that he argues result from an inherent 
propensity of the lower, habitual self to overindulge in pleasures in a way that causes them to 
become painful needs. Certain pleasures and pains are natural to us as embodied beings, but 
through habituation they can become dangerous necessities. Specifically, Hadot worries that 
repeated indulgences alter our way of perceiving objects: expanding upon Bergson’s claim that 
habit reduces our field of perception to its aspects relevant to immediate action, Hadot argues that 
repetition causes us to encounter objects only in terms of their potential to bring about pleasure or 
pain. When we see wine, fine food, or beautiful bodies, for instance, they appear as objects of 
desire and we name and evaluate them accordingly. By causing us to experience objects solely as 
objects of pleasure, habit prevents us from seeing objects in other ways and thus makes self-
restraint more difficult. Our experience of the world becomes defined by our appetites, thus turning 
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them into distorted passions. Habit takes control of us at an automatic level in pre-philosophical 
life, making previously harmless pleasures into dangerous necessities, exaggerating our fears of 
losing what we have, and finally distorting not just our character but our entire way of experiencing 
and behaving. In another context, Hadot claims that as a result habit comprises what Goethe calls 
das Gemeine, the trivial or ordinary, our immediate recognition of our surroundings in terms of 
our personal cares and concerns.349 Once habituated to experience of the world mediated by 
passion, we automatically encounter new situations in ways that reflect pleasures and pains. Habit 
thus gives rise to a limited, partial, and ultimately egoistic self in which our passions form our 
character and perception. It is in this sense that ancient philosophers claim that we are “enslaved” 
to the passions: habit seizes and perverts our perceptual experience and causes us to judge and 
conceive of the world in terms of pleasures as opposed to the pleasures proper to our nature as 
rational beings up to the point where we become unable to think or react to the world in any other 
fashion.350  
Without getting into the question of whether Hadot’s use of Bergson to illuminate 
observations concerning habit and perception stretching back into antiquity is legitimate from a 
historical perspective, the analysis of the relationship between habit and perception carried on 
throughout this dissertation allows us to question Hadot’s move expanding Bergson’s theory of 
habit to the case of pleasure. It is true from both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty’s perspectives that 
perception is primarily oriented towards practical life, though we saw Merleau-Ponty take issue 
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with Bergson’s understanding of that orientation as a reduction. In this regard, there is nothing in 
itself problematic about arguing that through repetition one can come to experience a particular 
object as pleasurable or painful and react accordingly. The question comes down to whether or not 
the leap from this observation to the claim that habit can bring about an entire existential mode of 
perceiving the world is legitimate. In this regard, I think it is helpful to return to Ravaisson’s 
discussion of the double law of habit, in which his distinction between activity and passivity allows 
us to see the exaggeration of desires as only one possible outcome of habituation. In the course of 
describing the double law of habit, Ravaisson in fact provides his own account of how 
uncontrollable desires are formed. While a wine connoisseur’s palate grows more sophisticated 
through the active application of perception, “taste becomes more and more obtuse in the one who, 
by passion, is delivered over to the frequent use of strong liquors.” (H 49) As sensation fades 
through repetition, consumption of more of a particular object is required to achieve the same level 
of pleasure that had been achieved on previous occasions. While both the connoisseur and the 
addict derive pleasure from the act of drinking, Ravaisson’s account introduces a qualitative 
distinction between pleasures that is absent in Hadot’s account. The connoisseur actively perceives 
the taste of the wine, is able to distinguish the subtleties of its flavor from other wines, and takes 
pleasure in her activity itself. In contrast, the alcoholic who drinks “by passion” takes passive 
pleasure from the sensation of alcohol. The connoisseur develops a habit just as much as the 
alcoholic, such that passion cannot be understood as the inevitable result of a habitual “mode” of 
experiencing the world but only a likely result of a passive manner of engaging with it.  
In fact, our criticisms of Bergson’s theory of habit from both Ravaisson and Merleau-
Ponty’s perspectives allow us to challenge the notion that pre-philosophical life should be 





active and passive forms of habit are consistent with our reinterpretation of Bergson’s theory of 
habit through Ricoeur’s notion of a “repetitive attitude” in which one engages with the world 
without the full application of bodily and perceptual intelligence under particular circumstances. 
When one engages in pleasures too often, or never changes one’s routines of taking pleasure, or 
even engages in a pleasurable activity when one is fatigued, one becomes more inclined to partake 
of that pleasure in a passive manner that accentuates the kind of gradually growing need for a 
particular pleasure that Hadot describes. This manner of describing the growth of disordered and 
exaggerated desires as the result of gradually diminishing sensation seems more convincing than 
Hadot’s, however, as it is not only consistent with the other observations Ravaisson makes 
concerning the effects of habit on sensation but also because it provides a less totalizing picture of 
everyday life. By viewing passion as a mode of existence like Goethe’s das Gemeine and 
identifying it with pre-philosophical life, Hadot merges the practical and the pleasurable in a way 
that suggests that addiction is a common feature of everyday life and that ignores real qualitative 
differences in ways in which people engage with pleasure. Passion is best seen as not a necessary 
but a contingent condition within human life, such that Hadot’s claim that philosophical practice 
requires a “tearing away from the everyday” through a radical transformation of one’s way of 
being relies on a misdiagnosis of the human condition.351 
This misdiagnosis of everyday life as in itself passionate is significant as it structures 
Hadot’s account of the methods and goals of philosophical practice. Hadot’s manner of drawing 
together ancient and modern thought attempts to provide the ancient conflict between reason and 
the passions with an existential grounding. As a result, overcoming the passions becomes a 
universal problem that all philosophical practice must solve. The existential fact that pleasure and 
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immediate need are the basis of our experience in our everyday, habitual lives is the basis of what 
Hadot calls the “revolution in the concept of knowledge” that he claims is developed in ancient 
philosophy and ultimately defines philosophy as a way of life as a whole.352 This “revolution” 
differentiates between propositional knowledge to which we consciously adhere and the values 
and motivations that guide our lives without our recognizing it, and which form the object of self-
knowledge. This distinction is made evident in the common experience of hypocrisy, in which the 
values we explicitly espouse are at odds with our choices, and Hadot argues that passion is the 
origin of this problem.353 Humanity as a whole lives, Hadot argues, like Alcibiades, who 
consciously concurs with Socrates in discussion that his political ambitions are of lesser value than 
taking care of his soul, but as soon as he leaves Socrates’ company he immediately gives in to his 
desire for praise and honor.354 Even though Alcibiades rationally assents to Socrates’ arguments 
concerning what is truly valuable and why, his true evaluations of things are revealed in his 
dissolute conduct. When habit and passion control our everyday experience of the world our 
conscious commitments are belied by our true concerns, and in this contradiction we become a 
“living problem” in Hadot’s words.355 The values revealed in our actions, which Hadot calls our 
“moral intention,” are crystallizations of our desires and aspirations, which through habit are 
directed towards pleasures and unworthy objects. Moral intention outlines the desiderative and 
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affective aspect of our psychology, motivations for action that are separate from reason and that 
in our everyday, habitual mode of being conflict with it.356  
Philosophical practice thus functions, Hadot argues, by bringing about a total 
transformation of one’s mode of existence from one governed by the passions to one governed by 
reason. Drawing now on Bergson’s differentiation between “superficial” and “profound” selves, 
Hadot argues that philosophy as a way of life should be identified as a whole with the “search for 
a superior state or level of the self.”357 Hadot’s signature concept of “spiritual exercises,” which 
we saw earlier were defined as a therapeutic of the passions, are thus best understood as bringing 
about an existential “leap” between different levels of the self.358 Spiritual exercises fulfill this 
function through a variety of rhetorical, dialectical, and even emotional and imaginative methods 
that integrate rational commitments directly into the desiderative and motivational level of our 
psychological life Hadot calls our moral intention. Spiritual exercises thus supplement the theories 
and arguments Hadot calls “philosophical discourse” by integrating them into the philosopher’s 
conduct. Hadot lists a number of such practices, including dialogue, reading and commenting on 
texts, writing down a master’s sayings, imaginative meditations, meditation on death, and 
communication through hortatory or protreptic discourse. The term “spiritual” emphasizes that 
such exercises work not singly on habits of thought, imagination, affectivity, behavior, and 
emotion but on all of them in turn so as to effect changes throughout “all of the individual’s psyche 
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(psychisme).”359 In doing so, spiritual exercises function by directly transforming the desires, 
evaluations, and even perceptions that form our moral intention in a way that makes them cohere 
with one’s rational commitments. Spiritual exercises change the entire condition of the person who 
practices them to the point where the doctrines and theories of a philosophical way of thinking 
about the world become fully incorporated into one’s ways of thinking and as a result serve as the 
basis of one’s comportment. 
The goal of philosophical practice is thus elimination of the passions as a basis of conduct 
and a transition to a rational mode of selfhood characterized by wisdom, tranquility, and joy. By 
changing our tendencies of motivation and perception, spiritual exercises alter the way we not only 
cognize the world but also encounter and understand it an automatic level. As a result, our manner 
of experiencing things in the world will not be based on their capacity to provide us with pleasure 
and pain but rather on our rational assessment of their objective benefit or harm to us. Spiritual 
exercises thus cure the passions as they cause our desires to conform to a rational measure as 
opposed to becoming the ever-deepening governor of our actions. In doing so, spiritual exercises 
give rise to harmony between reason and desire, thereby effecting a permanent change in our mode 
of existence. Hadot depicts the leap from the habitual to the philosophical mode of existence 
through the figure of the sage, a representation of the philosophical life common to all 
philosophical schools that personifies wisdom as a state of existence. The sage represents someone 
who has fully integrated rational theories into automatic conduct and who has distilled them into 
an attitude that defines their mode of experiencing and engaging with the world.360 The sage’s 
emotional characteristics follow directly from their rational commitments, such that there is no 
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tension between the two. As a result, the sage desires nothing other than what they need and so 
requires merely the joy of existence and contemplation for their happiness. Having controlled 
bodily pleasures, the sage remains unperturbed by events and maintains their composure 
throughout the course of their life. The sage thus achieves perfect tranquility, no longer plagued 
by the anxieties and pains associated with everyday life but instead satisfied by their state of 
existence as a rational individual.  
 Although Hadot attempts to recast the struggle between the reason and the passions in 
existentialist language that eases its dependence upon ancient psychological theories, his diagnosis 
of the passions as a fundamental and universal problem of human existence commits him to a 
dualistic account of human subjectivity and therefore of philosophical practice. For Hadot, the 
rational and passionate “levels” of the human self are inherently at odds: identifying the hypocrisy 
of Alcibiades, and his inability to overcome his base desires in spite of rational direction, as the 
universal condition of humanity in its pre-philosophical state presents a situation in which either 
reason or the passions dominate our psychological life. His identification of habit and passion as 
a “lower” level of selfhood indicates furthermore that he considers philosophical practice a 
reclamation of our true, rational nature from a universal fall into a fundamentally alien and 
inauthentic mode of being. To apply a category from the study of religious ethics, Hadot can be 
understood to possess a “recovery model” or self-cultivation, in which humanity recovers its true, 
rational self from its lostness in the habitual mode of existence.361 Philosophical practice can 
therefore only function as a total transformation of our way of being in and perceiving the world. 
Spiritual exercises engage multiple registers of our psychology in order to actively wrest control 
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of our moral intention from the passions and install reason as the governor of our psychic lives. 
The harmony between reason and moral intention characteristic of the sage is therefore one in 
which reason governs our emotions, desires, and affects. 
 Recognizing that passions are only a possible and ultimately exceptional form our desires 
can take allows us to criticize Hadot’s dualistic approach. Hadot’s understanding of the passions 
relies on what we can now see is a simplistic and one-sided understanding of the effects of habit 
on our affective life that precludes a more nuanced assessment of the relationship between different 
aspects of our psychology and therefore of human potential for rational self-mastery. Our analysis 
of the previous section has shown us that consciousness and the pursuit of rational commitments 
do not function solely in opposition to the habitual layer of the self but rather independently from 
it according to a complex dynamic. Holding a dualistic understanding of human subjectivity thus 
divests Hadot of resources that could be utilized in the pursuit of rational commitments. Hadot’s 
appropriation of Bergson’s theory of habit causes him to view habit as primarily a threat to living 
rationally, as the limitations it places on our perception create a propensity to fall into a passionate 
mode of existence. Habituation thus occupies only a very small place in the philosopher’s 
repertoire of exercises as Hadot articulates it, and only as an afterthought to the cognitive practices 
that form the majority of spiritual techniques.362 Ravaisson’s argument that habit is productive of 
desire, however, claims a more important role for habituation in pursuing rational commitments. 
Since the production of habitual inclinations produces a preference for the acts one undertakes, 
habit itself can be understood as a source of the harmony between reason and desire Hadot seeks. 
Instead of seeing habit as a hindrance to the project of changing our moral intention, the affective 
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means spiritual exercises employ could in fact be complemented by repetition of forms of action 
that follow from one’s rational commitments. Doing so would in fact have the advantage of 
exercising the form of pleasure that follows from activity discussed earlier in this section, 
strengthening one’s attachment to one’s commitments even further. A more appropriate means of 
overcoming the problems of the passions and hypocrisy would therefore seem to entail replacing 
passive habits stemming from a repetitive attitude with active ones rather than attempting to leap 
over the habitual level of the self as a whole.  
 While habituation can in one sense serve as an aid in the project of living in accordance 
with rational commitments, our analysis of habit also suggests the limits of the attempt to make 
reason into a governing principle of one’s actions. While spiritual exercises can make one’s 
automatic conduct and moral intention cohere with one’s rational commitments, it follows from 
the fact that embodied intelligence is primary over conscious intelligence as argued in the previous 
section that one’s conduct will eventually become habitual, not in Hadot’s sense, but in the sense 
that over time bodily spontaneity will gradually become more and more the source of one’s actions. 
As a result, even as one’s habits and rational commitments are merged, the actions associated with 
the expressions of those commitments will be entered into the productive and creative process of 
habituation. One’s actions will not therefore become mindlessly repetitive and ultimately 
passionate as Hadot claims, but they will begin to arise from a source other than conscious reason 
as they are spontaneously applied in different circumstances. At this point we can read Ravaisson 
and Merleau-Ponty’s critiques of rationalist theories of philosophical practice in tandem to reveal 
potential pitfalls of treating reason as the governing principle of one’s actions.  
Recalling Merleau-Ponty’s arguments concerning the constructed and incomplete nature 





terms of their value as defined by a set of philosophical doctrines causes her to miss alternative 
modes of knowledge embedded in her sedimented ways of spontaneously responding to the world. 
Too close an adherence to reason in one’s approach to the world without an appreciation of the 
concrete histories and evaluations embedded within one’s pre-reflective grasp of the world causes 
one to miss details and specificities that can help bring nuance to theory. As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it, the philosopher must possess “inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity,” 
that moment of skepticism that must coincide with rational knowledge in order to prevent 
commitment from becoming dogmatic.363 This skepticism is not the skepticism of Sextus 
Empiricus, for instance, in which specific modes of argumentation are brought against a position 
in order to bring us to a peaceful suspension of judgment. It is rather a skepticism like that of 
Montaigne, an attention to one’s immediate perceptual and affective life that causes one to 
complicate one’s manner of interpreting the situations one encounters and maintain the distance 
from them required to live freely in one’s social world. Attending to the concrete personal and 
social histories embedded within our pre-reflective experience allows commitments to remain 
responsive and thus relevant to the circumstances in which we live, even if that results in change, 
even constant change, in the content of one’s rational commitments. 
Without this openness to the ambiguity of one’s sedimented, pre-reflective experience, 
especially as one’s habitual aptitudes change in the course of the process of habituation, the 
harmony between reason and desire is at risk of becoming a violent domination of oneself. The 
constant change in our aptitudes will complicate the attempt to know the world solely through 
rational objectivity in the manner of the sage. As one encounters new situations, and particularly 
as one engages with one’s social world and acquires new forms of meaning from it, one’s manner 
                                                          





of interpreting the world at a pre-reflective level will change as well. In becoming habituated to 
new ways of acting and the forms of meaning that correlate with them, one’s preferences will 
change as one develops a habitual inclination for one’s new ways of being, such that one’s 
motivations will gradually drift away from one’s acquired rational commitments. Viewing such 
shifts dualistically as simply the reassertion of passion through the influence of habit inclines one 
to take an oppositional stance towards them, as they would give the appearance of deviation or 
backsliding from one’s philosophical training. In doing so, Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty would 
warn that the harmony between reason and desire would degenerate into the kind of domination 
through force Ravaisson sees in the Stoic art of life and Merleau-Ponty sees in contemporary 
Catholicism and Marxism. By treating the passions as irrational and antithetical to the 
philosophical life, they can have no role in the existential state of wisdom. Understanding changes 
in one’s habitual mannerisms, knowledge, and preferences in a similar manner denies them too a 
part in wisdom, such that the only way to maintain rational self-mastery will be through the 
application of what we saw Ravaisson call “force” that “extirpates” them to use Nussbaum’s term, 
practice that eliminates them from one’s psychic life to the extent possible.364 What Ravaisson 
calls “force” Merleau-Ponty calls the “philosophy of the commissar:” I would suggest that both 
are worried about the same basic issue, namely the inability of forms of rational commitment to 
recognize the desires and historical changes associated with the process of habit as legitimate 
components of the philosophical life, such that philosophical practice must attempt to eliminate 
them. As a result, the harmonious character of the sage will be unsustainable in the long run, and 
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philosophical practice will be in danger of becoming a practice of self-discipline that does violence 
to one’s habitual layer of selfhood.  
B. Beyond the Passions: Stasis, Attention to Oneself, and Self-Unfolding 
 
 These criticisms of Hadot’s understanding of the issues animating philosophical practice 
and of its way of resolving them puts us in a position to grasp the uniqueness of philosophical 
practice as Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty articulate it, as well as its advantages over 
Hadot’s. I will argue in this section that the forms of philosophical practice investigated in this 
dissertation can be read in tandem with each other in a way that resolves the problem of the 
passions without taking an oppositional stance towards the embodied and affective aspects of our 
selfhood and thus degenerating into a form of discipline that does violence to oneself. Ravaisson, 
Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s form of philosophical practice accomplishes this by avoiding the 
dualistic picture of the human subject on which Hadot relies. Instead of pitting reason against the 
passions as an opposed mode of existence or a general condition into which the subject falls, our 
understanding of the nature of habit allows us to view the passions as a contingent component of 
a larger problem, that of stasis either in one’s habits through the adoption of a repetitive attitude 
or in one’s conscious ways of thinking. Philosophical practice functions by resolving the problem 
of stasis, and in doing so provides both resources for a therapy of the passions and methods for 
engaging in self-formation that avoids ossification. This form of self-formation, which I define as 
self-unfolding, thus resolves the problems Hadot’s form of philosophical practice sets out to 
achieve, but by allowing the indefinite nature of the habitual subject to be the agent of self-
formation instead of artificially arresting it, it provides the added benefits of achieving bodily and 






Recognizing that the passions are not a fundamental condition of human existence allows 
us to view them in their proper context. The passions, as we have seen, are best understood as a 
symptom of a broader issue, namely the repetitive attitude that we saw in Chapter Two is also the 
origin of tendencies towards rigidity and conformism. In doing so, we are put at a better position 
to clarify the problems philosophical practice can and should solve. One is most likely to “fall” 
into automatism and repetitiveness, we can recall, when the conditions within which one acts 
remain relatively static. When acts under similar circumstances over time, the application of bodily 
intelligence and freedom that gives rise to its adaptation is unnecessary to achieve one’s practical 
ends. As a result, one will engage in the kind of “overtraining” or overapplication of habitual 
actions that allows one to act in a passive manner. This is the context, I would suggest, in which 
the word “routine” in its application to the concept of habits is most appropriate, as it coheres with 
common usage of the term.365 When we engage in unchanging routines, we do not apply the active 
components of bodily intelligence, and as a result we become more inclined to engage with the 
world in a passive manner. As this occurs, our habitual layer of selfhood degenerates from a 
dynamic to a static form of the “logic” of the body Bergson describes that cause the problems 
associated with routinized or “fossilized” habits. This problem of passivity that arises from stasis 
in one’s circumstances is therefore more accurately identified as a condition philosophical practice 
should attempt to resolve than the passions alone, as it underlies the problems not only of the 
passions but also as we saw in Chapter Two of inflexibility, conformism, and also the fixation or 
addiction to particular habits Ravaisson describes.  
As we discussed in Chapter Three and again in the previous section, however, this kind of 
stasis that afflicts the habitual layer of selfhood is not the only pathology that can develop in the 
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habitual body-subject. The irrelevance of one’s conscious commitments and their inability to adapt 
to the actual dynamic state of one’s habits and the practical needs to which they respond is also an 
issue to which the embodied subject is liable. Because the perceptual and embodied knowledge 
resides at a pre-reflective level, its changes will tend to outstrip one’s conscious knowledge without 
the application of the kind of skeptical attention Merleau-Ponty advocates. While what one could 
call stasis in conscious commitment arises from the inevitable gap between conscious and habitual 
layers of selfhood, we have seen that this stasis becomes problematic when one is unwilling or 
unable to adapt one’s conscious knowledge to changing circumstances. The figure of the sage, just 
like Catholic and Marxist philosophers, have let the stasis of their conscious knowledge and values 
become pathological, with the result that their commitments become violent forms of self-
discipline that seek to arrest the change of the habitual subject. As a situation that can give rise to 
such a negative result, I would argue that stasis in conscious commitment should also be 
understood as a condition that merits a practical response.  
  The goal of philosophical practice will therefore be therapeutic insofar as it attempts to 
resolve the problems associated with these two forms of stasis. Conversely, it will also be 
formative in attempting to bring about the dynamism that is attributable to habit in its ordinary 
condition and to help conscious knowledge mirror that dynamism. In examining how the forms of 
philosophical practice Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty develop respond to these issues 
without degenerating into a new form of static knowledge and violent discipline, I would suggest 
that Hadot’s two-fold typology of spiritual exercises will prove helpful. Hadot conceptualizes 
philosophical practice as a double movement that is first directed inward towards oneself from 





rotation that corresponds to the circular motion of the term epistrophē or “conversion.”366 For 
Hadot, philosophical practice begins as a turning back away from the world of everyday concerns 
and modes of perception and towards oneself, a move Hadot refers to as “concentration on oneself” 
in which the self “no longer confuses itself with the objects to which it is attached.”367 Through 
practices of attention to oneself and one’s habits and passions one gains consciousness of them 
and denaturalizes them. In doing so, concentration on oneself detaches us from the values, 
interests, and projects by which we define ourselves and serves as a preparation for self-formation. 
This preparation is followed by “expansion of oneself,” an active process through which we 
become a new kind of person.368 Expansion of oneself entails practices that apply the doctrines, 
arguments, and methods of a philosophical school in one’s everyday life such that they form part 
of one’s character. This process culminates in the philosopher’s formation into a sage, a new kind 
of person whose way of being follows directly from philosophical discourse. 
 Although his definition of each moment of conversion derives from his problematic 
opposition between reason and the passions, taken as a whole the double movement illuminates a 
thread common to Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work, namely that one cannot form 
oneself without first actively and effortfully detaching oneself from one’s current pathological 
tendencies. Even though the forms of stasis just discussed are not inevitable outgrowths of the 
nature of habit as Hadot believes, once they have become established they become difficult to 
overcome. Passive forms of habit, after all, are still subject to the same dynamics Ravaisson 
discusses, such that once they are acquired they too become states in which one tends to persist. 
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Likewise, due to the constant changes habits undergo, it will require continual practice to ensure 
that conscious knowledge appropriates and responds to the subject’s new experiences. Acquiring 
consciousness of one’s habitual tendencies and the awareness of alternative possibilities in a 
manner that weakens one’s old habits and ways of thinking is a necessary prerequisite to forming 
oneself in a certain way, and as a result something approximating Hadot’s return to oneself will be 
a crucial component of philosophical practice that follows from Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty’s work. And indeed, throughout our investigation we have seen that each of their forms of 
philosophical practice entail moments in which practitioners become conscious of themselves and 
thus return to themselves. Seen from this perspective, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of self-
experimentation and a modified version of Bergson’s concept of intuition in particular can be 
interpreted as methods by which existing habits can be brought up to the level of consciousness. 
While we saw Merleau-Ponty sharply criticize the realist tendencies of Bergson’s theory of 
perception that underlies the practice of intuition, some of the efficacy of intuition as a practice 
can be retained if we view it as the outward direction of attention that complements the inward 
focus of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of self-experimentation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s Socratic 
form of self-experimentation seeks to initiate a dialogue between one’s conscious knowledge and 
the immediate reactions, moods, and affects that reveal the content sedimented within one’s habits 
and express them in language through which new ideas can be created, intuition can be understood 
as examining one’s perceptual field in the same manner. By attending to one’s immediate 
perceptual experience, intuition serves as a kind of external dialogue with oneself that attempts to 
uncover one’s perceptual experience of the world and express it in such a way as to contrast one’s 
habitual, pre-conscious knowledge of the world with one’s conscious thought. In both cases, 





experiencing and engaging with the world, incomplete due to the fluid nature of habituation, but 
still enough to recognize it one’s habits or conscious knowledge have become static. 
 The effortful focus one’s emotions and perceptions practiced in self-experimentation and 
intuition suggest that they should be seen as two sides of one practice, which can be not inaptly 
named attention to oneself. Attention to oneself begins to combat the forms of stasis that give rise 
to pathological forms of habit. We have already seen in Chapters Two and Three how dialogue 
with oneself, whether undertaken in the manner of the philosophical skeptic or in the manner of 
an artist such as Turner or Cézanne, allows one to contrast one’s habitual experience with one’s 
conscious knowledge in a way that allows the latter to be altered, and I will not repeat those 
arguments here. I would argue that it also helps to combat the stasis that gives rise to the passions 
among other ills by making one conscious of that very stasis and opening one up to alternative 
possibilities for action. Practicing awareness of one’s reactions, affects, and (particularly in the 
case of the passions) one’s desires and fears will give insight into one’s regular characteristics and 
of the situations in which those regularities are expressed. In doing so, attention to oneself can 
identify the pathological forms one’s habitual way of being takes, along with the unchanging 
circumstances that give rise to them. With this knowledge, one can begin to search for ways of 
improving both one’s habitual tendencies and their contexts. To begin with habits themselves, in 
making oneself conscious of one’s pathological tendencies one can construct coping strategies for 
them. Focusing for the purposes of the present discussion on the issues of exaggerated desires, 
emotions, and fears that are constitutive of the passions, this entails learning to moderate outsized 
emotions, such that they no longer cause pain or distress. In his study of “somaesthetic” practices 
of cultivated attention to one’s body, Richard Shusterman argues that coping mechanisms can be 





responses correlated with them. In recognizing and naming experiences of anxiety as such, for 
instance, one will come to recognize the changes in breathing and muscle tension associated with 
the emotional state of anxiety even at moments when it had previously been unconscious. As a 
result, one will gain the ability to respond to those experiences with practices such as breathing 
regulation or muscle relaxation that moderates them.369 Another example of such mechanisms can 
be found in Hadot’s own discussions of ancient practices of meditation, in which one’s immediate 
reactions to and desires for pleasurable objects are directly opposed by practices of visualization 
that present the desired object in an unpleasant light or by repeating to oneself a pithy statement 
that is designed to weaken one’s attachment to it such as Marcus Aurelius’ statements that social 
and political life are just so much “emptiness, putrefaction, pettiness; little dogs nipping at one 
another; little children who laugh as they fight, and then suddenly burst into tears.”370 Techniques 
such as these serve as defense mechanisms that directly oppose and attempt to weaken the 
pathologies associated with static habits in a way that diminishes their negative effects. 
 While coping strategies defensively oppose existing static and passive habits, practices that 
attempt to uncover hidden opportunities for activity replace them with dynamic, active habits. By 
focusing attention on one’s bodily and perceptual habits and the circumstances with which they 
are correlated, one gains a more explicit sense of one’s concrete possibilities. As noted in Merleau-
Ponty’s discussion of freedom, our habitual world is never fully constituted, and in our everyday 
lives we are not conscious of all of the possibilities that exist in that world. Through attention to 
oneself, however, one can uncover alternative activities and projects to which one can commit 
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oneself in a way that can disrupt the stasis of one’s habits. This process functions in part simply 
through variation of one’s habits. In pursuing previously unknown actions and projects, one 
encounters situations irreducible to one’s existing perceptual and bodily schemata and forces either 
their adaptation or the construction of an entirely new habit through conscious exercise.371 Doing 
so re-engages bodily intelligence and freedom in a way that reinstates an active orientation towards 
the world. This orientation can be in fact both bodily and conscious: even though it would not give 
access to metaphysically real radical creativity in the universe, intuition as externally directed 
attention can instill us with a greater sense of our own powers and abilities to affect our world in 
previously unknown ways and hence give rise to a more limited yet real sense of mastery in 
Bergson’s words over our own actions and possibilities.372 Uncovering new possibilities in this 
manner combats the problem of the passions more specifically by locating alternative sources of 
pleasure that replace ones that have become exaggerated and harmful. Just as Merleau-Ponty’s 
worker through engagement and interaction with others gradually develops a sense of the 
conditions in which he lives and works and his possibilities for improving it, attention to oneself 
uncovers new possibilities for acting from which one could garner enjoyment. Taking enjoyment 
from new forms of action rather than from one’s passive habits serves as an especially strong 
antidote to the passions as in doing so one derives the kind of pleasure and preference associated 
with Ravaisson’s concept of “taste” that grows over time, as opposed to dependence upon the 
diminishing returns of passive pleasures.  
 Returning to Merleau-Ponty’s example of the worker suggests another, more profound way 
in which attention to oneself combats habitual stasis that goes beyond varying one’s existing habits 
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and instead uncovers possibilities one can actively pursue. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of self-
experimentation, while skeptical in its orientation, does not depart from his early conception of 
freedom in that it still blurs the distinctions between the individual and the social, the philosophical 
and the political in its attempt to clarify the ways our interactions with other people, with 
institutions, and with our own acquired manners of thinking. Variation of habits as described in 
the previous section is thus ultimately put into the service of uncovering precisely where our 
habitual world is open to our activity, or in other words of an interpretation of the world that allows 
us to change it, even if only incompletely and provisionally. Variation is already linked with 
commitment for Merleau-Ponty, such that the return to self by its own movement turns itself back 
outwards into the expansion of oneself, the turn of conversion out towards self-formation and 
expression of an alternative way of life. Whereas for Hadot the way of life pursued in the expansion 
of oneself is that of the sage, indistinguishable from universal reason and what is metaphysically 
real, however, for Merleau-Ponty the way of life into which one expands arises from the partial 
and perspectival interpretations of the concrete conditions of one’s life.373 Expansion of the self 
for Merleau-Ponty therefore does not entail any radical “tearing away” from everyday life that 
seeks to view it from an external perspective but a deeper engagement with it that makes explicit 
its tacit and inchoate possibilities. Expansion of oneself refers to “actively being what we are by 
chance,” of pursuing projects through which one gains new potentialities and a new sense of 
identity.374 And due to the intersubjective and historical constitution of the self, these possibilities 
will inevitably be social possibilities that pertain to the needs, responsibilities, and problems of the 
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concrete relationships, communities, and institutions in which one participates. Through 
examining one’s own circumstances and comparing one’s attempts at expression with those of 
others, one attends to the “local histories” that have formed one’s social context in the way it 
appears and attempts with others to construct projects that can change those histories for the better, 
whether through individual or through collective action.375 By pursuing these projects, the 
variation of one’s circumstances becomes full commitment to a new way of life that relates the 
return to and expansion of the self and institutes an active relationship with the world. 
 In particular, we saw that for Merleau-Ponty philosophical practice is a critical practice 
that questions not only whether conscious knowledge conforms to our present state but moreover 
whether particular institutional or social arrangements are conducive to our concrete interests or 
not as we best understand them. Putting this critical interest in contact with the present concern 
regarding stasis in one’s circumstances, we can say that philosophical practice will be particularly 
interested in conditions that cause the body to take on a passive role and prevent it from exercising 
its intelligent agency. One example of this, I would suggest, is the renewed trend towards 
bureaucratization and routinization David Graeber has identified in professional life under 
contemporary capitalism.376 Graeber’s claim that the rhetoric of “autonomy” and “flexibility” in 
the workplace is belied by a greater regularity in the kind of work actually done and the social 
arrangements that shape it, and furthermore tends to be associated with increased precarity in the 
worker’s life, is particularly relevant to our purposes as it points towards a situation in which the 
appearance of creative freedom fails to match the reality of the circumstances in which people 
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operate.377 The subordination of imagination and creativity to bureaucratic rules and conformity 
to ideals stemming from managerial literature can be understood to stifle the inventiveness of 
habitual agency through the enforcement of regimes in which repetitive tasks dominate working 
life. Philosophical practice that became attentive to this phenomenon would attempt to investigate 
the histories that brought it about and locate opportunities to change the situation most effectively. 
In doing so, practice would seek specifically to reverse the enforced stasis and passivity the 
application of such rules and discourse gives rise to and provide greater space for the intelligent 
freedom of the body to express itself. 
 By combining practices of self-examination with ones that actively cultivate new forms of 
habitual engagement, this transition from the return to self to the expansion of oneself balances 
between the primacy of habitual intelligence and the need to maintain suppleness in one’s 
conscious ways of knowing. For while Merleau-Ponty makes a powerful case for the desirability 
of becoming conscious of the contours of one’s habitual and social world, both for finding new 
possibilities of action and for gaining critical distance from one’s static knowledge, both he and 
Ravaisson make equally powerful arguments for why our primary mode of engagement with the 
world is and should be habitual. While conscious interrogation uncovers possible projects, once 
the goals associated with those projects are (relatively) set we have seen throughout this 
dissertation that perceptual and bodily knowledge entails a more immediate form of skill that 
furthermore is an inevitable result of repeating particular forms of action associated with projects. 
As one pursues a particular project, whether that of becoming a teacher or an artist or a proletarian, 
one’s consciously undertaken actions eventually become components of bodily intelligence and 
form one’s preferential and spontaneous orientation towards the world. While for Ravaisson and 
                                                          





Merleau-Ponty this is both a necessary and ultimately a desirable stage in pursuing particular forms 
of commitment, it does raise the issue of the relationship between conscious and habitual 
knowledge once again. The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk when it comes to habitual skills, 
such that the possibility that knowledge of oneself and one’s projects will not only lag behind the 
development of one’s habitual aptitudes but moreover that they too can become ossified. Through 
continued practice, one’s character might develop past the point of recognition as one creates a 
new style or method of acting, a situation that could give rise to the problem of the stasis of 
conscious commitment again. 
 Philosophical practice that recognizes the inevitably indefinite nature of commitment has 
the resources to solve this problem by making Socratic self-examination a permanent component 
of one’s training. Along with continued self-experimentation in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, I would 
also argue that Ravaisson’s practice of aesthetic imitation can also help maintain self-knowledge, 
due to its emphasis on drawing distinctions between oneself and the model. Along with the literary 
and artistic models Ravaisson argues help us understand how to act, we can also see the others 
with whom we interact as potential models. In observing their ways of behaving and pursuing 
shared projects, we gain the ability both to see ourselves and our own conduct in contrast with 
theirs and gain the desire to engage in a like manner to them in a way that inspires invention on 
our own part.378 This contrast with others helps us maintain a sense of our own tendencies, even 
as it impels us to pursue projects and cultivate habits associated with them. The combination of 
self-experimentation and imitation continually produce knowledge of the shifts and regularities of 
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one’s habitual aptitudes. Through these practices, knowledge of oneself and of one’s projects and 
circumstances can become progressive in Bergson’s sense, responsive and open to additions from 
one experiences while not interfering with the expression and development of one’s skills. 
 Philosophical practice undertaken in this manner therefore does not abandon reason, but 
neither does it pit a purely rational self against an irrational embodied and affective self. Instead, 
rationality takes on the role of clarifying one’s habitual world and of establishing coherence 
between the conscious and habitual layers of one’s selfhood. The habituated body-subject remains 
the primary agent in the pursuit of commitments: reason provides the original impetus of 
philosophical practice, uncovering the latent possibilities within one’s habitual world and 
continually clarifying one’s relationship with them, but then allows the habituated body to learn 
how to engage with the world spontaneously in such a way that one’s pre-reflective comportment 
and character becomes continuous with one’s projects. In the perspective that has been opened 
throughout this investigation, it is ultimately not only inevitable but ultimately desirable that bodily 
intelligence and freedom retains its primacy in everyday life. First, allowing the habituated body 
to independently engage with the world confirms the therapeutic efficacy of philosophical practice 
by replacing static habits with dynamic ones. Pursuing a new project abandons the repetitive 
attitude and instead cultivates active habits whose dynamism slowly makes them into the primary 
foundation of one’s character, such that one’s overall mode of engaging with the world gradually 
improves. Second, and related to this, by balancing the independence of habits with continual 
attention to oneself one also prevents the philosophical life from becoming ossified. Abandoning 
the ideals of complete rational self-mastery and self-knowledge of Hadot’s philosophical practice 
allows habitual aptitudes to freely develop and reason to remain continuous with it. One thus 





the possibility of philosophical practice becoming a violent discipline associated with his concept 
of the sage. And finally, in place of the fragile and ultimately untenable joy the sage feels at her 
rational perfection and her illusory freedom from her non-rational self with gradually increasing 
pleasure of acting and concrete and situated freedom within one’s social world as Ravaisson and 
Merleau-Ponty describe them. As they arise from the free development of the embodied subject, 
these benefits of philosophical practice are more sustainable than those Hadot’s form of philosophy 
provides, and rely on a more accurate understanding of the nature of the subject. Philosophical 
practice carried out in a manner that combines Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s 
approaches is thus able to resolve the problem of the passions Hadot’s form of philosophy is 
designed to solve in a more comprehensive manner by reaching to their root cause of stasis and 
ultimately serving as a stronger and more sustainable basis of a general way of life.  
 These benefits accrue to the subject undertaking this form of philosophical practice because 
it responds to the indefinite nature of self-cultivation. Rather than attempting to arrest the 
becoming of the habitual subject and fixing it into a pre-determined form, pursuing social projects 
through the medium of habitual agency allows the process of stylization to continuously deform 
and transform the subject while simultaneously maintaining critical self-awareness of those 
changes. Doing so, to paraphrase Heidegger, lets the being of the habitual body-subject be, such 
that the freedom and pleasure that arise through its active becoming are maintained. As a form of 
self-formation, philosophical practice as it is developed in Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty’s work succeeds in its goals precisely by not attempting to reduce the self that emerges 
through the course of its formation to a unitary set of characteristics such that it becomes an 
individual as Nehamas does, but rather by allowing the character of the philosopher to arise in a 





philosophical practice, the arising of the self that occurs in this form of practice does not occur 
through a radical transformation that uproots one mode of existence in favor of another. Instead, 
it is the continual adaptation of habitual aptitudes and the emergence of actions that are sedimented 
into them that brings about the indefinite change that preserves the freedom and pleasure of the 
subject. To provide a contrast with Hadot’s recovery model of philosophical practice, indefinite 
self-cultivation can thus be referred to as a self-unfolding model of practice. The term “unfolding” 
is appropriate in this context because it is in the very actualization of the aptitudes that constitute 
the habitual layer of selfhood that it is changed in unpredictable and continuous ways. Through 
the application of existing elements of the habitual self something new is formed, just as the 
opening of a folded piece of paper introduces a new set of surfaces that did not exist prior to its 
folding. By allowing the unfolding of the habitual subject to occur, philosophical practice 
preserves the freedom and intelligence inherent to the habituated body that subtends its larger 
social freedom while maintaining the self-awareness and self-knowledge that prevents the 
ossification of one’s way of life. 
3. General Conclusion: Habit and the Art of life 
 
Epicurus warns that “empty is the argument of the philosopher by which no human disease 
is healed; for just as there is no benefit in medicine if it does not drive out bodily diseases, so there 
is no benefit in philosophy if it does not drive out diseases of the soul.”379 Whereas the art of 
medicine cures the illnesses of the body and brings it to a state of health, philosophy when practiced 
rightly is an art of life that cures the illnesses of the soul and brings it to a state of health. This 
analogy, common in antiquity, between the philosopher and the doctor separates them based on 
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the object of their practice: the doctor’s art is set over the body, and the philosopher’s over the 
soul.380 The phenomenon of habit, however, breaks down the neat separation between the soul – 
or for Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty, the mind – and the body. Habit is simultaneously 
bodily and mental, a zone of interplay between conscious knowledge and choice, immediate bodily 
freedom and intelligence, and historical processes of adaptation and change that consciousness 
cannot fully appropriate even in theory. As a result, the maladies of habit, as well as its form of 
health, cannot be strictly separated into categories of “bodily” and “mental” but pertain to the 
embodied subject as a whole. The philosopher’s art of life as Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-
Ponty understand it therefore does not reduce to what Shusterman calls a “one-sided life of the 
mind,” but instead affirms the independence and even the primacy of the habitual body-subject.381 
Not only is indefinite self-cultivation theorized on the basis of an understanding of the dynamics 
of habit as a process, but it also treats the expression of intelligent bodily agency as a good in itself 
and allows the body to play an active role in defining the principles and projects to which the 
subject commits itself. When concerned with the habitual body-subject, the philosopher becomes 
simultaneously doctor of the body and doctor of the soul, and through the practice of indefinite 
self-cultivation achieves the health of both together.  
I do not pretend that the health and sickness of the habitual layer of selfhood includes all 
of the pathologies of everyday life to which philosophical practice can respond and all of the goals 
towards which it can strive.382 I do, however, hope to have demonstrated that the problems 
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associated with passive and repetitive habits and the stasis of conscious knowledge along with the 
benefits of situated freedom and the pleasure of action are genuine concerns that indefinite self-
cultivation confronts and that merit consideration by other potential conceptions of philosophical 
and embodied practice. For at the heart of this dissertation’s investigations of philosophical 
practice has been the claim that habit is the basis of a form of embodied subjectivity that can be 
reduced neither to the status of an effect of acts of consciousness nor to practical reason located 
within the body, even though we have seen throughout that the latter is an important component 
of habit. Over and above these conceptions, we have seen that habit is, to borrow the language of 
contemporary affect theory, an autonomic process that operates by its own laws, specifically the 
principles of desire, fossilization, and sedimentation which I have described as the governing 
dynamics of its historicity.383 As an independent and dynamic layer of our selfhood, habit thus 
possesses its own forms of pathology and ideal functioning that affect other aspects of our selfhood 
as well. Taken as a whole, Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s forms of philosophical 
practice address these issues in particular and thus constitute a genuinely novel form of practice 
that demonstrate not only the necessity but moreover the desirability of including the body in the 
articulation of projects of philosophical self-cultivation. 
Yet these same dynamics also demonstrate why philosophical practice cannot simply 
introduce techniques of bodily formation into its repertoire of exercises. For habit is not simply 
the object of self-cultivation, but rather the subject of its own cultivation. My analysis of theories 
of virtue acquisition in philosophy and religious ethics has demonstrated that embodied practice 
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functions by orienting the processes underlying intelligent habitual agency towards achieving a 
particular goal, such that the body actively learns to comport itself in a particular fashion. The 
body only takes on a new form of practical reason, however, by enacting it in specific contexts 
through the process of invention that introduces subtle changes into one’s aptitudes, which are 
themselves retained through sedimentation. The understanding of habit and its underlying 
dynamics that has developed throughout this dissertation therefore not only provides a deepens 
theories of embodied practice’s understanding of how embodied subjects are formed, but how they 
continue to express themselves in unpredictable ways in everyday life. That self-cultivation 
inevitably produces a new form of subjectivity that exceeds that which has been determined in 
advance also means that one’s conscious self-understanding will always remain behind one’s 
actual bodily state and be able only to approximate it. The self is never fully identical to itself but 
always in a state of becoming, and philosophical practice and embodied practice more generally 
will therefore be forced to continually engage in the kind of experimental self-examination 
Merleau-Ponty (and as I have argued, Bergson as well) describes to prevent conscious self-
knowledge from ossifying in a way that introduces dissatisfaction with oneself and even suspicion 
at one’s development. Reckoning with the inevitability that embodied self-cultivation will become 
indefinite as defined earlier in this chapter forces us to abandon a measure of our conscious self-
mastery, but I hope to have demonstrated that doing so opens us to greater freedom and joy. 
It is no secret that a major thrust of the past half-century of research in philosophy and the 
social and cognitive sciences has been to vindicate the intelligent and free nature of the body 
against its reduction to a passive object carried out by Descartes and his followers. The theories of 
embodied practice with whom I have put Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work in 





tradition of thought on the subject of habit that stretches from contemporary times back to 
Aristotle. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s work does not fundamentally challenge the 
basic Aristotelian picture of habit as hexis, and indeed we have seen that the debates between them 
articulate a set of links – overlooked in the case of Bergson and particularly Ravaisson – in the 
chain that connects this tradition. By grounding their conceptions of embodied subjectivity in 
analyses of the effects of repetition on the capacities of which the subject is formed, however, they 
provide nuance to the association of the body with practical reason. I have focused in this 
dissertation particularly on the notion of skill, as its gradually developing nature and the sense of 
adaptiveness it carries corresponds to the questions Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty ask 
concerning the body’s ability to operate in the absence of conscious deliberation. Yet I hope to 
have shown that the historical dynamics that govern habit force us to recognize the purposiveness 
of the body as a whole as the basis of continual changes in the body that go beyond the limits of 
conscious knowability. The body does not simply carry out our conscious purposes independently 
from consciousness: it actively prefers certain ways of acting over others; it develops tendencies 
that cause us to apply existing modes of behavior increasingly frequently and with greater ease; it 
learns how to adapt itself to new situations and thus changes itself in the process; and sometimes 
it lapses into stasis that introduces a host of problems. Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty 
drastically expand the range of embodied subjectivity beyond its stability and practical abilities to 
grasp it as a subject that is affected by its history and develops independently from consciousness. 
These processes are the condition for the possibility of bodily intelligence and freedom as it is 
understood in the organicist tradition, but they also inflect the embodied subject with dynamics 





With regards to these dynamics, I have argued that Ravaisson and Merleau-Ponty’s theories 
of habit are compatible and ultimately complement each other. Despite his outdated metaphysics, 
Ravaisson’s interpretation of habit as a desire to persist remains valuable because the dynamism 
the concept of tendency introduces is absent in Merleau-Ponty’s account. At the same time, the 
temporal scope of the development defined by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of sedimentation is far 
broader than that of Ravaisson. Together, however, they comprise the ontological foundation of 
everyday bodily intelligence and freedom. Bergson’s process of fossilization appears in this 
context as exceptional, the result of an attitude that is adopted, consciously or unconsciously, due 
to stasis in the conditions with which one interacts. And yet we have seen that it plays an extremely 
important role in accounting for the various pathologies that belong to habit. While desire and 
sedimentation are the basis of the “health” of the embodied subject, fossilization through the 
adoption of a repetitive attitude is the origin of its “sickness,” a machinic and passive orientation 
that is at the root of the symptoms philosophical practice treats. In mediating between the post-
Cartesian mechanistic conceptions of habit and the Aristotelian understanding of habit as hexis in 
this way, Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty enrich the organicist understanding both of the 
ordinary functioning of habit and of the ways it can degenerate. 
The exceptional nature of the pathologies associated with habit finally indicate why the 
philosopher’s art of life goes beyond the individual and extends to the social and even the political. 
Because the repetitive attitude is fundamentally the result of external conditions, philosophical 
practice functions as we have seen as a critical practice that attempts to uncover the specific 
conditions that exercise deleterious effects on the embodied subject and to find ways to alleviate 
those conditions. While the practices associated with attention to oneself and self-unfolding can of 





about particular maladies have a social or institutional origin. If they do, adequately responding to 
those conditions may require action that goes beyond the construction of individual coping 
mechanisms or variation and instead entail collective effort at changing them. Though in Merleau-
Ponty’s case this social and political orientation stems to a certain degree from his early Marxist 
politics, it derives at a more fundamental level from the ways habit itself is a mode of relating to 
the external world. The collapse of first and second nature means that embodied subjects are what 
they repeatedly do, but our discussion of invention and sedimentation demonstrates that precisely 
what we repeatedly do is a product of interaction between the body’s capacities and goals and its 
environments that facilitate or hinder them. The self produced by habits is not only embodied and 
fluid but is furthermore constituted in tandem with a world. Philosophical practice that seeks to 
therapeutically treat or aesthetically perfect the self must therefore go beyond focusing on the 
individual treated as an atomic unit and attend to the world(s) it inhabits and that inhabit it. 
At the outset of this dissertation, I noted Hadot’s claim that philosophical practice stems 
from an “elementary human need.” In spite of the grandiosity of his vision for philosophy as a way 
of life, however, Hadot himself in fact expresses pessimism regarding its potential to serve as 
anything more than a luxury. The cares, worries, and banalities of everyday life will ultimately 
gnaw at the sage’s repose in rational lucidity, the fulness of her practical purpose, and her sense of 
the sacredness of existence. “How can one harmoniously unite daily life with philosophical 
consciousness?”, he demands. “It can only be a fragile conquest, always threatened.”384 If the 
philosophical art of life learns to work with rather than against habit, I would suggest in closing 
that it can provide a more sound basis for the improvement of everyday life. In connecting our 
conscious life with our bodily and our environmental and social lives, habit is the key to the 
                                                          





everyday, the spontaneous engagements with the world of which our pre-reflective and non-
conscious existence is made up. Instead of tearing us away from the everyday, indefinite self-
cultivation plunges us directly into it and allows us to take our bearings even amidst the continuous 
changes of the embodied subject and the world in which it lives. In doing so, it uncovers the 
concrete ways we can improve our world and the ways we relate to it, such that conscious 
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